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ABSTRACT
The Infrastructure of Politics: Participatory Urbanism, Professional Strategies, and the
Production of the Built Environment in Post-Revolution Cairo
by
Claire Panetta
Advisor: Setha Low

This dissertation investigates the sociospatial and sociopolitical impact of the so-called
Arab Spring by focusing on urban transformations in Cairo after the January 25th Revolution. In
the wake of the 2011 uprising, Egypt’s capital witnessed a remarkable fluorescence of research,
activism, and intervention, much of it undertaken by newly empowered “professional elites.”
These non-state actors seized on the post-uprising farāgha–or opening–created by the country’s
ongoing political turmoil to launch a range of urban-focused initiatives that would have once
been impossible to pursue given the government’s labyrinthine bureaucracy and systematic
repression of “civil society.” While some offered sociocultural explorations of historic or
contemporary changes in urban life, others sought to improve the city and the lives of its
residents through “rehabilitation” projects in public space, housing, heritage management, and
infrastructure. Many, however, shared a commitment to fostering cross-class collaboration and
“community participation.”
Through an ethnographic analysis of four such initiatives scattered across central Cairo, I
make a two-fold argument about the sociopolitical implications of this post-uprising activity:
first, I contend that these projects constituted novel forms and spaces of political action, whose
organizers harnessed the reconfiguration of urban space to facilitate new ways of “being in
common” among the city’s residents. In this way, the organizers used their initiatives to
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“imagine and enact radically different futures” in the present (Larner 2014, 204). At the same
time, I argue that these activities were shot through with ambiguities and inconsistencies relating
to the broader political context as well as the actors involved and their interactions with each
other. In short, they were compromised sites of political engagement. Yet instead of concluding
that this pervasive indeterminacy signaled the “failure” of these initiatives as “political acts,” I
suggest that indeterminacy was a resource that various actors used in order to advance their aims
or agendas. I expand on this idea to argue that ambiguity is not simply an inevitable byproduct
of political processes; rather, it is the raw material out of which political action may be formed.
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transliteration system developed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).
When transliterating modern standard Arabic, I have adhered closely to the IJMES requirements
regarding vowels, italicization, and use of diacritics. This means that personal names, place
names, and names of institutions and organizations appear unitalicized and without diacritics–
with the exception of the ʿayn and the hamza, which I have kept. Additionally, I have avoided
Anglicized plurals on transliterated words (e.g., madrassas) and have used the Arabic plural
instead (e.g., madāris). Two exceptions to this approach are noted in the text. For the
transliteration of Egyptian colloquial Arabic, I used an English-Egyptian colloquial dictionary to
generate Arabic text, which I then transliterated according to the IJMES system. My goal has
been to preserve local language structure and pronunciation while also transliterating
consistently across the two dialects.
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INTRODUCTION
Departures, Returns, and Uncertain Beginnings
I landed in Cairo in early October of 2014. Still recovering from a blur of activity in
New York, I refused my friend Nadine’s invitation to stay at her family’s apartment in Shaykh
Zayed, one of Cairo’s numerous satellite cities catering to Egypt’s upper classes. Instead, I
booked a week at a notoriously dilapidated hotel in Zamalek, a centrally located, middle-class
neighborhood on the island of Gezira that has long been popular with foreigners. Though
Nadine protested, I shrugged off her concerns, arguing that Zamalek would make it easier both to
look for an apartment and to meet her for dinner at some of our favorite haunts.
Upon arrival at the hotel, it was immediately apparent that the place would live up to its
reputation. Nothing other than the lobby, itself just a narrow building entrance lined with
sagging leather couches, seemed to have been renovated or repaired since the 1970s: the
corridors were dank and dimly lit, the carpets gave off a pungent, musty odor, and the room
doors were so flimsy that the distribution of keys at the front desk seemed merely a performance
of hotel ritual. But I didn’t care. The moment I stepped inside my room, I dumped my luggage
on the carpet and headed straight for the window. Pulling back the curtains, I wrestled it open
and leaned out to soak in the view of Zamalek’s rooftops. It was late afternoon, and the haze and
the setting sun cast an orange-pink light over the neighborhood that was so deeply familiar it had
the uncanniness of a childhood memory. I took in the dusty beige apartment buildings with their
patchwork of windows and balconies, the trees nestled between them like padding, the
innumerable satellite dishes, the rooftop lodgings erected for the bowābīn (doormen/porters), the
smattering of old villas–one now a private school, its walls draped with Egyptian flags. Looking
around and listening to the tinny honking of cars in the streets below, I felt a wave of relief wash
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over me, dissolving with it a nugget of anxious longing I carried around in New York. It was the
relief of being back, the relief of knowing I could look out a window or step out of a building to
find Cairo there, waiting for me, willing to let me to partake–as I had for 14 years–of its ebb and
flow.
This relief, however soothing, was tempered by a certain wariness regarding my research
prospects–now magnified after a disastrous attempt at preliminary fieldwork in the summer of
2013. On that particular trip, I had returned to the city in mid-June, with plans to investigate the
newly-empowered Muslim Brotherhood and their potential interest in cultivating an “Islamic
city” in the neighborhood of Historic Cairo, a UNESCO World Heritage Site that is home to
hundreds of historically significant buildings. Nadine had greeted me in the airport arrivals hall
with two kisses and a barrage of questions in her flawless English: “What are you doing here?
Why did you come back? Don’t you know what’s happening?” I gave her a quizzical look as
she tried to wrestle the suitcase from my hands: “What are you talking about?” Making our way
to her car, she explained–with remarkable enthusiasm for someone who staunchly disavowed
any interest in politics–that a movement was underway calling for then President Mohamed
Morsi’s removal. Known as Tamarod, (usually translated as “rebellion” or “insurgency”), the
group was organizing a countrywide protest for June 30th, which they hoped would lead to
Morsi’s resignation and thus weaken (or possibly eliminate) the Muslim Brotherhood’s control
over the government. I cringed at both my ignorance and the timeline–a mere two weeks away.
“Well,” I rationalized to myself as we made our way out of the airport to join Cairo’s unrelenting
traffic, “one never really knows what will happen in Egypt. It could end up amounting to
nothing.”
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Image 1. Tamarod Banner in Zamalek: “Egypt is Free Now.” (Credit: author, June 2013.)

My casual speculation proved both right and wrong: on July 3rd, after three days of
massive protests, the Egyptian military staged a coup, removed Morsi, and reclaimed political
power. The situation was immediately deemed volatile and dangerous, and less than 48 hours
later, after much foot-dragging and stalling and insisting that I did not need–let alone, want–to
leave, I was evacuated back to New York. I spent the early morning drive to the airport fighting
back tears and cursing myself for having bought travel insurance, the provider of which had
3

ratted me out to my university’s administration, claiming I was the last of their clients left in
Egypt and was “resisting” evacuation.
In the year that followed, I stewed about the collapse of my research and struggled to regroup. And so it was that I ended up in a shabby hotel room in Zamalek in 2014 with only the
faintest outline of a dissertation project–nothing more, really, than an enduring interest in the
post-uprising fate of Historic Cairo and its architectural legacies. I had, however, seen some
indications during my aborted trip the previous summer of burgeoning conflicts over these
legacies, and I clung to these signs as a potential lifeline for my research. Most notably, there
had been growing anxiety among architects, conservationists, and activists that some of the
district’s historic structures–particularly, Ottoman-era domestic residences–were being illegally
demolished and replaced with towering, cement apartment buildings. For these professionals,
the new buildings represented not simply the loss of the area’s architectural legacies but also the
destruction of its “urban fabric,” which they understood as the deeply embedded relationship
between the built environment, the local residents, and their social and economic activities.
Concern over this threat to the district led Save Cairo, a group of activists and professionals
founded in 2007 and heretofore largely active on Facebook, to organize a protest on June 19th–
less than two weeks before those planned for June 30th. Gathered in front of the municipal
governor’s office in ʿAbdeen, the protestors decried what Nairy Hampikian, a prominent
Egyptian conservationist, described as the “ugliness that was spreading all over Cairo, the city of
1000 minarets” (El-Aref 2013a). They called on the government to “rescue and protect” Historic
Cairo, and they demanded that the authorities respond to the rampant destruction in the area by
freezing construction licenses, removing illegal buildings and additions, and refusing service
provision to existing ones (El-Aref 2013a).
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The Save Cairo protest struck me as significant in part because it suggested the area’s
architectural legacies were emerging as a new site of struggle in the aftermath of the so-called
January 25th Revolution of 2011. However, the event also caught my attention because it had not
occurred in isolation–rather, it had been organized in conjunction with a similar protest in
Alexandria to denounce the recent destruction of the port city’s renowned 19th and early 20th
century villas. The Alexandria demonstration had been spearheaded by Save Alex, another
group of Egyptian activists and professionals concerned with the post-uprising loss of the city’s
architectural legacies.1 The growing visibility of both groups (especially on social media),
reflected a surge of urban-focused activism and activity emerging out of the uprising–and against
the backdrop of ongoing political upheaval–that I had only begun to register when I was forced
to leave so abruptly in 2013.
This activity was still on my mind when I returned to Cairo a year later, and it took only a
few days to realize it extended far beyond either the geographical boundaries of Historic Cairo or
the professional boundaries of “historic preservation.”2 In fact, it was quickly apparent that the
city had become the object of a remarkable fluorescence of post-uprising urban research,
activism, and intervention. During previous extended stays in Egypt, I might have stumbled
across a handful of Cairo-related events over the course of several months; now, however, I was
swamped with Facebook announcements and listserv invitations for a plethora of urban-focused

1

Founded in 2012, Save Alex was focused on raising awareness of the demolition of the Mediterranean
city’s architecturally significant buildings–some 36 of which were torn down between 2009 and 2014
alone (Kingsley 2014a). According to one of the group’s founders, many of these buildings had at one
time been officially registered, meaning that their demolition had proceeded legally via a process of
official de-listing (Personal interview, Ahmed Hassan, July 18, 2016).
2
The term “historic preservation” (sometimes abbreviated to “preservation”) is distinct from both
“conservation” and “restoration,” each of which has its own genealogy and valences. However,
throughout this dissertation, I use them interchangeably to describe spatial interventions intended to care
for and protect Cairo’s architecturally significant buildings.
5

activities scattered across the capital, often in neighborhoods I had previously had little
opportunity to visit; from historic areas such as Shubra, al-Daher, and al-Khalifa to informal
districts such as ʿArd al-Liwaʾ and ʿIzbet Khayrallah. Indeed, over the next 18 months, I spent
countless hours tacking across the city to attend lectures, conferences, and workshops as well as
a staggering array of cultural activities such as walking and biking tours, public art projects and
installations, and film screenings.3
The volume and variety of these events was unprecedented: there were–quite literally–
hundreds of activities and initiatives spanning the fields of art, architecture, urban planning and
development, heritage management, education, and even journalism, virtually all with a shared
focus on Cairo. While some offered sociocultural explorations of historic or contemporary
changes in urban life, others sought to improve the city and the lives of its residents through
“rehabilitation” projects in public space, housing, architectural heritage, and/or infrastructure.
The scope of these initiatives will be discussed in detail in Chapter One, but one critical aspect
needs to be noted here–namely, that many were being established by local Egyptian groups and
individuals. The major cultural and educational institutions that had historically monopolized
these activities, such as the American Research Centre in Egypt (ARCE), the Goethe Institute,
and the British Council, were still important nodes of activity; however, their undertakings were
now complemented by those of a cohort of newly-mobilized Egyptian professionals working in
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For example, over a two-week period in December of 2015, I scrambled to attend a tour of the ʿAttaba
National Theatre organized by Megawra, one of the groups on which I focus in this dissertation; a
seminar on Italian architectural heritage at the Italian Cultural Institute; a walking tour through ʿAbasiyya
organized by the Hungarian Cultural Institute; a conference on Cairo’s museums at the French Cultural
Institute; a talk by Megawra’s founder on the organization’s recent heritage activities; an architectural
lecture on the Mosque of Ibn Tulun at the American Research Centre in Egypt and a separate tour of the
mosque organized by the Biblioteca Alexandrina’s Center For Documentation of Cultural and Natural
Heritage; a lecture on architecture and cinema at Cairo University; and a cultural festival in the City of the
Dead hosted by Archinos, a local architecture firm run by a team of Polish conservationists.
6

related fields. The majority of these “professional elites,” an expression I use to index training
and education as well as socioeconomic status and access to various forms of social and cultural
capital, were well established in their respective fields; however, the post-uprising turmoil
created a set of practical and socioeconomic conditions that enabled them to undertake a variety
of new, urban-focused projects, often in low income neighborhoods or among marginalized
communities, that would have once been impossible to implement given Egypt’s infamous
bureaucracy and heavy-handed government oversight.
This newfound ability to work both on and in the city–and the potential for radical urban
transformation that it seemed to augur–helped bring these Egyptian professionals into focus as
the ethnographic anchor for this dissertation. In response, I extended the reach of my project
beyond the perimeter of Historic Cairo to consider sociospatial activities and interventions in
other neighborhoods as well. Eventually, I narrowed in on the work of four, recently-established
initiatives scattered across central Cairo, each of which is explored in a chapter in this
dissertation: in Chapter Two, I look at Madd Platform, a network of young architects and
planners who produced a “bottom up” redevelopment plan for the Maspero Triangle, a longcontested area in Bulaq; in Chapter Three, I focus on the Cairo Heritage School, a loose
association of Egyptian architects who organize heritage management workshops for young
professionals near Shariʿa al-Muʿizz, the architectural heart of Historic Cairo; in Chapter Four, I
turn to the Cairo Lab for Urban Studies, Training and Environmental Research (known as
CLUSTER), which is an urban development group that works on rehabilitation projects in
Downtown Cairo; and in Chapter Five, I narrow in on Megawra, the lone NGO in the group,
which focuses on “participatory conservation” and heritage management in al-Khalifa, a small,
residential neighborhood “off the beaten path” in Historic Cairo.
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Image 2. Map of Central Cairo. (Credit: Alan Ho/Google Maps.)

In what follows, I make a two-fold argument about these non-state actors and their
sociospatial interventions. First, I contend that these initiatives constituted “political acts” that
harnessed the reconfiguration of urban space in an attempt to “change the very framework that
determines how things work” (Žižek 1999, 199). I ground this part of my argument in the recent
scholarship on “post-politics,” and I present it as a response to Mustafa Dikeç and Erik
Swyngedouw’s (2017) call to “re-center the urban political” by “considering the city as an
immanent site for nurturing political subjectivation, mediating political encounter, staging
interruption and experimentally producing new forms of democratization that prefigure radical
imaginaries of what urban democratic being-in-common might be all about” (Dikeç and Erik
Swyngedouw 2017, 3). With this appeal in mind, I argue that the aforementioned initiatives
sought to cultivate a sense of political belonging to and engagement with the city–what I am
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going to describe as political subjectivity–among those participating in their activities.
Significantly, this subjectivity was not oriented around direct or oppositional engagement with
the government authorities–in fact, most of the groups relied heavily on tactics of
accommodation, compromise, and flexibility vis-à-vis the authorities to help them advance their
agendas. Instead, it was grounded in the idea of a cross-class, urban-based “being-in-common,”
or “commoning” as James Holston has described it: “the development not only of a sense among
people that they are constructing a realm of acting together–call it solidarity–out of their
common activities, but also of a sense that they have contributor rights to the commons thus
created” (Holston 2019, 136). In the context of Cairo, a city defined by socioeconomic
stratification and segregation, and in the face of protracted political instability and a resurgent
authoritarianism, any attempt at such “commoning” was a radical act.
The second part of my argument interweaves scholarship on neoliberalism and urban
citizenship, social movements, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to bend this reading
of these initiatives in new directions. Here, I contend that these sociospatial interventions, qua
“sites of politics,” were shot through with ambiguous, conflicting or inconsistent elements–
counterintuitive collaborations with other actors, plans and projects that stalled or collapsed,
disjunctures between ideology and practice. These indeterminate elements, which stemmed from
the instability of the political context as well as the socioeconomic makeup of the groups
involved in the initiatives and their interactions with each other, inevitably compromised the
activities being pursued, and thus challenged the attempts at “communing” embedded in them.
Yet instead of concluding that this pervasive indeterminacy signaled the “failure” of these
attempts, I suggest it was a resource and a tool that various actors used in order to advance their
aims or agendas. I expand on this idea to propose that ambiguity is not simply an inevitable
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byproduct of political processes; rather, it can be the raw material out of which political action is
formed.
In the next two sections, I lay out my argument and the theoretical coordinates on which
it is based. I then turn to a review my research methodology. As is perhaps already evident from
my earlier narrative of return, my fieldwork was punctuated by uncertainty–largely as a result of
the ongoing political turmoil that erupted after the January 25th Revolution, and which continued
well into 2016. In this section, I reflect on the ways in which the upheaval thus shaped my
research–both topically and methodologically, considering how certain fieldwork conditions led
me to focus on the cohort of professional elites described above. I conclude with a brief
overview of the chapters that follow.

Argument and Theoretical Coordinates
Building an Infrastructure of Politics in/through the City
It was clear from the outset that the Egyptian professionals heading up these new
initiatives were navigating very different social, political, and economic terrain from that of
existing institutions (such as those noted above). Most obviously, they lacked–at least initially–
the financial resources, international support, and local reputation enjoyed by their counterparts.
Their ability to quickly solicit funding and build networks at the local and international level is a
testament to their determination as well as the appeal–among funding agencies–of supporting
“democracy projects” in the wake of the January 25th Revolution. In addition though, many of
these professional elites had been actively involved in the uprising, and they often connected
their current activities to the original aspirations of the protest movement–distilled in the popular
slogan “ʿayesh, ḥurriyya, ʿadāla igtimaʿiyya” (“bread, freedom, social justice”). Their personal
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fidelity to these aims manifested in myriad ways, but it was arguably most evident in two
interrelated commitments: first, the effort to develop sociospatial interventions predicated on
engaging the “local community” around a set of shared urban concerns, and second, the use of
the term “community” to refer not only to residents of the neighborhoods in which they worked
but to Cairenes from different socioeconomic backgrounds living elsewhere in the city as well–
an idea that reflected the dominant narrative of the January 25th Revolution as a moment when
Egypt’s entrenched social stratification was momentarily suspended.

Image 3. January 25th Protest Banner: “Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity.” (Credit: Mohamed Abdel
Ghany/Creative Commons, 2011.)

In fact, for many of these new organizations, “community participation” was the
ideological backbone of their work, translating into a variety of initiatives ranging from
participatory research projects and collaborative design workshops to educational programs for
local youth and street festivals to support the work of local craftsmen. By foregrounding “local
communities,” these groups sought to challenge entrenched patterns of government-led urban
11

development, which have tended to view city-dwellers (particularly those living in low-income
neighborhoods) as problems to be overcome through marginalizing tactics such as eviction
and/or relocation. At the same time, the organizers were working with an expansive view of
what constitutes a “local community:” by developing projects that brought Cairenes from across
the socioeconomic spectrum into the neighborhoods in which they worked, they staged
opportunities for cross-class contact and interaction that have historically been hard to come by
in Egypt. In turn, they hoped to harness these opportunities to cultivate a sense of shared
commitment and belonging to the city, a feeling that participants were “constructing a realm of
acting together…out of their common activities” (Holston 2019, 136).
This effort to reconfigure how residents related to their immediate neighbors, the built
environment, and to each other struck me as having political valences that extended beyond the
attempt to reshape the physical landscape of the city. Indeed, I began to see Cairo not simply as
the setting for political activity but as a tool through which to pursue it–in other words, the
medium through which novel forms of political engagement and subjectivity might be
developed. This sentiment led me to the scholarship looking at the political potential embedded
in the so-called post-political moment. Drawing on this literature, I came to view the work of
these non-state actors as nascent “forms of political practice” struggling to find expression
amidst a return to autocratic governance (Postero and Elinoff 2019).
Contemporary political theorists have framed the “political” as a space or a moment that
emerges when the “given order of things is questioned” and when those who have no voice–and
who are “uncounted and unnamed”–claim the right to speak (Swyngedouw 2009, 607).4
Political activity, as Jacques Rancière describes it, is thus “whatever shifts a body from the place
4

For more theoretical work on politics and the political, see Nancy 1991; Nash 1996; Rancière 1992,
1999; Mouffe 2005.
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assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen,
and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as
discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière 1999, 30, quoted in Swyngedouw 2009,
607). Because the political marks a disturbance to (or disruption of) the status quo, it is
generally characterized as a realm of “contestation and agonistic engagement” (Wilson and
Swyngedouw 2014, 6). Indeed, it is treated as inherently antagonistic–a space or a moment
defined by conflict, contention, and debate (Swyngedouw 2009, 616). As such, the political is
positioned in contradistinction to “politics,” which is understood as fundamentally consensusbased. Politics is dependent upon a warping of the political into “technological forms of
management or organization, which “leads to the effective silencing of genuinely political
questions” (Marchart 2007, 66, quoted in Swyngedouw 2018, 42). In short, because of its very
nature, politics encroaches upon and attempts to “colonize” (and ultimately subdue) the political
(Swyngedouw 2018, 42).
Scholars writing about “post-politics” (sometimes also referred to as “post-democracy”)
have argued that the latter dynamic dominates the current political landscape. The past few
decades have witnessed the “retreat of the political” and the rise of “politics,” which has taken
the form of a “techno-managerial apparatus of governance [in which] fundamental choices are no
longer possible or deemed reasonable” (Swyngedouw 2018, xv-xvi). In this new post-political
world, matters of public concern are “reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and
legitimated through participatory processes in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly
defined in advance” (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014, 6). Politics has effectively snuffed out any
possibility for legitimate political engagement.
Though this paradigm is persuasive–all the more so given recent geopolitical trends,
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some scholars have pushed back against it. Anthropologists and geographers in particular have
challenged claims about the wholesale “disappearance of the political,” arguing that the scale and
extent of this “de-politicization” have been exaggerated (e.g., Holston 2019). Instead, they have
called for an expanded, more flexible understanding of “the political” and of what constitutes
political activity–not only in the aftermath of recent global insurgencies, when the streets, parks,
and squares have been cleared of protestors, but even amidst a resurgence of authoritarianism
(Swyngedouw 2018). For Nancy Postero and Eli Elinoff, a reconceptualization of the domain of
the political entails acknowledging the “instability and non-linearity of [political] processes” as
well as the myriad forms they can take. They argue further that such processes must be
disaggregated from a “sense of inevitable emancipatory possibility” (Postero and Elinoff 2019,
16). As they explain, “emergent politics from Thailand to Bolivia to Brazil did not produce new
emancipated publics but, in fact, gave way to yet more complexity: military dictatorship,
indigenous-conservative alliances, and the return of the extreme Right, respectively. Yet, such
openings and transformations portend new possibilities” (Postero and Elinoff 2019, 16).
Postero and Elinoff also advocate for a broader view of potential “sites of politics,”
which they maintain are not “reducible to spaces of institutional governance” (Postero and
Elinoff 2019, 6). This is a call that Wendy Larner (2014) anticipated in her analysis of an “urban
community organization” in Bristol. Larner contends that the multi-faceted project, which rents
space to social and cultural initiatives, acts as an “‘incubator’ for alternative forms of living and
working” and a “node for experimentation that may give rise to new political possibilities”
(Larner 2014, 198, 203). In particular, she pushes back against the post-political critique that
non-state organizations are implicated in the new political order because they simply bring
together “enlightened technocrats and liberal multiculturalists” who, in turn, “reinforce[e] the
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neoliberal status quo” (Žižek 1998). Instead, she contends there are often “multiple and
heterogeneous actors” coalescing around different post-political initiatives and that it is therefore
reductive to dismiss the work of groups such as Coexist as “always and inevitably coopted”
(Larner 2014, 191).
In a different vein, James Holston has challenged the privileging of dissensus, which
theorists such as Rancière have argued undergird all forms of political action and engagement.
Holston writes that positing “agonism, antagonism, conflict, disagreement, dissensus, hostility,
and jus belli as the fundament of political life to the exclusion of other conditions is…reckless
given the diversity of possible modes for actualizing politics” (Holston 2019, 124). In light of
this critique, he turns to Hannah Arendt’s (1958) contention that the political emerges directly
from “acting together” and her argument that political activity depends on “alliance, solidarity,
trusts, caring, talk–in short, a commoning” (Holston 2019, 125). Put differently, the political,
though it may include conflict, develops from people “making something in common” (Holston
2019, 124).
In the ethnographic chapters of this dissertation, I draw on these recent critiques to argue
that CLUSTER, CHS, Megawra, and Madd Platform were facilitating a form of “acting
together” through which to “imagine and enact radically different futures” in the present (Larner
2014, 204). Through sociospatial initiatives that brought “multiple and heterogeneous actors”
together from across the socioeconomic spectrum to discuss and address a set of urban concerns–
and by framing those concerns as shared–they “prefigured the desired elements of a new social
order” (Holston 2019, 133). Moreover, by replicating these attempts to foster a sense of “being
in common” (both across their initiatives and over time) they were slowly building a new
“framework for determining how things work”–what I describe as an infrastructure of politics.
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Politics on Ambiguous Terrain
This proposition regarding the political valences of the work of these professional elites
is the first part of the story I tell in this dissertation–and, in fact, it is not the crux of the
arguments I make in the ethnographic chapters; rather, I treat it as the foundation for
understanding the initiatives being discussed. Instead, the chapters narrow in on the second part
of the story, which concerns how this endeavor to build an “infrastructure of politics” played out
on the ground: what did the attempt at “political subjectification” look like in the context of postuprising Cairo? Taking up Larner’s description of the urban community initiative in Bristol, I
suggest that the sociospatial initiatives explored in the coming chapters were “incomplete,
paradoxical, and compromised experiment[s]” (Larner 2014, 204). In other words, they were
uneven affairs–both internally and across organizations, riddled with inconsistencies, and
frequently resulting in unfinished interventions or indeterminate outcomes.
I use my ethnographic material to trace the contours of these inconsistencies, focusing on
three factors or conditions that contributed to them: first, the groups and individuals organizing
these initiatives were working in a turbulent political (and socioeconomic) context. In particular,
the government was in an almost permanent state of upheaval during this period: ministries were
founded and then dissolved, government officials appointed and then sacked, projects were
announced and then abandoned, etc.5 The activities being developed and implemented by my
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The fate of two ministries discussed in this dissertation is emblematic of this turmoil: the Ministry of
Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements (MURIS), which played a central role in Madd Platform’s work
in Maspero (discussed in Chapter Two), lasted a mere 14 months: established in July of 2014, it was
dissolved in August of 2015 (Sabry 2015). Similarly, the Ministry of Antiquities (MoA), which is
discussed in the context of the work of both CHS (Chapter Three) and Megawra (Chapter Five) was
formed after breaking away from the Ministry of Culture in 2011; however, in 2019, it was merged with
the Ministry of Tourism to create the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA) (Alaa El-Din 2019).
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interlocutors were thus highly vulnerable to this political volatility. Second, the organizations
(as well as the government authorities with whom they interacted) were themselves in flux. My
interlocutors’ rhetoric and ideological positions frequently shifted or failed to align with the
content of their activities. Such discrepancies (between what the groups said and what they did)
often reflected the necessity of compromising with other actors or institutions or taking a more
pragmatic approach in order to see an initiative brought to light. Yet they were also, at times,
indicative of either the disjuncture between the professional and class backgrounds of the project
organizers and the communities with which they worked or of my interlocutors’ uncertain or
still-evolving agendas. (The fact that they themselves were unsure of what they were doing or
where they were headed.) Finally, the relationships between the project organizers and the
government authorities with whom they interacted were also often unsettled and fraught with
complications. This instability reflected, in part, the authorities’ anxiety about these new
initiatives and their inability to determine whether they represented a threat to their power or an
opportunity for the consolidation of it.
Taken together, these paradoxical or inconsistent elements reveal that the initiatives
discussed here were messy and ambiguous “sites of politics.” And yet none of these elements is
unique to the Egyptian context with which this project contends: a fluid working environment,
fragmented and fluctuating agendas, volatile negotiations among different actors–these are
characteristic components of almost all political projects. What this dissertation attempts to
show is what shape political activity takes in spite of–or perhaps because of–this fundamental
condition. All politics is compromised. How do different actors move forward?
Since the first of the aforementioned three factors–i.e., Egypt’s general state of upheaval–
will be discussed in detail in Chapter One, this section focuses on providing some theoretical
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grounding for the second and third conditions. With regard to my interlocutors’ backgrounds
and the paradoxes embedded in their work, the emphasis on “community participation” is a vital
example in this regard. The interest in engaging the local community was clearly more than
mere tokenism or a symbolic gesture to be inclusive: all of the groups discussed in this
dissertation involved local residents or other community members directly in their initiatives,
often repeatedly or in multiple contexts. Nevertheless, this inclusion was usually uneven and
hierarchical: the “local community” collaborated on activities whose parameters–often both
ideological and material–had already been delineated by the professionals organizing them.6
Thus, for example, “participatory” initiatives to address local heritage sites might earnestly
solicit local residents’ views on the buildings, but the projects were still predicated on the idea
that such sites warranted preservation. Moreover, this kind of participation was not always
incorporated into whatever iteration of a given project was ultimately implemented–i.e.,
community involvement sometimes had little or no influence on the work that was actually done.
In short, local residents were, to an extent, “coopted into projects not their own” and
consequently expected to conform to the aims, ambitions, and guidelines of a given initiative
without any guarantee regarding what their involvement would yield (Kelty 2017, S81).
This dynamic was magnified by the fact that the groups and individuals spearheading
these projects were largely socioeconomic outsiders vis-à-vis the communities in which they had
based themselves. Consequently, they brought a constellation of professional and class-based
dispositions to their interventions. These dispositions, which were often grounded in their
professional training, included specific ideas about how public space should be used and who
should have access to it, what homeownership and land tenure should look like, and how cultural
6

This unevenness has left me reluctant to describe these sociospatial initiatives as “grassroots.” Who or
what constitutes the most basic level of organization in this context?
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and architectural heritage (turāth) should be managed and who should care for it. By applying
these ideas to their work, these professional elites mobilized what Ryan Centner (2013) has
described as “spatial capital.” Writing about class-based conflicts in Istanbul, Rio de Janeiro,
and Buenos Aires, Centner defines spatial capital as a “form of symbolic capital in a field where
material space is at stake” (Centner 2013, 255). It is the power to “take place”–i.e., having the
capacity and resources to reconfigure urban space to fit a particular habitus, which, in the context
of his own research, entailed middle class struggles over what constitutes the “right kind of city,”
a vision of urban life predicated on class-based and self-referential ideals of “livability, morality,
and citizenship” (Centner 2013, 248).
Although Egyptian class relations have their own distinctive logic, this notion of “taking
place” is still relevant, and the aforementioned protest organized by Save Cairo in 2013 is
illustrative in this regard: though attempting to “save” the city, it was still predicated on a set of
assumptions about what it should be “saved” from (and to)–i.e., assumptions about what
buildings have value and how they should be used–that appeared to run counter to the actions of
residents in the very communities they sought to “protect.” As Nick Dines (2016) describes the
heritage professionals and activists challenging the dominant model of “neoliberal urbanism” in
Italy: they position themselves “against insensitive redevelopment projects that are seen to
threaten the physical and social composition of historic urban areas,” and yet they still “seek to
mould the contours of a heritage-conscious population articulated in terms of citizenship,
democracy and identity, which often translates into maxims about appropriate cultural values and
public behaviour” (112). The organizers of the activities with which this dissertation is
concerned likewise projected their own vision of the “right kind of city” onto the Cairo
neighborhoods and residents with which they worked–one that elaborated (either implicitly or
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explicitly) a set of “maxims” regarding appropriate behavior, values, and practices of urban
dwelling and belonging. These maxims were built into the architecture of their work, and the
information generated through “participatory” activities with local residents was invariably
refracted through them.
The aims and agendas of my interlocutors were also often in flux–sometimes in response
to external factors but at other times in response to their own evolving ideologies. In the
narratives that project organizers shared with me about the origins of their various activities, they
frequently described an initial sense of aimlessness or uncertainty about what they were doing
and where it would lead them. As a result, the initiatives themselves were unstable entities–both
internally and over time. In fact, they proved to be quite malleable: projects, agendas, and
alliances shifted and evolved, and their organizers often showed themselves willing to make
compromises–both ideological and practical–in order to bring their initiatives to fruition.
CLUSTER’s explicit efforts to position themselves as “mediators” are illustrative in this regard.
Moreover, if the project organizers and their initiatives were changeable, so too were the
government agencies with which they came into contact. Even amidst continued political
turmoil and a purported post-uprising security vacuum, the latter often exerted considerable
effort to monitor and regulate the activities of these groups. And yet, the government
authorities’ actions and decisions were full of indirection–they often seemed to court these
organizations one minute and cut them down the next. This inconsistency manifested in longterm patterns of indecision and inaction followed by sudden bursts of activity or changes of
course (as illustrated in the chapter on Madd Platform) but was also evident in erratic day-to-day
interactions between state and non-state actors (which I explore in the context of the CHS
workshop in Historic Cairo). Both conditions point to the fact that “the government” is not a
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coherent, integrated whole–neither within nor across the institutions that comprise it; rather, as
Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller claim “government is a congenitally failing operation:” state-led
projects collapse or are subverted or otherwise reconfigured; people, things, or events run wild
and elude control; unexpected outcomes create new problems (Rose and Miller 2010: 288). In
short, the exercise of governmentality rarely pans out as planned–a reality that my interlocutors
were well aware of and with which they grappled on an almost daily basis.
Given the instability of both state and non-state actors, it is perhaps predictable that the
interactions between them were also fluid and unpredictable. Indeed, as I demonstrate in the
ethnographic chapters that follow, the urban-focused organizations that proliferated after the
January 25th Revolution negotiated a range of relationships–some of them quite tumultuous–with
the government officials and agencies (as well as other non-state actors) with whom they
worked. In some contexts, these groups were willing to collaborate with and accommodate the
government authorities. This stance is encapsulated by Megawra’s efforts to build strong
connections with both the Ministry of Antiquities (MoA) and the Cairo governorate in order to
facilitate their work in al-Khalifa. The authorities often reciprocated in kind, even showing an
eagerness to work with these non-state actors–particularly, as we will see, when little (or no)
financial investment was required or when the proposed activities might have otherwise been
considered the government’s responsibility.
In other contexts though, the dynamic proved more volatile, and my interlocutors were
left uncertain not only of the fate of their interventions and the long-term future of their work but
of their ongoing status vis-à-vis different official institutions as well. The trajectory of Madd
Platform’s project in the Maspero Triangle is the example par excellence in this regard: initially
designed as “parallel” (i.e., developed without government involvement or support), the project
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was later adopted by the Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements (MURIS) and
subsequently coopted by other government institutions, with Madd Platform eventually losing
complete control over their work.
These divergent scenarios illustrate what scholars have argued about relations between
non-state groups (sometimes glossed as “civil society”) and state or government institutions
(often over-reified as “the state”)–namely, that they are murky and unstable. Yet, they also point
to the deep entanglement between these actors, which has been addressed in scholarship on the
relationship between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs),
and government agencies under conditions of neoliberal governance and development.7 Now
understood as key political and economic institutions at the local, national, and international
levels, NGOs have often been treated as substitutes for “the state,” which is allegedly “in
retreat.” This withdrawal of government institutions (from the provision of social and welfare
services) is generally attributed to the adoption of neoliberal economic policies, which ostensibly
aim to “create a ‘utopia’ of free markets liberated from all forms of state interference” (Brenner
and Theodore 2002, 352). This narrative of non-state organizations filling in for a retreating
“state” has engendered a tendency to dichotomize actors and to equate NGOs with “the people”
and thus position them in opposition to “the state” (Elyachar 2005, 171; Bernal and Grewal
2014, 6-7). In response, scholars have argued that NGOs and government institutions are, in
fact, deeply interconnected and more accurately treated (along with international organizations)
as part of the same unit of analysis (Elyachar 2005, 170). As Chiara De Cesari has recently
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For reasons that are discussed in the next chapter, very few of the urban-focused initiatives that
proliferated after the January 25th Revolution were formally registered as NGOs. In fact, as already
noted, only Megawra obtained NGO status. The remaining groups operated under other institutional
labels or umbrellas (e.g., consulting or architecture firms, initiatives, laboratories, schools, etc.).
Nevertheless, their varied relationships to the municipal and state authorities, central to the argument
being made here, can be better understood in light of the scholarship on NGOs.
22

written with regard to heritage NGOs in Palestine and Italy, we need to “view [states and NGOs]
as entangled, sharing a shifting and yet-uncharted terrain” (De Cesari 2020, 43).8
These “blurred boundaries” among “the state,” “civil society,” and the “private sector,”
as De Cesari puts it, have also been excavated by scholars writing more generally on so-called
neoliberalism (De Cesari 2020, 43). Here, the emphasis has been on challenging the purported
“retreat of the state” by demonstrating how neoliberal frameworks in fact lead to the
“redeployment” of government structures and the reconfiguration of relations among individuals,
groups, and institutions at all scales–local, national, and transnational (Peck and Theodore 2012,
181; see also, Brenner and Theodore 2002). As Rosemary Coombe has described it in the
context of cultural heritage management, neoliberal forms of governance have not manifested in
the withdrawal of “the state” but in the “devolution of authority to new agencies and coalitions of
agencies, joint partnerships, public–private alliances, and multi-scalar assemblages of NGOs,
international authorities, and transnational agencies” (Coombe 2012, 378).
The resulting configurations–not only in the domain of cultural heritage but across
myriad fields and disciplines–make “state–society dichotomies difficult to maintain” (Coombe
and Weiss 2015, 45). In other words, NGOs and other non-state organizations may “not be as
‘NG’ as they might wish us to believe” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 993): they may launch with a
degree of independence but subsequently be coopted by government agencies to serve the latter’s
own ends. Alternatively, they may be caught up helping state institutions advance official
agendas from the outset. At the same time, non-state organization themselves may actively
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James Ferguson has written similarly that we should think of NGOs and the myriad other groups
associated with so-called civil society “not as ‘below’ the state, but as integral parts of a new,
transnational apparatus of governmentality.…In this optic, it might make sense to think of the new
organizations…not as challengers pressing up against the state from below but as horizontal
contemporaries of the organs of the state” (Ferguson 2004, 392).
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solicit support–financial, practical, or otherwise–from the requisite authorities in order to achieve
their own aims. These blurred boundaries are particularly evident in the context of the CHS
workshop, where the organizers struggled both to negotiate with the Egyptian authorities and to
preserve some autonomy in order to be able to shape the event according to their own aims and
ambitions.

The Political Potential of Indeterminacy
Among scholars writing about post-politics, there is debate about how to bring into being
a set of actions–or “events”–that will ultimately yield genuine political transformation.9 The
disagreement hinges on whether it is possible to engender such transformation from within the
infrastructure of government or if such transformation must come from “outside” this
infrastructure–on the grounds that anything “inside” is inevitably compromised and coopted. I
believe this argument overstates the distinction between the interior and exterior of governmental
apparatus, affording each a solidity it does not have and establishing a clear boundary that does
not, in fact, exist. Scholars, such as those noted above, have already argued that this boundary
(between “the state” and “the non-state”) is porous–and that this porousness is not simply an
exceptional, momentary condition wrought by political upheaval but the status quo. Given this,
the question about where to locate politically transformative “events” strikes me as missing the
mark–there is no “inside” or “outside.” This opens up the possibility that all political activity is
already compromised–or, alternatively, that no political activity is compromised because there is
no realm of “pure” politics from which to start.
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Swyngedouw describes Alain Badiou’s conception of the political as an “emergent property, articulated
through ‘an event’ understood as an immanent interruption in the state of the situation.” This event
inaugurates a “political sequence”–or process of politicization; however, given this process of unfolding,
the initial event can only be identified as “political” retroactively (Swyngedouw 2018, 24).
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To make a corollary point, I want to circle back to Rose and Miller’s characterization of
government as a “congenitally failing operation.” They go on to write that “we do not live in a
governed world so much as a world traversed by the ‘will to govern’, fueled by the constant
registration of ‘failure’, the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant
injunction to do better next time” (Rose and Miller 2010, 289). In line with my previous
comment, I think this proposition–that “discrepancies” are evidence of governmental “failure”–
erroneously presumes the existence of some clearly defined infrastructure of government against
which failure or success can be determined. As I have argued above, “the government” is a far
more nebulous category, lacking the internal consistency implied here.
This leads me to suggest that instead of looking at discrepancies, inconsistencies, and
ambiguities as exceptions or evidence of “failure,” we treat them as always already present–part
of the very fabric of all forms of governance and political activity. The multiple elements of
indeterminacy that characterized the post-uprising urban landscape in Egypt suggest to me a far
more fundamental and pervasive state of ambiguity (both within and across different institutions
and groups) than is often accounted for. Indeed, in the final analysis, none of the actors involved
in the sociospatial activities I explore in the coming chapters had entirely fixed ideological
agendas or rigidly stable positions vis-à-vis other actors. And yet, this unfixedness did not
produce a state of chaos–rather, it was productive, enabling both state and non-state actors to act.
In other words, if we accept the pervasiveness of indeterminacy across the political and
governmental landscape, we can then look at this indeterminacy as potentially productive–
exploitable as a technology of rule but also as a space from which to stage political action. For
my interlocutors, this “action” was largely organized around “communing”–bringing Cairenes
together to engage with each other around a set of urban concerns. Against a backdrop of
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uncertainty, inconsistency, and indeterminacy, that “action” was a constant both over time and
across the different projects with which this dissertation is concerned. It was the kernel at the
base of almost every activity.
What does this suggest about politics in the era of post-politics? Dikeç and Swyngedouw
write that the “challenge is to move from outbursts of indignation to the slow process of
sustained transformative strategies through which a new socio-political spatialization becomes
imagined, practiced, and universalized” (Dikeç and Swyngedouw 2017, 9). In addition to
looking at what happens after the squares have been cleared, perhaps we also need to re-consider
where the emphasis on “sustained” or “durable” political action is placed. Could the continual
planting of that kernel–however unpromising the soil, however fleeting, compromised, or
incomplete the surrounding context might be–eventually yield long-sought political outcomes?

Methods
The research on which this dissertation is based has been through multiple iterations as a
result of Egypt’s political upheaval. Indeed, the methodology, research question, and theoretical
framework all emerged out of the conditions under which I conducted fieldwork. Yet, even as
the focus of my project evolved, Cairo remained the one variable I refused to reconsider though
everything else was in flux. Indeed, I clung stubbornly to the city even when the January 25th
Revolution threw everything into turmoil, even when the June 30th protests swept both my
project and me away, even when I returned in 2014 to find the tenor of the city off, mysteriously
out of tune.
Initially after the 2011 uprising, my abiding interest in Cairo left me worried and curious
about the impact of the post-uprising turmoil on the urban fabric: would there be any resources
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or energy left to address the myriad challenges facing the city amidst the country’s disarray and
dysfunction? What would happen to the city’s crumbling architectural legacies, its ailing
infrastructure and perennially snarled traffic? Perhaps predictably, many of these problems grew
worse, aggravated by a lack of investment coupled with an aggressive government-led effort to
re-assert control over the city and its residents. Yet, the proliferation of urban-focused activity
after 2011 made it clear that other dynamics and actors were shaping the urban landscape as
well–suggesting the city was entering uncharted territory.
On a personal level, this boom of urban-focused activity–the tail end of which I caught
when I returned to begin my fieldwork–felt like a gift. Not only did it present me with a
potential focus for my research, but it was an excuse to spend an endless amount of time out on
the streets, hurrying from neighborhood to neighborhood, which is largely how I spent my 18
months of fieldwork in Cairo. From the fall of 2014 through the summer of 2016, I attended
countless lectures, conferences, and film screenings, and participated in sketching, walking, and
even biking tours (the last a truly novel experience for me). I observed workshops and street
festivals, volunteering at several and attending many others as a participant observer. Turning up
repeatedly at these activities–sometimes as the lone non-Egyptian, I was able to make myself
familiar enough to solicit meetings with potential interlocutors. To that end, I conducted
structured and semi-structured interviews with the founders of CLUSTER, Madd Platform,
Megawra, and the Cairo Heritage School, as well as with other local architects, urban planners,
academics, conservationists and activists involved in various urban-focused projects related to
both Cairo and Alexandria.10
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My fieldwork was conducted in a mix of Arabic and English, which is significant given that language is
often a powerful signifier of socioeconomic background in Egypt, where linguistic choices are made
strategically to index class status (De Koning 2009, 59-66). Thus, although I anticipated conducting
interviews in Arabic, most of my interlocutors steered the conversations into English, which is perhaps
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Ultimately, my decision to focus on these non-state organizations stemmed from a
convergence of practical factors and intellectual curiosity. With regard to the latter, it was clear
that these new groups had capitalized on a moment of fluidity after the uprising to undertake
novel projects and exercise a degree of agency that had previously been inaccessible to them–in
short, both their work and their ability to work were unprecedented. However, by the time I
began my fieldwork, this farāgha, or “opening” as CLUSTER’s co-founder described the post2011 context, was closing: the government authorities were redoubling their efforts to stamp out
protests and other forms of dissent while also shuttering NGOs and other non-state actors. The
dogged persistence of these professional elites in the face of this crackdown suggested there were
political valences to their projects that could be traced back to the January 25th Revolution.
Indeed, I came to suspect that these initiatives might represent one of the few remaining spaces
in which the political and ideological aims of the uprising continued to be pursued.
The decision to focus on these non-state actors dovetailed with certain fieldwork
conditions that left me re-thinking other aspects of my research methodology. Because of the
fragile links these new organizations had forged with both the communities in which they were
based and the government agencies with which they interacted, I worried that pursuing
interviews with either group would prove disruptive to their work. In some instances–especially
with regard to the local authorities, I feared such interviews might even jeopardize the
organizations’ activities. Moreover, I was acutely aware of a subtle guardedness coloring my
day-to-day interactions with Egyptians that contrasted sharply with the experiences I had accrued
over the course of fourteen years spent tacking back and forth between New York and Cairo.

unsurprising, given their educational and class backgrounds. In contrast, the workshops, lectures, and
walking tours that I attended were more variable, and might be held in Arabic, English or a combination
of the two, depending on the organizers, the host institution, and the intended audience.
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When coupled with the fact that research by foreign scholars was unwelcome and being dealt
with aggressively by the authorities, this sudden reserve suggested that attempting to incorporate
these groups into my fieldwork might be unwise or even counterproductive.
In fact, when I arrived back in 2014, it was almost immediately apparent to me that
something had changed in Egypt. Even before I left the airport, I was caught off guard by the
inexplicably brusque attitude of the bank teller who sold me the required entry visa stamp.
Usually a relished moment of re-entry when I could start practicing my rusty Arabic, the
encounter proceeded so perfunctorily and without a single pleasantry exchanged that I was left
wondering if I had inadvertently offended the man. I wrote off the interaction as a fluke, but
several days later I was left scratching my head again during a walk along Shariʿa al-Muʿizz.
Besides the disorienting emptiness of the street and the adjacent Khan al-Khalili, normally
bustling with tourists, and the inexplicably shuttered shops, what struck me most about the walk
was the indifference of the shopkeepers: from one end of the street to the other, no one breathed
a word to me. While I relished the opportunity to linger in front of stores whose employees
would have previously sent me scurrying away with their calls to come inside, I was mystified
by the silence, which radically transformed the space and rendered it virtually unrecognizable. I
went home perplexed, writing in my journal that something was “vaguely off.” I again hoped the
experience would prove an aberration, but in the weeks that followed, the pattern repeated itself
across myriad encounters: what would normally be a friendly exchange was reduced to a terse,
subtly hostile interaction.
By itself, this seemingly pervasive shift in attitude–an odd mix of suspicion and disdain–
would not have deterred me from interviewing residents of Historic Cairo or local government
officials (which was still my intention when I returned to begin fieldwork); however, it was
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coupled with other changes that ultimately left me revisiting my research plans. On the one
hand, it quickly became obvious that I would not be able to move freely around Historic Cairo as
I once had: during my initial visits to the neighborhood I was questioned several times about my
identity and my purpose in being there by seemingly random individuals. Without any kind of
local-level institutional affiliation, I struggled to explain myself, and found that I was suddenly
leery of telling people I was a foreign researcher. On the other, I began to hear of both Egyptian
and non-Egyptian scholars facing similar challenges: archive permits denied, non-Egyptian
academics deported or prevented from entering the country, their Egyptian counterparts
simultaneously banned from leaving.11 Such incidents were admittedly not without precedent–as
Lucie Ryzova (2017) has noted, research conditions for both Egyptian and non-Egyptian
scholars tend to ebb and flow; however, the compounding of conditions struck me as
qualitatively different. Indeed, the government-led crackdown on academic freedom (however
cyclical), was only one element of a far-reaching attempt to stifle any activity that carried even a
whiff of activism or dissent.
The crackdown affected not only my own work, but that of my interlocutors as well.
With their activities increasingly scrutinized and circumscribed, they were understandably
suspicious of the interrogations of an American doctoral student. Yet, their professional and
educational backgrounds also suggested they understood the nature of my research in a way that
put me at ease. As I describe in the ethnographic chapters that follow, many of the individuals
heading up these sociospatial interventions had pursued advanced professional training and
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The most visible incident in this regard, at least on the international stage, was the death of Giulio
Regeni, an Italian PhD student from Cambridge University, which occurred in early 2016–towards the
end of my fieldwork. Regeni was in Egypt to conduct research on informal labor unions, and although
the government has denied involvement in his murder, it is widely presumed that he was picked up by
security forces on January 25th and subsequently detained, tortured, and killed.
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education–often abroad or at one of Egypt’s private universities. Consequently, I felt it easier to
explain my project and frame certain questions, but I also found that I was reasonably confident
they would not misconstrue my aims or intentions. Working with this group of interlocutors
meant I was not left looking over my shoulder, wondering whether an interview would end with
my being reported to some government official working at one of Egypt’s countless ministries.
Conversely, this proximity sometimes created an awkwardness in interviews and
meetings, and it may have prevented the development of a degree of rapport I have often
associated with ethnographic research. Over the course of my fieldwork, I rarely ever felt like an
“insider,” and I certainly never reached that hard-earned moment of sensing I had suddenly been
brought into the fold. It was not uncommon for my interviews to begin with a variation of: “And
what exactly is it that you want?” Some of this standoffishness may have been due to a
heightened awareness of the structural relationship embedded in these interviews. The model of
the Western researcher turning up unannounced–and uninvited–to sponge information off of “the
locals” and then return home to convert that material into critique (as well as social, professional,
and economic capital) was not lost on them, and I sometimes had the impression it engendered a
desire to keep me at arm’s length.
Layered over this dynamic was the fact that many of my interlocutors were public figures
whose activities were well known among certain segments of the Egyptian population. They
gave interviews about their work to media outlets such as Mada Masr, lectured extensively both
domestically (at institutions such as the American University in Cairo and the Goethe Institute)
and abroad (at places such as the American Institute of Architects in New York), and published
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their work in books and academic journals.12 This public visibility inevitably raised questions
about my interviews and how my interlocutors approached these meetings. And indeed, there
were moments when I had a distinct sense of déjà vu, listening to statements and assertions I had
already read in print. Ultimately though, one of the concerns of this dissertation is the public
narrative produced by these non-state actors about their work. How were they framing their
projects to a general audience and what does that framing tell us about the political possibilities
emerging out of the January 25th Revolution? That being said, in analyzing this narrative and
identifying points of disjuncture with the ways in which their activities were implemented, I do
not intend to discredit the public discourse. Instead, I want to read the discourse alongside the
work the organizations undertook in order to show the challenges and opportunities they faced in
translating their aims and aspirations into concrete interventions in space.

Chapter Overview
This dissertation uses an ethnographic investigation of sociospatial changes in postuprising Cairo as a way both to think more expansively about what constitutes “politics” and to
reconsider the role of ambiguity and indeterminacy in shaping political activity. These two
theoretical strands are woven into the dissertation’s ethnographic chapters, each of which charts
the trajectory of one of the four initiatives noted above. I explore the contours of these projects–
how they formed, where they worked, who led them, and what they sought to do–in order to
argue that they constituted “sites of politics” born of the January 25th Revolution. Yet I also
maintain that they were compromised affairs, infused with ambiguity and inconsistency, which
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Mada Masr is an online Egyptian newspaper founded in 2013. As one of Egypt’s few independent
media outlets, it has been censored by the government authorities since 2017 as part of a sustained
attempt to stifle press freedom (Chick 2017).
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sometimes related to the context in which they developed but at other times reflected the
uncertain agendas or shifting relationships among the groups and individuals involved. I index
these ambiguous elements throughout the four chapters and then return to them in the
conclusion.
In order to read these initiatives as both spaces and forms of political action, it is
necessary to contextualize the sociopolitical environment in which they unfolded. Thus, in
Chapter One, I provide an overview of both the “Arab Spring” and the January 25th Revolution,
highlighting the ambitions of the protest movements that swept across the region as well as their
immediate “outcomes,” particularly the Egyptian government’s efforts to re-assert control over
the country and to stamp out any vestiges of popular dissent. Additionally, this chapter provides
a fuller discussion of the aforementioned boom in post-uprising, urban-focused activity in Cairo.
Here, I sketch the space created for these interventions after the January 25th Revolution as well
as the shape these various projects took; however, I also note their deeper roots in pockets of
urban activism and “community”-oriented urban planning that predated the upheaval. This
chapter thus has two aims: first, to set up the ideological and practical links among these
elements–i.e., the 2011 uprising, earlier forms of urban-focused, non-state activity in Cairo, and
the sociospatial initiatives discussed in this dissertation; and second, to detail the fluid–and
rapidly evolving–context in which the organizers of these projects were working, one that both
created new opportunities and presented significant obstacles.
The ethnographic chapters that follow reveal a shared commitment–across these
initiatives–to “community participation” and cross-class contact and collaboration, which lies at
the heart of my claim about their political valences. However, this commitment was not always
easy to realize in practice, and these four chapters thus track the challenges my interlocutors
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faced in the course of their work. In this regard, they can be loosely organized into two sections.
The first two chapters, which look at the activities of Madd Platform in the Maspero Triangle
and the Cairo Heritage School in Historic Cairo, illustrate the vulnerability and instability of
these initiatives in the face of the government’s efforts to shore up its own authority. While
Madd Platform’s work was completely co-opted by the Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal
Settlements (MURIS), the Cairo Heritage School struggled to maintain some autonomy in the
face of heavy-handed regulation by the Ministry of Antiquities (MoA).
In the next two chapters, I focus on CLUSTER’s projects in Downtown Cairo and
Megawra’s interventions in al-Khalifa in order to unpack some of the tactics deployed by these
organizations to manage that vulnerability. Here I emphasize how both groups positioned
themselves as “mediators” between the “local community” and government agencies or other
influential non-state actors with whom they interacted. Through explicit attempts at
collaboration and accommodation, these two organizations managed to persevere with their work
in the face of increasing government scrutiny and regulation. This approach proved remarkably
successful–particularly for Megawra, who had cultivated a highly productive working
relationship with both the MoA and the Cairo governorate by the time of my fieldwork.
The conclusion to this dissertation revisits the argument laid out in this introduction and
re-threads it with ethnographic details from the chapters that follow. In particular, I synthesize
some of the unsettled elements of these initiatives to suggest that shifting relationships, evolving
agendas, and indeterminate outcomes often served as resources to be harnessed. In short,
ambiguity was not a marker of “failure” (political or otherwise) but rather a tool that state and
non-state actors used as they struggled to move forward.
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CHAPTER ONE: NEW ACTORS IN FAMILIAR SPACES: CONTEXTUALIZING THE
SOCIOSPATIAL IMPACT OF THE JANUARY 25TH REVOLUTION
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the political, social, and economic context shaping
the work of the organizations that are the focus of this dissertation. My aim is to highlight the
groups’ ideological and practical links to the political upheaval–and specifically, the January 25th
Revolution–while also showing their connection to earlier forms of urban-focused activism and
activity in Cairo. I begin with an overview of the events that swept through the greater Middle
East from late 2010 through early 2011, noting the aims and aspirations of the so-called Arab
Spring as well as the speed with which the uprisings spread from Tunisia to the rest of the
region.13 In particular, I emphasize their uneven outcomes and perceived inability to bring about
“transitions to democracy,” which form the basis of the widespread claim that the Arab Spring
has been a political failure. I then narrow in on the January 25th Revolution in Egypt, sketching
the events that defined the demonstrations as well as the activism and organizing in the decade
prior that shaped them.
In the second half of the chapter, I turn my attention to the sociospatial impact of the
January 25th Revolution on Cairo. Here, I show how the uprising and its aftermath reconfigured
the city and the lives of its residents, creating spaces not only for continued protest but for a
range of new urban-focused initiatives as well. I also look at the precursors to these new
activities, again demonstrating that they were informed by a variety of antecedents–in this case, a
legacy of “community-oriented” urban planning projects as well as more recent incidents of

13

In popular media and scholarly writings, several expressions have been used to describe the political
upheaval that convulsed the Middle East from 2011-2012: the Arab Spring (and later, the Arab Winter),
the Arab Uprisings, the Arab Revolts, and the Arab Revolutions. Commentators have debated each
term’s significance and its applicability (or lack thereof) to the regional turmoil–in particular, the phrase
“Arab Spring” has been critiqued as a misnomer (e.g., Rooksby 2011; Massad 2012; Gelvin 2015, 37-38).
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urban activism to protest government policies and interventions. In outlining the city’s post2011 sociospatial transformation, as well as the origins of that transformation, I set up a
framework for understanding the work of the groups discussed in the ethnographic chapters that
follow.

Overview of the Arab Uprisings
On December 17th, 2010, a young street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi stood outside
the governor’s office in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, doused his body with paint thinner, and
set himself on fire. His self-immolation was a spontaneous act of desperate protest against the
local administration and the police–the latter had confiscated his scales as well as the produce he
had planned to sell that day, claiming he lacked a vending permit (Fahim 2011). As news of the
incident spread throughout Tunisia, thousands of citizens took to the streets to demonstrate,
giving voice to a range of social, political, and economic grievances encapsulated in the grim
circumstances of Bouazizi’s life: limited education and job opportunities, crippling poverty, and
chronic police harassment (Jebnoun 2012, 59). Although President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali
responded with promises of “jobs, reforms, and free elections,” the protests continued to spread,
and on January 14th, ten days after Bouazizi had died in hospital, massive demonstrations forced
Ben Ali to step down, ending his 23-year presidency (Kirkpatrick 2011).
The political upheaval unleashed by the so-called Tunisian Revolution (sometimes
referred to as the Jasmine Revolution) quickly proliferated across the region: in neighboring
Algeria, protests over housing broke out in the capital at the end of December and rapidly
evolved into calls for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who had ruled the country since 1999, to
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resign (Nossiter and Williams 2011).14 By late January, mass protest movements had developed
in Egypt, Yemen, Oman, Syria, Sudan, and Jordan, and, within several weeks, the unrest had
spread further to reach Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, and Lebanon. Despite the
diverse social, political, and economic conditions in these countries, the protestors articulated a
fairly consistent set of demands: an end to autocratic rule as well as political and economic
reform to address chronic issues of government corruption, rampant unemployment, stagnant
wages, and police brutality.
Governmental responses and reactions were varied, but initially, it appeared that the
existing regional political order would give way to a new one: leaders were toppled not only in
Tunisia and Egypt, but in Libya, where Muammar al-Qaddafi was captured and killed by
opposition forces in October 2011, and in Yemen, where President Ali Abdullah Saleh ceded
power in February 2012.15 Elsewhere, rulers made political and economic concessions in
response to the protests: in Morocco and Jordan, constitutional reforms were implemented; in
Algeria, the government voted to repeal the country’s 20-year old emergency law; and in
Bahrain, the monarch removed a number of cabinet ministers (Al Jazeera 2011; Richter 2011;
Lynch 2016).16
Yet even as governments promised systemic change, there was evidence to suggest the
protestors’ demands would not be realized. In fact, across the region, dissent was being
aggressively stamped out: squares were cleared (and sometimes, as in the case of Bahrain,
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On April 2nd, 2019, after weeks of renewed demonstrations, Bouteflika finally stepped down (Nossiter
2019).
15
Although Saleh left office, he was implicated in the internal conflict that subsequently developed
between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels. Allied with the latter, he was directly involved in
their takeover of the capital of Sanaa in 2015, which led to President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s
resignation (El-Naggar 2015).
16
For a concise summary of regional events at this time, see Hudson 2012, 21-24.
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razed), protestors were arrested and detained, and thousands of citizens were killed in clashes
with security forces.17 Within months, the demonstrations in Syria had disintegrated into a fullscale civil war that–as of the time of writing–is still ravaging the country. In Libya and Yemen,
the mangled transitions that followed the removals of Qaddafi and Saleh led to the collapse of
the governments and internal conflict that quickly devolved into civil war. Elsewhere, such as in
Bahrain, autocratic regimes were being restored or reinforced (Lynch 2016).
As the region witnessed a resurgence of authoritarianism, the momentum generated by
the Arab uprisings dissipated, and with it, the widespread hope that the Middle East’s political
foundations would be reconstructed from the ground up. Barely two years after the protests
erupted, the geopolitical landscape seemed more repressive and more autocratic. The “old
order,” what Asef Bayat describes as the “incumbent elites and their networks of patronage,” and
the key institutions of governance such as the judiciary, police, intelligence apparatus, and the
military appeared to have survived the uprisings more or less intact (Bayat 2017, 11). In short,
with the possible exception of Tunisia, it appeared the Arab Spring had been unable to deliver
“democracy” to the region (Lynch 2016). Consequently, among mainstream and media
commentators, the regional protest movements were scripted as a political “failure” (e.g.,
Alfadhel 2016; Lynch 2016; Roberts 2016).
However, scholars have challenged this conclusion and the explanatory framework of
“authoritarian durability.” Some have maintained that we are still at the beginning of a long
process of political change, and it is therefore too soon to know what the consequences of the
uprising will be (e.g., Bellin 2012; Cavatorta 2015; Beinin 2016; Lynch 2016). Others have
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In Bahrain, Pearl Roundabout, the center of protest activities in Manama, was razed and then
reconstructed by the government in an attempt to both inhibit further protests and manage the symbolic
potential of the space (Ollamh and Lanthier 2016, 150-151).
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argued that the outcomes of the political upheaval have been too varied (both within countries
and across the region) to suggest a simple return to the status quo. In this vein, Laryssa Chomiak
(2016), writing about Tunisia, contended that “analysts’ extensive focus on political
achievements indicative of liberal democratic consolidation, or the linking of devastating events
to a ‘reversal of democracy,’ have…painted a limited and minimalist picture of where Tunisia
stands today.” Still other scholars have pushed back against the very idea that the uprisings
failed. In the context of Egypt, Paul Amar proposed that, while the country did not experience a
“social revolution” (defined as the overthrow or radical equalization of social hierarchies), it did
undergo a “revolution in consciousness,” understood as the distribution of new forms of
“knowledge and awareness” (Amar 2013, 38). Though it is unclear how widespread this
“revolution in consciousness” has been, Amar offers an important insight that underpins this
dissertation–namely, that the January 25th Revolution has had unexpected sociopolitical
consequences outside the realm of formal or institutionalized politics.

The January 25th Revolution in Egypt
The Egyptian protests did not start until after Ben Ali had resigned in Tunisia; however,
the demonstrations that began on January 25th, a national holiday intended to commemorate the
Egyptian police, were not simply a spontaneous response to the Tunisian upheaval. On the
contrary, various forms of “contentious action” in the years prior–some of it focused explicitly
on urban concerns–laid the foundation for the mass mobilization of Egyptians in early 2011
(Fahmi 2009; El-Ghobashy 2011; Abdelrahman 2015; Beinin 2016). For Maha Abdelrahman
(2015), these earlier activities intensified and diversified as a result of protests responding to the
outbreak of the second Palestinian intifāda in 2000, when Egyptians took to the streets to
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challenge the government’s international policies. Building on the momentum generated by
these demonstrations, pro-democracy activists, labor organizers, and “marginalized citizens”
began using an array of tactics to contest the government’s domestic policies–especially its
embrace of “neoliberal development” and consequent privatization of public-sector institutions
coupled with its retreat from the provision of social services (Abdelrahman 2015, 4-5). The
demands articulated in these strikes, marches, occupations, and other actions were rarely met.
However, Abdelrahman contends that these actors, even if largely disaggregated, contributed to
the “long revolutionary process” leading up to 2011 by facilitating the formation of antigovernment networks, increasing public awareness of socioeconomic and political grievances,
and “normalizing” protest such that it became an unquestioned part of everyday life
(Abdelrahman 2015, 69). In short, these efforts helped to create a “culture of protest” that was
critical to the organization of the January 25th demonstrations (Beinin 2016, 7).
Central to these pre-2011 activities were a series of industrial labor strikes in the mid2000s, often overlooked in the mainstream narrative of the January 25th protests, which has
generally scripted the uprising as a “peaceful protest led by middle-class, technology-savvy,
urban youth demanding greater political freedom” (Abdelrahman 2015, 5).18 In particular,
scholars have foregrounded the strikes organized by workers at Misr Spinning and Weaving
Company in the Delta city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra between 2006 and 2008, the first of which was
largely successful in forcing the government to fulfill the strikers’ demands. This success in turn
inspired subsequent strikes both in al-Mahalla al-Kubra and across the industrial sector, thereby
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This critique of the mainstream narrative of the uprising is echoed by Salwa Ismail, albeit in a very
different context. Writing about urban space and Cairo’s “popular quarters,” she contends that the
“middle-class characterization and the Tahrir-centred narrative are part of an account that glosses over, or
denies altogether, the place of popular quarters and the role of urban popular forces in the protests and in
the Revolution more generally” (Ismail 2014, 269).
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helping to build an infrastructure of mobilization that was critical to the January 25th protests
(Beinin 2013, 192-193; Abdelrahman 2015, 56-58; Beinin 2016, 75-79).
A significant outgrowth of the Mahalla al-Kubra strikes was the April 6th Youth
Movement (Harakat Shabab 6 Abril) one of the main youth groups involved in the Egyptian
uprising.19 Founded in 2008 to support the textile workers, the group made extensive use of
social media to both organize protests and disseminate their demands for political reform.20
They had already spearheaded a “Day of Mourning” in 2010 to denounce police brutality on
January 25th, and they were planning a similar event for 2011 when the Tunisian demonstrations
began (Lim 2012, 242). The success of the Tunisian uprising encouraged activists and
organizers to shift their attention away from the police and to focus instead on the presidency.
As Ahmed Maher, one of the founders of the movement commented at the time: “After the
revolution in Tunisia, we are able to market the idea of change in Egypt. People now want to
seize something’’ (Maher, quoted in Fleishman 2011). The group thus began to reframe the
protests around a call to end Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule.
With this new focus, the group joined forces with the Egyptian Movement for Change,
known colloquially as Kefaya (Enough), an opposition coalition founded in 2004, the National
Association for Change, a political reform initiative established in 2010, and Kulina Khaled Said
(We Are All Khaled Said), another influential Facebook group that had been created to
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The movement’s name is derived from the date of protest planned by the workers in al-Mahalla alKubra in 2008.
20
The use of social media and the Internet as tools to express dissent and organize protests predates even
the founding of the April 6th Youth Movement: the opposition group Kefaya is credited as one of the
earliest groups to make use of blogs when they gained online traction in Egypt in 2005 (Fahmi 2009; Lim
2012, 237). In turn, the April 6th Youth Movement made use of Facebook as early as 2008 and then
capitalized on the launch of its Arabic language service in 2009 to reach a broader public (Shapiro 2009;
Tufecki and Wilson 2012, 366)
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commemorate the death of a young man killed by local police in Alexandria in June 2010.21 The
latter’s founder, Wael Ghoneim, had used the social media site to call for demonstrations in
Cairo and Alexandria in the immediate aftermath of Said’s death, and the success of those
protests, coupled with the broad popularity of the page itself, rendered the latter a critical
platform for publicizing the 2011 demonstrations (Alaimo 2015, 5). Together, these groups
launched a massive mobilization campaign, using social media, cell phone text messages, and
flyers to galvanize Egyptians and bring them down to the streets on January 25th (Lim 2012).
Merlyna Lim (2012) notes that “informal networks” were also critical to “spreading the word,”
with coffee shops, mosques, football (i.e., soccer) fields, and taxi cabs serving as “network
nodes” through which the protests were publicized (243).
Although there was evidence of far-reaching support for the protests–particularly online–
the sheer number of Egyptians who turned up on that day took the organizers–as well as the
government and security forces–by surprise: tens of thousands of citizens took to the streets and
squares of the country’s urban centers, including Alexandria, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Beni Suef,
and al-Suez (Fahim and El-Naggar 2011). They gave angry voice to an array of long-simmering
grievances such as political corruption, the long-standing emergency law, economic hardship and
rampant unemployment, but they coalesced around a single, clearly articulated demand: an
immediate end to Mubarak’s presidency. With this call for resignation, the protests quickly
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Though the exact circumstances surrounding Said’s encounter with the police are disputed, it is known
that two officers ultimately beat him to death outside an Internet café on June 6th, 2010. Widely
circulated images of his disfigured face, taken by family members at the morgue, sparked public outrage
among Egyptians, for whom his death was emblematic of police brutality and the impunity with which
security forces routinely terrorized civilians (Ismail 2012). As Abdelrahman (2017) writes, Said’s case
was “strongly intertwined with that of the lives and grievances of millions struggling under Mubarak’s
neoliberal order: a story of police brutality, humiliating daily encounters with state authorities, constant
harassment in public spaces and the total absence of a reliable structure to frame the relationship between
citizens and an increasingly erratic state” (190). Unsurprisingly, his death is often cited as key to
galvanizing support for the January 25th protests (Preston 2011).
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spread beyond Egypt’s major cities, and in the days that followed, they brought the entire
country to a standstill.
As was widely celebrated in the media and scholarly accounts, the protestors came from
all walks of life and reflected a broad cross-section of Egyptian society–a spectrum of ages,
genders, classes, and religious and political affiliations. The demonstrations thus seemed to both
reflect and transcend the socioeconomic divisions that underpinned many of the protestors’
grievances. Nowhere has this dynamic been more scrupulously documented than in the case of
Midan al-Tahrir, the physical and symbolic epicenter of the uprising. Occupied continuously
almost from the outset of the demonstrations, the square evolved into much more than simply a
site of protest: it became a microcosm of the society the protestors hoped to realize. In this
regard, Farha Ghannam (2016) has argued that Tahrir became a “heterotopic space” during the
uprising–one that embodied a “counter arrangement,” which stood in explicit opposition to the
widespread political and economic corruption and social injustice the protestors sought to
challenge. To that end, the square became a place where people “self- organized” to eat, sleep,
pray, socialize, and even marry, and where they provided for each other with a range of services
established to facilitate the occupation–food stalls, childcare, a makeshift hospital and pharmacy,
and even basic sanitation infrastructure (Abourahme and Jayyusi 2011, 627; Ghannam 2016).
Most significantly though, at least in terms of Tahrir’s symbolic legacy, it was a place to both
experience and invoke communitas, that “intense feeling of community, social equality,
solidarity, and togetherness [that] is experienced by people living together at a site where normal
social statuses and positions have broken down” (Peterson 2015, 171). The different
socioeconomic, religious, and political backgrounds of the protestors–neatly encapsulated in
images of Muslims protecting Christians during prayer and vice-versa–were routinely referred to
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in media and popular discourses about the uprising as evidence of a newly-recovered social
cohesiveness
From the outset, the Egyptian authorities struggled to contain the gatherings and slow the
momentum of the demonstrations. The state security forces out on the streets resorted almost
immediately to tear gas, rubber bullets, concussion grenades, and other repressive tactics, which
led to violent and often deadly clashes that quickly enflamed the protests (Fahim and El-Naggar
2011). Recognizing the volatility of the situation, the government deployed the military on
January 28th–dubbed the “Friday of Anger” (Gomʿat al-Ghadab) by protestors–while
simultaneously initiating a complete shutdown of the Internet and the mobile phone networks in
hopes of crippling protestors’ ability to communicate and organize. At the same time, Mubarak
made several concessions to the protestors: among other moves, he appointed a vice president,
dissolved parliament, and promised not to seek re-election later in the year; however, none of
these tactics was successful in quelling the protests (Richtel 2011). In fact, Mubarak antagonized
the demonstrators when he announced, eight days into the protests, his refusal to resign.
Likewise, the deployment of the military also backfired, with the army strengthening its
popularity with Egyptians and burnishing its popular image as the “protector of the nation” by
maintaining a façade of restraint and refusing (at least publicly) to attack civilians (Bumiller
2011; Shane and Kirkpatrick 2011). Similarly, the blackout of the Internet and phone networks,
which lasted until February 2nd, inadvertently increased the number of protestors, as many
Egyptians felt a new compulsion to get down to the streets, so to speak, once they were no longer
able to follow the demonstrations virtually (Hassanpour 2014).22 Consequently, in the days that

22

While the Internet played a vital role in the Egyptian uprising (Woods 2011; Tufecki and Wilson 2012),
the outcome of the government’s network-wide shutdown is arguably a testament to the fact that the
“virtual” cannot replace “physical.” As Mohamed ElShahed (2011a) notes: “Commentators in the West
have been quick to credit online social networking with empowering the protests. But the
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followed, new protestors flooded Egypt’s streets and squares, where they loudly insisted that
“the people want the fall of the regime” (“al-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-nizām”). With the protests
growing in both scale and scope–and the government facing international pressure to respond,
Mubarak announced on February 11th that he would step down.23

Image 4. Celebrations in Midan al-Tahrir on February 11th. (Credit: Jonathan Rashad/Creative
Commons, 2011.)

After his resignation, a group of senior military officers known as the Supreme Council
of Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power, declaring it would lead Egypt through a transitional
phase that would culminate with presidential elections in 2012. This period of SCAF rule was

revolution…has provided powerful evidence that the virtual is not enough: in the course of several
historic days in Tahrir Square it became decisively clear that the occupation of physical urban space was,
and continues to be, crucial to the success and continuity of the revolution.”
23
A report commissioned by Mohamed Morsi during his presidency concluded that 846 Egyptians were
killed during the uprising. The vast majority of these deaths were attributed to the actions of the police,
who used live ammunition and often fired directly at the protestors (Kingsley and Doss 2013). Of those
846 deaths, only 232 appear to have occurred in Cairo while the rest occurred in other towns and cities
across the country (Ersoy 2015, 117).
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marked by ongoing turmoil within the government, on the streets, and in daily life. With regard
to the latter, food and oil prices surged, crime rates increased, and long-simmering domestic
conflicts–particularly in the restive Sinai–led to a string of bombings across the country. At the
governmental level, multiple parliaments were dissolved and then re-instated, a series of
constitutions were written and then rejected, and numerous ministers appointed and then
sacked.24 Consequently, SCAF’s tenure was marked by popular frustration at both the pace and
the scope of change. In fact, as early as April 2011, protestors took to the streets to “save” the
Revolution from SCAF and to demand the complete dismantling of Mubarak’s political
infrastructure, which was widely seen as still intact (MacFarquhar 2011; Sallam 2011; Tadros
2012).25 As would become the pattern in the coming months, security forces responded to these
protests with violence, leading to a string of deadly clashes across the country.26
The presidential elections held in June 2012 did little to resolve the instability.
Widespread dissatisfaction with SCAF was subsequently re-directed toward the new president,
Mohamed Morsi, the candidate put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP). Along with his Islamist-led government, Morsi generated deep anxiety among
certain segments of the population about the future of the country–in particular, among selfidentified “liberal” and “secular” Egyptians, who feared the new leaders would attempt to
24

SCAF oversaw a referendum on proposed constitutional amendments as well as parliamentary elections
in which the Muslim Brotherhood’s newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won nearly 45% of
the seats. The FJP won these seats as part of a coalition of political parties known as the Democratic
Alliance for Egypt (Jadaliyya 2011). Another electoral coalition, the Islamist Bloc, won some 25% of the
seats, resulting in the widely reported claim that Islamist groups won the majority (70%) in the
parliamentary elections (Jadaliyya 2012).
25
In contrast, SCAF maintained that the January 25th Revolution had been successfully concluded, and
protestors should thus demobilize and allow the situation in the country to stabilize (Sallam 2011).
26
One of the most notorious incidents in this regard was the “Maspero Massacre” in October 2011: a
largely Coptic demonstration being held in front of the national television and radio building in Maspero
was brutally broken up by government forces. Both the police and the military used live ammunition and
armored vehicles–the latter of which were captured on video running over the protestors–in their attempt
to disperse the crowd. At least 26, mostly Coptic, citizens were killed in the incident (El-Husseiny 2011).
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establish an “Islamist autocracy” (Kirkpatrick 2012a). As a result, government decisions and
announcements in the first months of Morsi’s presidency were routinely met with protests and
other forms of contentious action, which in turn led to further violent confrontations–sometimes
with security forces but also between Morsi’s supporters and his opponents. In particular,
Morsi’s infamous November decree, which granted him far-reaching executive powers while
also removing judicial oversight (ostensibly to prevent the courts from dissolving the Islamist-led
constitutional committee), sparked widespread outrage and a new round of protests to challenge
what was perceived as a flagrant “power grab” (Kirkpatrick 2012b; Kirkpatrick and El Sheikh
2012; El Rashidi 2013).
Capitalizing on this growing dissatisfaction with the president, a group of young activists
came together in April 2013 and formed the Tamarod movement. With the ultimate aim of
having Morsi removed, the movement had a two-fold agenda: collect 22 million signatures
supporting a “withdrawal of confidence” and calling for early presidential elections and organize
a mass protest on June 30th, the one-year anniversary of his inauguration (Hubbard 2013).
Though the exact number of signatories to the petition is disputed, the campaign generated
widespread support and the protests held on June 30th were massive–it is estimated some 14
million Egyptians took part (Abou-El-Fadl 2013). Already poised to react, the military
responded almost immediately: on July 1st, they issued an ultimatum that gave Morsi 48 hours to
address the protestors’ demands. When he refused to step down, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi,
then the head of the Armed Forces, orchestrated a military coup on July 3rd to remove him. He
placed Morsi under house arrest and appointed the head of the constitutional court, Adly
Mansour, to serve as interim president until elections could be held in 2014.

47

Image 5. Protestors gathering in Doqqi en route to Midan al-Tahrir. (Credit: author, June 2013.)

The coup (alternatively referred to as the “second revolution”) sparked a new round of
demonstrations by Morsi’s supporters, who set up two major encampments in Cairo: one in
Midan Rabaʿa al-ʿAdawiyya in Medinat Nasr and another in Midan al-Nahda in Giza. The sitins, which saw frequent confrontations with security forces, continued for nearly six weeks until
al-Sisi ordered their removal on August 14th. His decision led to a bloody and violent clearing of
the squares: police and military forces used armored vehicles, bulldozers, tear gas, birdshot, live
ammunition, and snipers to disperse the protestors, and it is estimated that nearly 800 civilians
were killed as a result (Fahim and Gladstone 2013; Kirkpatrick 2013). Despite public outrage at
the so-called Rabaʿa Massacre, al-Sisi himself won the presidential elections held a year later,
riding to power on a promise to restore order and bring security and stability to the country after
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more than three years of turmoil (Abaza 2017, 182). What followed, as I discuss at the end of
this chapter, was a rapid and aggressive resurgence of authoritarianism, which is now considered
to be far more repressive than anything that came before.

The Aftermath of January 25th: Spatial Conflict and Urban “Disorder”
The political and economic turmoil that followed Mubarak’s resignation in 2011
profoundly impacted the country’s urban centers–particularly Cairo, which emerged as the site of
two seemingly contradictory urban processes: the first, a struggle between protestors and the
government authorities for control of the city’s public spaces, and the second, a new freedom of
movement and activity for Cairenes as they went about their daily lives. Together, these
developments underscored the centrality of the city and its built environment to the struggle over
the post-uprising political landscape; however, they largely played out in different parts of the
city: while the confrontations over space developed in key protest locations such as Midan alTahrir, the newfound freedom of movement mostly unfolded in residential neighborhoods and
business districts.27 Nevertheless, the processes were interconnected in that the spatialized
conflicts preoccupied the security forces, thereby contributing to a “security vacuum” elsewhere
in the city (and indeed the country as a whole), which in turn created opportunities for urban
residents to pursue a variety of new urban spatial practices.
The demonstrations that proliferated after Mubarak’s removal continued to use Cairo’s
streets and squares as both the location and the object of sustained confrontation between

27

I do not want to overstate the distinction here: while opportunities for greater mobility and activity
opened up in some residential areas, other neighborhoods–particularly informal settlements–were
simultaneously subjected to increased surveillance and regulation. In these areas, the police and security
forces used a range of tactics to monitor local residents–for example, by constructing new police stations
on the perimeter of certain neighborhoods (Beier 2018, 231).
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protestors and security forces–underscoring the fact that the city’s public spaces had never
simply been a “passive setting” for the political upheaval (Stadnicki et al. 2014; Beier 2018).
For the government, the struggle for spatial control entailed a two-pronged response: on the one
hand, it meant escalating the use of urban spaces for the performance of state violence. Perhaps
counterintuitively given Cairo’s increased visibility in the media after the uprising, the
authorities began to use the city and its built environment as a “stage for regime atrocities that
were once confined to secret detention centers and state security dungeons” (ElShahed 2011b).
They showed a willingness to publicize an array of violent attacks (with tear gas, batons,
birdshot, and live ammunition) on protestors of all backgrounds–a show of force likely intended
to discourage protestors from taking to the streets.28 On the other, the government sought to
securitize and militarize the spaces favored by the demonstrators, including Midan al-Tahrir and
Shari‘a Mohamed Mahmoud, a street located off of the southeast corner of the square and the
site of repeated confrontations between protestors and security forces (Trew et al. 2012).29
Through “zoning efforts,” such as the erection of checkpoints, concrete-block walls, and barbed
wire barriers, as well as an increasingly visible military and police presence, the authorities
attempted to isolate and contain the demonstrators (Ryzova 2011; Abaza 2013a; Abaza 2013b).30
28

One of the most highly publicized of these attacks was the “blue bra” incident, in which an anonymous
female protestor fleeing Midan al-Tahrir in December 2011 was beaten with batons by security forces and
dragged across the square. As shown in a video capturing the episode, soldiers used her abaya (a loose,
robe-like garment worn over clothes) to pull her, thereby exposing her midriff as well as her chest and
blue bra, which they proceeded to kick and hit. The video quickly went viral and provoked widespread
outrage as well as a massive women’s protest under the banner “Egypt’s Daughters are a Red Line”
(Banat Misr Khat Ahmar) (Soueif 2011; Hafez 2014; Pratt and Salem 2017).
29
A week of violent clashes on Mohamed Mahmoud left some 40 protestors dead and hundreds more
severely injured. After, there was a move to change the street’s name to Eyes of Freedom Street (Shariʿa
ʿAyoun al-Huriyya), in honor of the numerous protestors who had been partially blinded in the
confrontations as a result of snipers specifically targeting their eyes (Khalil 2012; Abaza 2013b, 128-129).
30
Yet the walls and barricades were also tactics for disrupting daily life in Cairo as they caused relentless
traffic jams and frequently rendered businesses and offices inaccessible (sometimes even forcing them to
close). In turn, the authorities used this breakdown in urban mobility to lay further blame on the
demonstrators for inhibiting a return to “normalcy” (Abaza 2013b, 127).
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Image 6. Closure of Shariʿa al-Sheikh Rihan near Midan al-Tahrir. (Credit: author, February 2015.)

Protestors and activists contested this “mounting militarization of daily urban life” and
sought to claim the spaces of the city for themselves–not only through continued demonstrations,
but through other spatialized modes of resistance as well (Abaza 2017, 174). At the forefront of
these tactics was the “revolutionary graffiti” that spread across Cairo in the wake of Mubarak’s
ouster. Artists and activists used the city’s blank spaces to convey an array of politicized
messages–to commemorate the “martyrs of the revolution,” to disseminate civic or activist
agendas, and, of course, to offer satirical commentary (often by evoking Egypt’s Pharaonic past)
on the country’s continuing political turmoil (Lennon 2014). Not coincidentally, the locus of this
activity was the area around Shariʿa Mohamed Mahmoud, where elaborate murals and images
appeared on the walls of the American University in Cairo (AUC) as well as on concrete barriers
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erected to close the streets surrounding the school (Morayef 2012).31 Although the authorities
responded with an aggressive campaign to remove the graffiti, the artists themselves were
undeterred, returning to create new drawings and murals every time the “professional wallwhiteners” painted over their work (Abaza 2013a, 125-126).
In a sense, this battle over Cairo’s walls encapsulates the spatialized conflicts that were
playing out in the area more broadly from 2011-2013: a cycle of actions and reactions by
protestors and security forces unfolding in–and entailing a struggle over–a very localized space.
However, as already mentioned, this localization of conflict had spatial implications for the rest
of the city: because the government’s resources and attention were focused on a very small swath
of Cairo, some areas witnessed a dramatic increase in monitoring and surveillance while others
experienced an unprecedented slackening of such.
This slackening in turn contributed to the aforementioned security vacuum caused by the
withdrawal of the police, who had initially retreated during the uprising itself, when protestors
vented a deep-seated anger at long-standing patterns of police brutality by burning dozens of
police stations across the country. After Mubarak stepped down on February 11th, many officers
refused to return to their posts, citing both fears of the public and frustration with poor working
conditions (Tarek 2011a; Ismail 2012: 445).32 As a result, certain areas of Cairo were
temporarily released from the unrelenting surveillance that had defined daily life under the

31

The barriers were painted by the “No Walls” project, a collective of artists and activists who painted
trompe l’oeil images of the streets behind the walls (Lennon 2014).
32
A mere three days after Mubarak’s resignation, police participated in a labor protest along with other
public-sector workers demanding better working conditions and higher salaries (National Public Radio
2011). In March 2013, during Morsi’s brief tenure as president, they went on strike, again demanding
better working conditions but also protesting their deployment in the suppression of protests (Kingsley
2013).
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Mubarak-era state of emergency (hāl al-tawaraʾ).33
The resulting security vacuum had a variety of sociospatial consequences: first, the police
withdrawal during the uprising led many neighborhoods in Cairo (and elsewhere in Egypt) to
establish al-ligān al-shaʿbiyya (popular committees) to protect local communities and maintain

Image 7. Graffiti on Shariʿa Mohamed Mahmoud. (Credit: author, January 2013.)

order and security (Hassan 2015; Harders and Wahba 2017). Some of these committees
disbanded after Mubarak’s resignation, but others began to “explore the boundaries of collective
action” in the weeks and months that followed (Ibrahim and Singerman 2014, 106). To that end,
they channeled their energy into addressing neighborhood-level concerns such as waste removal,
33

The country’s emergency law has been in place virtually uninterrupted since 1981. It affords the
Egyptian government sweeping powers to regulate citizens’ actions and movements in public space, and
it has ensured a highly visible police presence throughout the country for decades.
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infrastructure upgrading, and land access and use (Stadnicki 2016, 238). In some instances, the
committees simply monitored the local authorities’ activities, but in others, they negotiated
directly with government offices to have certain concerns addressed (Ibrahim and Singerman
2014, 107).
Second, after the protests had ended, the security vacuum led to widespread concern
about a nationwide spike in petty and violent crime.34 Reports of car thefts, sexual assault,
muggings, and armed robbery–as well as looting of archaeological sites–circulated widely in the
media and fed into a popular discourse about the country descending into “lawlessness and
disorder” (Tarek 2011b; Abdelrahman 2013).35 Though the actual extent of this criminal activity
is unclear, Cairo figured prominently in the associated narrative, where it generated a kind of
moral panic about being on the streets.
Finally, the situation enabled the city’s low-income residents to pursue more freely what
Asef Bayat (2013) has described as “the quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” spatial tactics
through which low-income residents “struggle to survive and to better their lives by quietly
impinging on the propertied and powerful” (15). Many of these tactics, such as land
encroachment and unauthorized construction of residential buildings–a common phenomenon in
Cairo’s informal neighborhoods (ʿashwaʾiyyat), have long been part of the urban fabric;
however, in the turmoil that followed the uprising, residents were able to undertake them more
openly. Moreover, these practices were supplemented by other forms of what is sometimes
referred to as “DIY urbanism,” such as the building of local infrastructure or the demolition of
private homes, apartment buildings, and even some recognized historic structures (Hanna 2013;
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Some Egyptians contended that the police, who were often disinclined to follow up on reports of
criminal activity, were collaborating with local thugs and criminals (Tarek 2011b).
35
For more on the looting of archaeological sites and museums and the destruction of architectural
heritage, see Hanna 2013; Ikram 2013; De Traffford et al. 2015.
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Kimmelman 2013; Stadnicki 2014; Furniss 2016).
Of these activities, the most symbolically significant–perhaps because of its visibility as
well as its popularity in the area around Midan al-Tahrir–was street vending, which increased
exponentially as part of the broader expansion of the country’s informal economy (Stadnicki
2014, 14). Although it has a long history in Egypt, after Mubarak’s resignation, the practice
exploded across Cairo as vendors capitalized on the absence of the police, and the commensurate
reduction in harassment, confiscation of goods, and fining, to re-claim the city’s streets and
squares to sell their wares (Brown et al. 2017). Yet while vendors selling food and drink, gas
masks, and revolutionary memorabilia had been welcomed in Midan al-Tahrir during the
uprising, in its aftermath, their presence on Cairo’s streets came to epitomize the instability and
perceived urban chaos that characterized the post-January 25th period (Abdelrahman 2013).
Tapping into an entrenched discourse about vending as an “inefficient, chaotic, parasitical, and
disorderly” practice, the government condemned the vendors in the media as inhibiting the
“restoration of order” (Abdelrahman 2013; Nagati and Stryker 2013, 34-47).36

Antecedents to the Post-Uprising Fluorescence of Urban Activism and Intervention
In the midst of this alleged urban “disorder,” Cairo began to witness the proliferation of
sociospatial interventions noted in the introduction: a fluorescence of urban-focused activities
distributed across the city–from affluent, centrally located neighborhoods to low-income and
informal communities. Broadly concerned with understanding and improving the city and the
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Though the government repeatedly tried to remove the vendors–initially as part of a clean-up campaign
in Tahrir–their efforts were haphazard and largely ineffective. In fact, it was not until 2014 that the
government really asserted control over the situation, finally forcing the vendors working in the streets
around Tahrir to relocate to a bus terminal parking lot on the periphery of central Cairo (Barsoum 2014;
Rabie 2014). Later sweeps removed vendors working in other areas of central Cairo (Malsin 2015).
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lives of its residents, these activities were remarkable in terms of scope, volume, and specific
concerns. However, this surge of interest in the city was unique neither to Cairo nor to the postuprising moment–on the contrary, it both preceded the January 25th Revolution in Egypt and
spanned the region in the wake of the upheaval.
With regard to the latter, the “Arab Spring” had sociospatial impacts on urban centers
across the Middle East–including those in Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and Jordan (Al-Nakib 2014;
Clément and Salah 2014; Clerc 2014; Sawalha 2016). The breadth of this impact has led some
scholars to conclude that the uprisings “reinstated [the city] as a political stake,” while others
have argued that the uprisings were themselves a response to urban transformations wrought by
the spread of neoliberal policies across the region (Beier 2014; Stadnicki et al. 2014, 8). In this
vein, Najib Hourani and Ahmed Kanna write that the roots of the upheaval lie in the experiences
of “everyday citizens of Arab cities who have suffered the bitterness that neo-liberalism sows:
perpetual underemployment, increased poverty, population displacement, authoritarian control,
and political-economies dominated by local, regional and indeed, global finance, insurance, and
real estate interests” (Hourani and Kanna 2014, 601).
As to timing, there were important antecedents to this post-uprising activity–not only in
Cairo, but in Egypt more generally. Kareem Ibrahim (2014) suggests that the model of
community-focused urban planning and development that characterized the post-2011
interventions can be traced back to the early 20th century. Specifically, he locates the beginning
of what he describes as the “struggle for an alternative urban development practice” in the work
of Hassan Fathy and Ramses Wissa Wassef, two Egyptian architects whom Ibrahim describes as
the first professionals to address local communities and their socioeconomic needs in their
design proposals (Ibrahim 2014, 240-242). Their designs, in his view, represented an initial
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attempt to challenge the “high-modernist top-down paradigm” that had dominated urban
planning in Egypt since the 19th century. Their proposals met with resistance at the time, but
they set the stage for later work–specifically, a cluster of urban planning projects pursued from
the 1970s onward that focused on “inclusive” development and which actively tried to engage
local residents and respond to their concerns (Ibrahim 2014, 242-248).37 Given this history,
Ibrahim concludes that the surge of post-uprising urban-focused activities did not mark the birth
of either a “new mode of practice” or urban activism in Egypt–rather it constituted the “third
wave” in a longer history of similar efforts (Ibrahim 2014, 239).
Urban activism in the decade prior to the January 25th Revolution formed another
relevant precursor to the post-uprising activity. During this time, Cairo witnessed frequent
demonstrations targeting a range of urban-specific issues, including anti-eviction and antidemolition campaigns in low-income and informal neighborhoods (Bell 2009; Deboulet and
Florin 2014). For example, on Gezirat al-Qursaya, a small island in the middle of the Nile,
residents spent years, beginning in 2007, clashing with the military as they resisted the
government’s attempts to expropriate their land (Bell 2009; Al Eddin 2013). These
mobilizations also entailed a variety of labor-based protests by urban service workers–most
notably, the zabālīn, Cairo’s largely Christian community of garbage collectors, who challenged
the government’s efforts to curtail their work and privatize the city’s waste removal (Kuppinger
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These projects were pursued by both Egyptian and non-Egyptian organizations, and the Aga Khan
Trust for Culture (AKTC) in the Darb al-Ahmar neighborhood of Historic Cairo is a good example of the
type of community-focused development activities that Ibrahim (who worked at the organization for
many years) is describing. Begun by the Aga Khan in the 1980s as an initiative to build a park for the
residents of Cairo, the project eventually expanded to include a multi-faceted program of physical and
socioeconomic “rehabilitation” in al-Darb al-Ahmar, which abutted the new green space (For details on
the project, see Sedky 2009, 196-206; Ibrahim 2014, 245-247.)
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2013; Deboulet and Florin 2014).38
Many of these pre-2011 protests, sit-ins, and occupations were undertaken in direct
response to urban living conditions born of the Egyptian government’s long-standing
commitment to neoliberal urban development. These conditions began to take root with
President Anwar al-Sadat’s policies of economic liberalization in the 1970s–colloquially referred
to as the infitaḥ (opening) program–and then gained momentum with Mubarak’s adoption of an
IMF and World Bank-sponsored plan to overhaul the country’s flailing economy in the 1990s.
Known as the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, the plan hinged on the
privatization of government-owned enterprises such as electricity and telecommunications.
Ultimately, the program’s most significant outcome was to “concentrate public funds into
different, but fewer hands. The state…turned resources away from agriculture, industry, and the
underlying problems of training and employment [and]…subsidize[d] financiers instead of
factories, speculators instead of schools” (Mitchell 1999, 31). This shift led not to the “retreat of
the state” but rather to the re-allocation of public resources into the hands of a small group of
Egyptian elites with deep ties to the government. These well-connected Egyptians were able to
acquire government-owned assets for much less than their market value while also monopolizing
revenue across a range of industries such as tourism (Adham 2005; Armbrust 2012).
In Cairo, this transformation was particularly apparent in the city’s real estate market,
where the government drew on an already powerful alliance with the private sector to subsidize
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Developing alongside these protest activities, but only rarely intersecting with them, was a burgeoning
“environmental, social, and economic rights movement” in Egypt (Ibrahim 2014, 251). Though not
explicitly concerned with urban issues, this movement led to the formation of a number of groups, such as
the Egyptian Centre for Housing Rights (established in 1997), whose work would eventually take up
questions of urban planning and development (Stadnicki 2015).
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Image 8. Development in Cairo’s Satellite Cities–New Cairo. (Credit: author, June 2013.)

the development of gated communities in the rapidly-proliferating satellite cities located on the
capital’s periphery (Mitchell 1999; Adham 2005). Yet it was also evident in the governmentsponsored proposals for urban megaprojects that emerged at this time–most notably, the Cairo
2050 Plan, a massive government project prepared by the General Organization for Physical
Planning (GOPP) and announced in 2008.39 The proposal, which was never formally released to
the public, was summarized by Madd Platform as offering “a vision of 2050 Cairo marked by
soaring office and hotel towers, vast new parks, large-scale touristic zones, and peripheral newtowns in the desert, intended to house a population that would no longer be concentrated in the
main urban core. [Some versions showed] new subway systems, monorails, expansive new parks

39

The GOPP is a national agency established in 1973 and tasked with developing and implementing
regional and urban planning policies (El Shakry 2006, 89).
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over existing cemeteries and neighbourhoods, expanded satellite cities in the desert beyond the
ring road” (Madd Platform 2015, 90). Unsurprisingly, the plan, which faced widespread
criticism and condemnation, called for the razing and redevelopment of several districts and the
relocation of thousands of residents.40

Image 9. The Cairo 2050 Plan. (Credit: General Organization of Physical Planning, 2008.)

Collectively the conditions wrought by the structural adjustment program had a profound
effect on the city and its residents, contributing to rampant real estate speculation and a crisis of
affordable housing while also aggravating the growing sociospatial segregation in the city and
the socioeconomic degradation of its low-income (and particularly informal) communities (Bayat
1996; Adham 2005). These conditions festered in the capital in the years leading up to 2011, and
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The plan was suspended in the immediate aftermath of the Egyptian uprising; however, it was
subsequently resurrected–albeit in modified form–as the Cairo Strategic Development Vision (CDSV).
Its resurgence is seen as emblematic of the government’s reclamation of both power and urban space
(Tadamun 2014; Flahive 2018). For more on the original proposal, see Deknatel 2012; Sims 2010, 88-89;
Tarbush 2012.
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they underpinned many of the grievances voiced during the uprising itself, leading some scholars
to conclude that the protest movement had a “strong urban dimension”–or, more definitively,
that it constituted an “urban revolution par excellence in its roots, manifestations, and
ramifications” (Stryker et al. 2013, 6; Stadnicki 2015; Beier 2018).

New Actors and the Post-Uprising Urban Landscape in Cairo
The issues with which the post-uprising interventions in Cairo were concerned, such as
access to public space, the maintenance of cultural and architectural heritage, and the provision
of urban services, also reflected sociospatial changes wrought by the government’s long-standing
fidelity to so-called neoliberal urbanism. Yet, the social, political, and economic conditions that
defined the post-uprising moment were unique, and it was their convergence that enabled
professional elites to begin responding directly to these concerns. The first of the post-uprising
conditions has already been described earlier in this chapter–namely, the security vacuum caused
by the retreat of the police and the government’s preoccupation with ongoing protests and its
own internal affairs. As already noted, this temporary suspension of the aggressive surveillance
of daily life created space for Egyptians to be on the streets and in public spaces in ways that
were once virtually impossible. In Cairo, it allowed urban residents from across the
socioeconomic spectrum to claim (or re-claim) various spaces of the city and use them in novel
ways.
This newfound spatial freedom was coupled with a momentary flood of funding to
“promote democracy” from major international agencies such as the EU and the Ford Foundation
(Elagati 2013; Herrold 2016, 200; Brechenmacher 2017, 37-64). Most notably, USAID
attempted to distribute roughly $65 million in “democracy grants” to Egyptian organizations in
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the spring of 2011 (Chick 2011). The grants were to be given directly to local groups (some 600
of which applied) irrespective of their official status, and they were meant to support a variety of
activities, including those that would strengthen the country’s political parties, improve election
monitoring, and support the development of an independent media (United States Government
Accountability Office 2014, 5). Collectively, this funding proved highly contentious and was
almost immediately subjected to government scrutiny and regulation. In particular, USAID’s
efforts, which were structured so as to bypass the authorities, set off a firestorm and led to a
legislative and judicial crackdown on organizations that had failed to obtain the necessary
approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity (Elagati 2013, 2). Nevertheless, the surge of
financing underscored the prevailing sentiment at the time, encapsulated by the co-founder of
CLUSTER’s observation that “everyone wanted to support democracy” after the January 25th
Revolution (Personal Interview, Omar Nagati, August 1st, 2016). Moreover, an initial wave of
financing, however limited, did reach some of these organizations, which allowed them to launch
at a pivotal moment (Personal Interview, Yehia Shawkat, August 27th, 2015).
Critically, this influx of money and the lax security situation dovetailed with a collective
sense of “empowerment” and optimism about the future of the country. There was a palpable
emotional energy after the uprising–a sense, as CLUSTER’s co-founder again described to me,
that Egypt was entering a “new era” in which it would at last be possible to “do something”
(Personal Interview, Omar Nagati, August 1st, 2016). This energy translated into action almost
immediately–in fact, on February 12th, less than 24 hours after Mubarak announced his
resignation, groups of Egyptian youths descended on Midan al-Tahrir to collect the accumulated
trash, sweep the surrounding streets, remove graffiti, and re-paint the curbs. Dubbed “Tahrir
Beautification Day,” the event served as a symbolic attempt both to re-claim public space and to
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scrub the country clean of years of neglect, mismanagement, and corruption (Winegar 2011).
The clean-up effort, which lasted for weeks and extended across the capital,
foreshadowed an explosion of activism and organizing after the uprising. Indeed, in the months
after Mubarak’s ouster, the ranks of existing NGOs and other non-state organizations ballooned
as young Egyptian professionals, inspired by the protests, left their jobs to work for non-profit
groups (Personal Interview, Yehia Shawkat, August 27th, 2015).41 These established
organizations were quickly joined by a variety of new initiatives and projects ranging from antiharassment and sexual assault campaigns to increased labor organizing to a string of “schools”
designed to provide young Egyptians with alternative education opportunities. While some of
these initiatives eventually obtained official status as NGOs, and others worked under different
institutional umbrellas such as consultancies, law firms, or private companies, the majority had
no official or legal standing. And yet it was precisely this mixture of entrenched, formally
recognized organizations and new, informal groups who had been able to capitalize on the
government’s preoccupation with other matters, that defined so-called civil society in the post2011 moment.
With regard to urban-focused groups and initiatives, the confluence of the
aforementioned conditions–greater professional freedom, reduced government oversight, access
to international funding, a collective sense of motivation, and the expansion of the NGO-sector–
mobilized a group of professional elites working in urban-related fields to take action
(CLUSTER, “Cairo Urban Initiatives Platform,” n.d.; Stadnicki 2015).42 The initiatives
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To take just one example, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), an independent human
rights group established in 2002, grew from 15-20 members to nearly 80 in the wake of the uprising
(Personal interview, Yehia Shawkat, August 27th, 2015). More recently, EIPR opted to obtain formal
status as a registered NGO, which has meant reducing their staff size and limiting the financial support
they receive from foreign funder (Al Malky 2015).
42
Stadnicki (2015) estimates that, by 2013, there were more than 100 registered groups concerned with
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spearheaded by these non-state actors shared a focus on Cairo but varied in terms of origins,
structure, and leadership: while some pre-dated the uprising–but grew more visible and stable as
a result of it–others were formed in its aftermath or even concurrently with the upheaval
(Stadnicki 2015). Additionally, while most of these groups were devoted explicitly to urban
issues and the creation of “alternatives to official urban planning,” existing development
organizations and human rights groups must also be considered part of this post-uprising interest
in the city because many expanded the scope of their work to address urban issues (such as
housing rights and land tenure or the maintenance of urban infrastructure) (Stadnicki 2016, 238).
As for the individuals involved in or heading up these groups, although they came from
diverse professional fields–such as architecture, urban planning, and heritage management–and
brought a range of ideas and perspectives to their work, their socioeconomic and educational
backgrounds were fairly similar. In view of this shared background, I described them as
“professional elites” in the introduction, a term intended to signal not only their work
experiences but their educational backgrounds and professional networks as well.43 Many of
these professionals held advanced degrees from universities in Europe, Canada or the United
States–or from Egypt’s private institutions of higher education, such as the AUC or the Arab
Academy for Science, Technology, and Marine Transport (AASTMT), and their work reflected

various “urban issues,” compared with only 20 in early 2011; however, even these figures fail to capture
the volume of activity at this time, as they do not account for the numerous unofficial initiatives and
organizations working on and in the city and which likely outnumbered those that were able to obtain
some kind of official recognition.
43
Stadnicki (2015) refers to these actors as “urban professionals,” and he describes them as
predominantly architects and planners as well as students, who frequently held multiple positions (e.g.,
teaching at a local university while also running an architecture firm). He contrasts these professionals
with “politicized activists,” whom he describes as those who saw urban issues as a “cause of indignation
and protest, but who [were] not…specialists by profession.” I do not necessarily agree with this clean
demarcation between professional and non-professional–or, for that matter, between activist and
professional, which is certainly not applicable to some of my own interlocutors. However, his attempt to
organize the various non-state actors involved in these activities gestures at the scope of their initiatives.
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these educational experiences. They brought specific ideas about architectural heritage, public
space, and urban rehabilitation–as well as terms like “empowerment” and “participation”–to their
work. Moreover, most had spent years working in their respective fields–both overseas and in
Egypt–and they consequently had professional connections (both inside and outside the
government) and access to financial and other resources that they were able to corral, and which
greatly facilitated their activities. Collectively, they were also a close-knit–even somewhat
insular–group, and they frequently collaborated on projects or endorsed the others’ work. That
being said, while I agree with Stadnicki’s (2015) suggestion that this group could “give the
impression of being limited to circles of experts, or even of an in-group elitism,” in practice, this
was not the case. On the contrary, most were explicitly concerned with reaching beyond their
inner circle to connect with a wide array of professionals, activists, and academics (to say
nothing of the communities in which they had embedded themselves).
My focus on this particular cohort is partly due to their new-found visibility after the
uprising. Because of the government’s rigorous efforts to regulate urban development, the built
environment, and public space prior to the upheaval, the specific projects these professional
elites undertook represented a significant break with previous patterns of urban management and
development. These new initiatives aimed to revitalize the urban fabric and improve urban
living conditions through a variety of concrete interventions in neighborhoods across the capital:
there were standard urban rehabilitation projects to upgrade local infrastructure, housing stock,
and public spaces as well as conservation efforts to restore architecturally significant buildings
and street festivals designed to revitalize local crafts and workshops. There were also mapping,
archiving, blogging, and documentary activities intended to generate publicly available urban
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data that could be used for research and policy development. In addition, there was a broad
category of interventions aimed at providing Cairenes with new experiences of (and in) the city.

Image 10. City Walk organized by the Heliopolis Heritage Initiative. (Credit: author, November 2015.)

These included biking and walking tours, urban sketching and photography workshops, street
festivals, public art performances and exhibitions, and open-air film screenings and concerts.
Finally, there was a cluster of initiatives, which Roman Stadnicki (2015) glosses as “urban
activism,” that focused on helping residents’ to realize their “urban and environmental rights”–to
housing, to an adequate standard of living, to heritage and public space, etc. (Tadamun, “Know
Your Rights,” n.d.).
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In the aggregate, the format and structure of these projects revealed a common interest in
engaging multiple audiences and fostering interaction and collaboration among local residents,
young professionals, and (in a few cases) government authorities and institutions. The groups
pursued this agenda in various ways: by creating educational programs for local youth, hosting
the aforementioned street festivals that foreground the work of local craftsmen, and by
conducting “rapid ethnographic surveys” among residents to determine their most pressing
concerns vis-à-vis housing and infrastructure. In addition, they sought to bring local residents
into contact with Egyptians from across the socioeconomic spectrum by organizing activities for
young Egyptian professionals (such as art and design workshops) but also by creating
experience-based events for non-professionals such as those already noted.
Over the course of my fieldwork, I was able to observe and/or participate in almost all of
these activities–indeed some, such as the biking tours, were just getting underway. At the same
time, there was a clearly articulated feeling that a window, thrown open in the immediate
aftermath of the uprising, was beginning to close. To that end, my interlocutors worried about
the future of their activities in the face of the government’s efforts to consolidate power and reassert its authority. They wondered about their ability to continue working as well as the nature
of the activities they might be allowed to undertake, and they already spoke, with a palpable
nostalgia, of the halcyon days that had followed the January 25th Revolution.

The Return to Authoritarian Governance
Their anxiety was well-founded: the convergence of conditions that facilitated their
activities proved remarkably fleeting. As noted earlier in this chapter, even under SCAF and the
Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP, the authorities sought to regain control of both the city and the
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newly mobilized activists and other non-state actors. However, the 2013 military coup marked a
turning point in the post-revolution political landscape as the Egyptian armed forces “returned”
to center stage. In a moment some commentators have described as the “counter-revolution,” the
government began to redouble its use of repressive tactics to suppress both the ongoing political
dissent and the flourishing work of various non-state organizations (Abdelrahman 2015, 73).44
Thousands of protestors, activists, and journalists were arrested, detained, or disappeared: it is
estimated that from 2013-2014, some 40,000 Egyptians were arrested on the grounds that they
posed a threat to “public order or national security” (Brechenmacher 2017, 43).45 Similarly,
NGOs and other groups–particularly those with links to the now-banned Muslim Brotherhood or
those pursuing “human rights” work–were targeted with raids, trials, and new legislation (as well
as the sudden enforcement of existing legislation) designed to curtail their activities (Al Malky
2015; Brechenmacher 2017, 40-48). Central to these efforts was the passage of a new law that
criminalized receipt of foreign aid for any activity “deemed harmful to national interests”
(Kingsley 2014b). Sweeping in its scope, the law enabled the authorities to prosecute the
founders, directors, and staff of numerous non-state organizations. Ultimately though, these new
legal restrictions appear designed not so much to eliminate these organizations but to strengthen
and consolidate the Ministry of Social Solidarity’s control over them (Al Malky 2015).

44

Egyptian non-state organizations (both formally recognized NGOs as well as other groups) have
struggled in Egypt for decades. Under Mubarak, these organizations increased rapidly in number–a
corollary to the government’s adoption of neoliberalizing economic policies: whereas there were roughly
14,000 registered NGOs and foundations in 1993, by the time of Mubarak’s removal in 2011, that number
had more than doubled to reach 30,000 (Herrold 2016, 195). At the same time, these organizations have
been subjected to strict monitoring and regulation. Using a mix of “divide-and-rule tactics, selective
enforcement of civil society laws, and unofficial security sector oversight,” the government authorities
have maintained tight control over their activities and significantly limited their ability to work
(Brechenmacher 2017, 38).
45
More recently, in September 2019, a burst of modestly-sized protests, sparked by a series of videos
posted online by an Egyptian “whistleblower” living in Spain, led to the arrest of some 4,000 protestors
(Kirkpatrick 2019; Yee and Rashwan 2019).
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In conjunction with this crackdown on social and political activism and dissent, the
government authorities also worked to re-assert control over the city, its built environment, and
its public spaces. Beyond the spatial conflicts and “militarization” of everyday life described
earlier, the government undertook a variety of interventions–particularly in Downtown Cairo and
the area around Midan al-Tahrir–as part of the “restoration of order” (Abaza 2017). These
interventions ranged from new bans on vending and street parking to official neighborhood
“clean up” campaigns to a proposal to eliminate all informal housing. Yet such efforts were
more than just a practical attempt to re-instate order; they also functioned as a symbolic
expression of “the state’s” return to power. As Kareem Ibrahim, the co-founder of an urban
development company known as Takween, observed, these endeavors were “part of the state’s
attempt to restore its status [to] before the revolution. We see a sudden attention to downtown,
to turn it into a model of civilised cities. It’s an attempt to clear whatever the state considers a
threat to this image” (Ibrahim, quoted in Malsin 2015). And it was not simply the threats to the
government’s image that were being eradicated–in some contexts, the government’s activities
constituted an attempt to re-write the narrative of the recent political upheaval by erasing all
traces of it (Personal Interview, Omar Nagati, August 1st, 2016).
These manifestations of the Egyptian government’s turn to what I would describe as a
particularly virulent form of autocratic rule had an acute but varied impact on the urban-focused
organizations that are the focus of this dissertation. The funding that had flowed so freely for a
brief moment after January 25th dried up, and many non-state organizations witnessed a mass
exodus of staff, as countless young Egyptians left the country to pursue work opportunities or
advanced degrees overseas. Similarly, the optimism that had prevailed after the uprising
dissipated, replaced with the aforementioned nostalgia for the brief opening that appeared in its
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immediate aftermath–or worse, a deep pessimism and sense of futility. Consequently, some
initiatives fell apart or simply petered out. However, others–including three of the four groups
discussed in the coming chapters–have endured, albeit under altered conditions. This
perserverance suggests their activities may be some of the last spaces for Cairenes to try to
“enact new worlds in the confines of the present” (Larner 2014, 203).
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CHAPTER TWO: “WE DON’T SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE AS THE BUREAUCRATS:
MADD PLATFORM AND THE REDEVELOPMENT OF THE MASPERO TRIANGLE
Introduction
When I sat down to begin writing this chapter in early 2019, I realized it was high time I
checked to see if there had been any recent developments in the fate of the Cairo neighborhood
that is its focus. The Maspero Triangle, a low-income and densely populated district located just
north of Midan al-Tahrir and abutting the Nile, has long been the focus of proposed government
intervention. Indeed, since the early 20th century, the Egyptian authorities have produced a
steady stream of redevelopment proposals targeting (or at least including) the area (Madd
Platform 2015, 104). Though these plans have varied in terms of the scale and scope of the
proposed interventions and the government agencies sponsoring them, they have consistently
called for the razing of the existing built environment, the relocation of its residents, and the
reconstruction of the neighborhood as a central business district. Yet in spite of this ongoing
threat to the area, I felt little anxiety as I searched for information. Given what I know of the
machinations of Egyptian bureaucracy–as well as the fate of the vast majority of the
government’s proposals, I anticipated that I would find little more than a stray article or two
reporting further delays in or revisions to the latest redevelopment plan. To my dismay, I
quickly learned I was wrong: in early 2018, after months of “negotiations” between the Ministry
of Housing and local residents regarding compensation and relocation, final eviction notices
were issued, after which the authorities quickly levelled the entire neighborhood (Mohie 2018a;
Samih 2018; Wahba 2020, 11).
As I pored over a slew of articles documenting the demolition, what I found particularly
disturbing were the haunting photographs that accompanied them: a series of aerial shots
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Image 11. Aerial photograph of the Maspero Triangle after the 2018 demolition. (Credit: Ziad
Hassan for Mantiqti, 2018. Reproduced with permission of the photographer. )
showing what had once been home to some 3500-4000 families residents reduced to a mere
smudge. These ghostly images of an entire neighborhood erased stayed with me and begged–
perhaps more so than the demographic statistics–the question of how: how could this have
happened in just a few short months? After years of delays and failed proposals and government
upheaval, how were the authorities able to corral the necessary resources to implement the
proposed demolition so quickly? Of course, for anyone familiar with the Egyptian context, these
questions are, for all intents and purposes, rhetorical. In fact, the sequence of events in Maspero
typifies an all too familiar narrative in the context of Cairo–one in which low-income urban
residents (particularly those settled in ʿashwaʾiyyat) live in a state of protracted precarity, at the
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mercy of a mercurial and highly unpredictable government bureaucracy. As one of Madd
Platform’s founders told me: when dealing with the Egyptian authorities, one must “take care”
because “they can take what they want and do anything” (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa,
June 8th, 2016).
What distinguished the demolition of the Maspero Triangle and burned the photographs
into my mind was partly the sense that the images reflected something intrinsic to the mechanics
of the Egyptian government–the potent mix of power and arbitrary decision-making. Yet it was
also the contrast that the photographs set up with an earlier moment, after the January 25th
Revolution, when a radically different future for the district and its residents had been proposed
and seemed–however fleetingly–within grasp. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Maspero
Triangle was swept up in the deluge of post-uprising urban initiatives that proliferated across the
city. Indeed, the area was ripe for such intervention, given its fraught history and the longrunning conflict between local residents and the government authorities. Yet it was precisely
because of that history–and the community’s almost palpable vulnerability–that the initiative on
which I focus here, the Maspero Parallel Participatory Project (Mashrouaʿ Maspero al-Tasharaky
al-Mowazy), engendered such optimism, and a sense that the political landscape had begun to
shift.
This chapter traces the arc of this initiative, which was begun in 2013 by a collective of
young Egyptian architects and urban planners known as Madd Platform. Working closely with
residents in the Maspero Triangle and independently of the government (at least initially), the
group undertook a year-long research and design project in the neighborhood that they used to
create a new planning proposal for the district. Their aim for the proposal was to address to both
the government’s interest in redeveloping and community members’ desire to remain in the
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neighborhood under conditions of secure tenancy. In its effort to balance these interests, and to
treat both groups as legitimate “stakeholders,” the project stood in sharp contrast to those
previously prepared by the government authorities.
In this chapter, I unpack Madd Platform’s work in Maspero in order to provide an initial
illustration of what “community participation” has meant both ideologically and in practice for
the post-uprising sociospatial initiatives with which this dissertation is concerned. Given the
timing of the project (which roughly coincided with the June 30th protests that removed Morsi
from office), the group was able to catch the tail end of the “opening” afforded by the 2011
political upheaval. Their work, which included not only research, but numerous public meetings
and conferences held in and with the local community, reflected this timing. That being said, I
should note that I only learned of the project in 2015–long after the group had lost control of the
plan and terminated their work in Maspero. I therefore had no opportunity to observe the group
working in the area, and consequently, in what follows, I have had to rely on interviews
conducted with Madd Platform’s co-founders, their exhaustive self-published report, talks they
gave at various local institutions, and published articles documenting their work and the fate of
the neighborhood. Using these materials, I summarize the origins of the group’s work and their
commitment to working as a “participatory” organization running in “parallel” to the government
authorities. I then chart their shift to collaborating directly with the Ministry of Urban Renewal
and Informal Settlements (MURIS) and discuss the outcomes of that involvement. In the final
sections of the chapter, I analyze the eventual demise of the group’s redevelopment plan and the
subsequent razing of the neighborhood in 2018. Here, I use the fate of Madd Platform’s work to
highlight the vulnerability of some of these post-uprising urban initiatives–increasingly
magnified in the current political climate–to co-optation by the government. I suggest that these
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projects may be variously received by government agencies and institutions: while some may be
seen as a threat to the government’s authority, others may be viewed as an opportunity for the
exercise of it (and still others may be seen as both). In this way, I want to begin setting up a
contrast between Madd Platform’s work and that of CLUSTER and Megwara, which I discuss in
later chapters. The ability of the latter two groups to avoid the kind of co-optation experienced
by Madd Platform is, I propose, a reflection of both the individuals running the projects and the
way in which the organizations have positioned themselves vis-à-vis other state and non-state
actors.

The Future “Manhattan in Cairo:” A Brief History of Bulaq and the Maspero Triangle
The Maspero Triangle comprised the southern tip of the area known as Bulaq Abu alʿAla (often referred to simply as Bulaq). At the time of Madd Platform’s work in the
neighborhood, it was home to an estimated 14,000-18,000 residents distributed over 82
feddans(approximately 0.3 square kilometers) (Madd Platform 2015, 108). Physically, it was
bounded by three major streets: the 26th of July corridor running east-west on the northern edge,
Shari‘a al-Galaa running along the southeastern side, and the Corniche running north-south along
the western edge. Several large buildings (for which land had been expropriated over the years)
had been constructed along the Corniche side: the Ramsis Hilton Hotel, the Egyptian Radio
Television Union (also known as the Maspero Building), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Behind these towering structures, however, was a residential neighborhood–a warren of narrow
streets and alleys lined with low-rise apartment buildings. The latter were a mix of 19th and 20th
century construction and more recent, informal development, some of which were brightly
painted–orange, yellow, turquoise, and pink. Though many were in advanced states of decay,
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the older buildings often included remarkable architectural features such as small wooden
balconies or intricately carved doors. Coupled with the scale of the neighborhood, the
architecture helped to create a sense of intimacy and even insularity, which was reinforced by the
area’s demographics. Socially and economically, Maspero was remarkably tightknit: according
to Madd Platform’s research, while nearly 70% of Maspero’s families had immediate or
extended relatives living in the area, nearly 80% of residents also worked in the neighborhood
(Madd Platform 2015, 132-133). The district was also home to an array of businesses–with a
particularly high concentration of automotive repair and supply shops (Madd Platform 2015,
122-124). Consequently, the neighborhood saw a high volume of non-residents visiting the area
(Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016).
Historically, the Maspero Triangle formed out of the fusing of two neighborhoods that
had developed independently of each other: the northern section emerged as an extension of
Bulaq Abu el-‘ala, while the southern area developed as an extension of Downtown Cairo (the
history of which is discussed in Chapter Four) (Madd Platform 2015, 104). Bulaq, which runs
along the east side of the Nile, was first occupied in the early 14th century, when changes in the
river’s course allowed for development to the west of the existing city.46 In 1438, it became
Cairo’s main port and a central node in the East-West spice trade, a critical development that
enabled the district to flourish, attracting affluent Cairenes and leading to the construction of
numerous public buildings such as mosques, hammāmat, and wikālat–some of which survived to
become part of the area’s later architectural heritage (Abu-Lughod 1971, 36; Selim 2017, 51-57).
The area remained the capital’s main port until its closure in the second half of the 19th century, a
development that both reflected and accelerated the district’s already changing character. By this

46

For a comprehensive study of Bulaq’s early history, see Hanna 1983.
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time, Muhammad ʿAli (1805-1848) had begun building numerous factories and technical schools
in Bulaq as part of his plan to “modernize” Egypt. These efforts, coupled with the port’s closure,
eventually engendered a profound shift in the neighborhood’s demographics: during the reign of
Khedive Ismaʿil (1863-1879), local elites began to decamp for new buildings in Downtown
Cairo while migrants and workers flocked to the area, transforming it into a working class
industrial quarter comprised of small factories and workshops–sociospatial features the
neighborhood maintained into the 21st century and which figured in Madd Platform’s work
(Abu-Lughod 1971, 91; Selim 2017, 52).
By the early 20th century, these changes in Bulaq had attracted the attention of the
Egyptian government, and the Ministry of Town Planning declared the district–along with
several other low-income neighborhoods–in need of government intervention to address
socioeconomic decline and unregulated development. In response, the Ministry prepared an
elaborate development proposal for Cairo, which included land expropriation in older districts
(such as Bulaq) as part of an effort to clear “slum colonies” and facilitate urban upgrading.
Although the proposal, like so many that followed, was never implemented, other interventions
at this time set into motion major sociospatial changes to the area. Specifically, the Ministry of
Public Works, which had also responded to the growing concern about Bulaq, used new property
ownership policies to sell large plots of vacant land in the area to private investors (Selim 2017,
61-63; 69). This decision had a direct impact on the development of the Maspero Triangle, for it
put the land into the hands of a Turkish aristocrat, Pasha Sharkas, who subsequently allowed his
workers and staff to build on it. Their tenancy was eventually guaranteed in the 1940s, when
Sharkas’s son endowed the property for a period of 20 years, a legal decision that brought
Maspero under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments (Wazarat al-Awqaf).
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The Sharkas family’s endowment of the area was only the first in a series of land
transfers and property sales over the course of the 20th century. Most notably, in 1973 (after the
waqf had expired), the Pasha’s descendants agreed to the Ministry’s request to sell the land to
Kuwaiti and Saudi investors (Madd Platform 2015, 104).47 Several decades later though, the
government changed course and sought to regain control over the area. To that end, they
established Maspero for Urban Development in 1997, a government-run real estate company
charged with purchasing properties in the district (Khalil 2018). Coupled with the introduction
of new investors and real estate groups and the construction of the major buildings noted above,
these sales and transfers created a multitude of state and non-state actors with property rights in
the district, which, in turn, led to enormous uncertainty regarding land tenancy.
In spite of this legal knot around the question of property ownership, the Egyptian
authorities continued to propose redevelopment plans that either included or targeted Bulaq and
the Maspero Triangle. The administration of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) produced Plan
2020 for Bulaq in 1966. Though never implemented (in part due to the 1967 war with Israel), it
focused on the construction of major new arteries that would have cut through the heart of the
district (Selim 2017, 87-93). In addition, Nasser’s government produced a number of urban
master plans that focused on public housing development, the creation of industrial zones and
satellite cities, and so-called slum clearance in low-income neighborhoods–all of which would
have had a direct impact on Bulaq (El-Batran and Arandel 1998, 219). Though the authorities
were largely unsuccessful in implementing these plans, several individual projects were
undertaken and affected the area–in particular, the construction of the Corniche and the Egyptian
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This move, in and of itself, created a great deal of confusion around land tenure and property
ownership: since the land was endowed, the Gulf investors could not build on it; however, property
owners only owned their buildings–and not the land on which the building was located (Personal
Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016).
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Radio Television Union, which was built at Nasser’s behest in 1959. Nasser’s successor, Anwar
al-Sadat (1970-1981), fared only slightly better: from 1979-1981, he was able to relocate some
5000 residents from the neighborhood to a new housing development in Zawiya al-Hamra as part
of a plan (suspended after his assassination) to remake Bulaq as a central business district–
replete with hotels, luxury housing, offices, multi-story parking garages and entertainment
centers (Ghannam 2002, 30; Selim 2017, 103).48 Following in the footsteps of his predecessors,
Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) authorized the construction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which was completed in 1994, and also proposed Plan 3133 for Bulaq in 2005. The latter
proposal, which was left largely unimplemented, revived some of the features of Plan 2020 while
also lifting a years-long hold on issuing construction permits and allowing for building
demolition in response to “safety concerns” (Selim 2017, 138-141). Additionally, and also in
keeping with Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak developed a set of proposals for Cairo as a whole, first
generating plans that attempted to improve socioeconomic conditions and the existing urban
infrastructure in low-income and informal neighborhoods and then shifting to plans that
advocated eviction, relocation, and redevelopment (Selim 2017, 123).
In the aggregate, although there were periodic evictions throughout this period, few of
these redevelopment proposals–either those concerning the city as a whole or those focused on
Bulaq and the Maspero Triangle–made it past the planning stages. Nevertheless, the regular
unveiling of new proposals meant that residents lived in a permanent state of uncertainty
regarding their future. This sense of precarity was exacerbated by the tenuousness of their living
arrangements and the lack of secure tenancy: according to Madd Platform, only 20% of
Maspero’s residents were property owners. The remaining 80% were residing in their homes
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The Ramses Hilton was also constructed at the end of his presidency, in 1980.
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under different terms–frequently, the original owner had moved away or abandoned the property,
but in some instances, the owner had died, and the descendants were unaware of the existence of
the property. In turn, this insecurity was aggravated by the fact that the neighborhood’s
infrastructure and built environment were rapidly deteriorating and in desperate need of
attention–and yet the government authorities refused to issue permits for building repairs. In
fact, in the 1980s, new legislation placed heavy restrictions on such repairs, a move that had
devastating consequences for Maspero after the 1992 earthquake, which severely damaged
houses in the neighborhood and led to the collapse of some 14% of the total building stock
(Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016).
In 2008, this dynamic intensified with the formation of the Informal Settlements
Development Fund (ISDF). Established as a kind of ad hoc committee, with representatives
from a variety of ministries as well as a number of non-state entities, the ISDF was charged with
mapping and categorizing informal communities while also developing and carrying out
government-sponsored interventions in such areas–including eviction and relocation efforts.
With this mandate, the fund began an aggressive new round of evictions in Bulaq and Maspero,
removing residents on the grounds of unsafe building conditions and relocating them to newly
completed housing projects on the outskirts of Cairo (Khalil 2018).49 Perhaps not coincidentally,
these evictions dovetailed with the announcement of the Cairo 2050 plan, which was described
in Chapter One and called for the wholesale reconstruction of entire neighborhoods and the
relocation of their residents. Bulaq and the Maspero Triangle figured centrally in the plan, with
the government once again proposing to convert the area into a financial district–a “Manhattan in
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The evictions spurred the formation of the Maspero Youth Association, a local group that sought to
galvanize residents to oppose the government’s interventions. The association was particularly active in
late 2011, after the collapse of two houses, which led them to organize a series of protests and sit-ins as
well as meetings with the Cairo governor (Khalil 2018).
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Cairo” as Madd Platform described it (Madd Platform 2015, 104).50 As with its antecedents, the
Cairo 2050 Plan was never implemented–in part due to the January 25th Revolution, which
brought the project to a grinding (if temporary) halt. Yet the forces that swamped the
government’s proposal simultaneously facilitated the formation of Madd Platform and their work
in Cairo, to which I now turn.

“Development from the Bottom Up:” Madd Platform’s Model of Participatory Planning
As with all of the initiatives discussed in this dissertation, Madd Platform traced their
origins to the 2011 uprising–or, more specifically, to the liminal period of “opening” that
followed. At a talk given at the Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC) in 2016, two of
the group’s founders, Ahmed Borham and Mohamed Abo Tera, both professionally trained
architects and planners, described the political upheaval of 2011 as presenting an opportunity for
those working in their field to “expand their influence.” In Borham and Abo Tera’s case, it was
a chance to respond to long-simmering frustrations with the government’s urban planning and
development policies (such as those described above)–albeit with an unprecedented degree of
freedom and latitude. In short, they saw the post-uprising moment as an opportunity to pursue
work that “bypassed” the government authorities.
Madd Platform’s third founder, Ahmed Zaazaa, also saw the moment as a chance to get
out into the streets and “do some networking.” In his case, this meant simply turning up at
community events and municipal meetings unannounced and distributing his business card to
anyone who might be interested in his services (offered gratis) as an architect and urban planner
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The Cairo 2050 Plan was not the only government plan produced that addressed the area at this time:
between 2008 and 2010 two other proposals were developed that either focused on or included the
Maspero Triangle: the Cairo Governorate Plan released in 2009 and another plan that was developed with
the GOPP and the governorate in 2010 (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016).
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(Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016). This ambitious, if somewhat unusual,
approach proved successful: just a few months after the uprising, residents from al-Kom alAhmar, a village on the western periphery of Cairo, contacted Madd Platform to request help
generating a development plan for a wide, unpaved road (a recently covered canal) running
through their neighborhood (Abotera 2017). This project was soon joined by a second, in which
the group was again contacted by local residents: community members from Mit ʿUqbah, a
centrally-located Cairo neighborhood, reached out to the group asking for assistance in
addressing local congestion and improving road infrastructure (Personal Interview, Ahmed
Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016). In both cases, Madd Platform conducted research and so-called rapid
needs assessments and then held meetings with community members to review different ideas
and develop proposals with which they could approach the local municipality. Although the
projects were only partially implemented (if at all), in the case of Mit ʿUqbah, the group
successfully pressured the municipality into paving the streets using stones that could be
removed to repair the underlying infrastructure.51
Beyond their material outcomes though, these two early activities enabled Madd Platform
to develop a basic template for future work, one grounded in the idea of “development from the
bottom up,” as Zaazaa put it in a 2016 lecture he gave at Megawra. This template eventually
solidified to form the group’s “ethical umbrella,” which comprised four components: “social
empowerment, societal participation, the publication of all information [regarding Madd
Platform’s] projects…as open source, and working solely with initiatives that popular
organizations have instigated” (Madd Platform 2015, 19).
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In the case of al-Kom al-Ahmar, Madd Platform developed a comprehensive proposal that was
presented to–and well received by–the municipal authorities; however, the ongoing political upheaval
(particularly after 2013) meant the project was never implemented (Abotera 2017).
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Underpinning this “ethical umbrella” was a desire to invert the trajectory of collaboration
normally associated with development activities–specifically, by starting with residents, nonstate organizations, and academics and including the government authorities only at the end,
once a proposal had been developed. To that end, this model of work constituted an explicit
rebuke to what the group saw as the colossal failure of the Egyptian government’s “top down”
style of urban management. In addition though, for Zaazaa, it reflected the momentary inversion
of power relations that characterized the post-uprising moment. As he told me, in the immediate
aftermath of the January 25th Revolution, the government was “afraid of the people,” and this
fear created new spaces–quite literally–for Egyptians to meet, discuss, and organize. While
groups such as Madd Platform certainly capitalized on this opportunity, so too did local
residents: in his view, the popular committees (al-ligān al-shaʿbiyya) described in Chapter One
were an illustration of this–as were the early meetings he attended at which he distributed his
business card and the phone calls Madd Platform received from community members (Personal
Interview, June 22nd, 2016).
This framework prioritized the “local community” and the participatory nature of the
work–i.e., the inclusion of residents in all phases of project development and the commitment to
ensuring that the impetus for their work came from within the community. Madd Platform saw
such participation as a “right” that had transformative potential, writing that it is “not an end in
itself, but a means to realize a certain objective. When the user becomes able to make key
decisions, has the freedom to change whatever that relates to the design process, builds and
manages their dwelling, then the planning process and its resulting built environment would
become catalysts for personal and societal development” (Madd Platform 2015, 62-63).52
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They described residents’ “right to participation” as the right to “take a central role in [decisionmaking] related to the creation of the city space they live in” (Madd Platform 2015, 128-129).
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Also central to this template was Madd Platform’s own identity and positionality–
namely, the idea that they were neither a foundation, nor an NGO, nor a company They were
“borderless” as Zaazaa told me, a position they felt afforded them a great deal of flexibility when
implementing their work (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016). They likewise saw themselves not
as central actors spearheading urban development but rather as “consultants” helping local
communities bring about desired changes. Given this orientation, the group deliberately
positioned itself as operating outside of the framework of the government and its local
institutions–hence, the repeated references to the “parallel” nature of the Maspero project as well
as the occasional self-representation as a kind of internal “other” working in (sometimes direct)
opposition to the government authorities. During their NVIC talk, Borham and Abo Tera teased
out this idea of the “other” and framed their activities as diametrically opposed to those of the
authorities responsible for urban planning and development in Cairo. They even went so far as
to suggest that their work might not be intelligible or comprehensible to the government,
declaring: “we don’t speak the same language as the bureaucrats.”

From Parallel to Official: Madd Platform and the Maspero Triangle
Madd Platform was able to test their “parallel” model of “participatory planning” on a
much larger scale starting in 2013, when members of Maspero’s legna shaʿbiyya contacted the
group and requested a meeting to discuss growing concerns about a new proposal to build 64
residential towers in the area (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016).53 Eventually
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When I asked Zaazaa about the legna having approached Madd Platform (in light of the fact that the
group had struggled to earn the trust of the local community) he explained that, at the time, they were at
odds with the community over how to address the situation. The legna thus lacked the full support of the
community (which meant that their “endorsement” of Madd Platform was of limited help in building
rapport) (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016). This internal friction was a significant point for the group
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joining forces with the Egyptian Center for Civil and Legislative Reform (ECCLR), a human
rights organization already working in the area to provide legal assistance to Maspero’s
residents, Madd Platform organized a public conference with community members to address the
situation (Khalil 2018). The meeting, according to Borham and Abo Tera, was a tense affair–in
part because there was widespread concern among residents that the plan for the proposed towers
(which they had supported until they saw the proposed cost of the apartments) would be
withdrawn; however, the friction was also due to a general wariness regarding Madd Platform.
As Zaazaa explained to me, given the history of the area, residents had seen many young
researchers come and go, and they were therefore suspicious of the group and their intentions
(Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016). Undeterred, and eager to establish their legitimacy, the
group forged ahead, securing an office in the area and attempting to integrate themselves into the
local community by attending events (such as weddings) and working to address infrastructural
issues. The goal, as Zaazaa told me, was to experience and partake of daily like in the
neighborhood so that they would no longer be seen as “outsiders” (Personal Interview, June 8th,
2016).
Having thus embedded themselves in the community and secured funding from a local
non-profit organization, the Arab Digital Expression Foundation, the group began a six-month
participatory research project in September of 2013 to gather information regarding practices of
land use, the local architecture, infrastructure, and housing conditions, as well as social networks

though: in their report, they were careful to highlight the “inappropriateness of putting the parties of the
conflict into the three abovementioned categories and considering each party to be one homogenous
group. On the one hand, the area’s residents do not all have a unified position or goal. Furthermore, the
government relationship to the land varies...Therefore, explaining the entangled relationship between the
different parties must not overlook the anatomy and internal makeup of each main party” (Madd Platform
2015, 162).
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and behavioral patterns. Once again, “inclusive planning” served as the group’s guiding
principle, and local residents were central to this phase of the project: a team of community
members from different social and professional backgrounds (they included lawyers, engineers,
teachers, and craftsmen) helped the group tailor its research materials, conducted much of the
multi-method ethnographic fieldwork (which was comprised of surveys, focus groups, and
general observations), and assisted in analyzing the information and developing the needs
assessment, which formed the basis of the three “strategic concept plans” prepared by Madd
Platform (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016; Madd Platform 2015, 101). The
plans varied with respect to land tenure and the extent (or lack thereof) of rarefaction, but the
version that ultimately gained the most traction entailed ceding the fringes of the district to Gulf
investors (with some stipulations about how land would be used) while leaving the core of the
district, which would be reclaimed by the Cairo governorate, for current residents, who would be
granted formal property rights (Madd Platform 2015, 377). In this way, the proposal sought to
resolve the “ownership deadlock” that had stymied development efforts in the area for decades
(Borham and Abotera 2015).
The group presented the proposals to local residents in a series of meetings in the spring
of 2014, telling them that the fate of the project was now in their hands–in other words, it was for
the community to determine whether (and/or how) to proceed with Madd Platform’s proposals.
However, at about this time, the group crossed paths with Laila Iskander, an Egyptian consultant
and “social entrepreneur” who expressed a desire to see their work and who had recently been
appointed MURIS’s new minister.54 Her interest in the project was wholly unexpected: after
developing the proposals for Maspero, the group’s intention had been to “push the project
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MURIS was created to tackle informal housing and serve as an institutional “upgrade” of the ISDF.
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through the media” as a way of pressuring the Cairo governorate to meet with local residents.
Direct involvement with the government authorities had not been seriously considered (Personal
Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 22nd, 2016). However, given Iskander’s background and her
own status as an outsider in the ranks of the government, Madd Platform expressed a willingness
to work with her and the ministry.55 Her arrival on the scene thus marked a turning point for the
group–the moment when their project went from being “parallel” to “official.” Deeply
impressed with their proposals, she expressed a keen interest in having them reviewed officially
as a first step towards putting the project into action.
After Gateway Studio, a planning company, was recruited to serve as the umbrella
organization for Madd Platform (who could not sign any official paperwork given their status as
an unregistered organization), 12 weeks of twice-weekly meetings were held between the group
and various government agencies and officials. These meetings were draining, combative
affairs, according to Zaazaa, who described the process of negotiating with authorities as akin to
a “battle between camps” (Personal Interview, June 22nd, 2016). Moreover, Zaazaa and Borham
were skeptical of the state actors with whom Madd Platform was interacting, suspecting that the
government’s support of the project was simply posturing–or, alternatively, as Borham
suggested, that the authorities would “swallow everything and spit it out as something else”
(Personal Interview, Ahmed Borham, August 3rd, 2016). It was thus much to their surprise that
the meetings eventually yielded a strategic plan for the area, to which all stakeholders–investors,
residents, and government agencies–agreed (Madd Platform 2015, 392). In the revised proposal,
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Iskander had come to MURIS via the Ministry of the Environment, from which she had actually been
removed. According to Zaazaa, she held unorthodox views–by ministry standards–such as advocating for
collaboration with young activists and supporting work among Cairo’s marginalized communities (e.g.,
the zabālīn, the city’s garbage collectors). In his view, her colleagues were simply waiting for her to be
removed before they reverted to “business as usual” (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016).
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which framed the district as the “new Downtown,” two “investor zones” and one “recreational
zone” would be created; however, residents would be allowed to stay in the area as long as they
agreed to be internally relocated (Madd Platform 2015, 408). Although Madd Platform had
significant reservations about the details of the plan, there was still a sense of progress–not least
because the proposal maintained the architecture of Madd Platform’s original plan, as well as a
feeling that they had successfully persuaded investors and government officials that there were
viable alternatives to the “Dubai model” of urban development (Ahmed Borham, Personal
Interview, August 3rd, 2019).56

The Maspero Triangle in the Hands of New Actors
In April of 2015, following the signing of the agreement, the area was registered for replanning and an international design competition (with terms of reference prepared by Madd
Platform) was launched for what would be the district’s new master plan. The events
surrounding the competition–particularly Madd Platform’s involvement–were celebrated in the
media as a cause for optimism and a sign of the changing political terrain (Shenker and
Michaelson 2015). However, in September of 2015, Iskander was abruptly removed from her
post, and, shortly thereafter, the ministry was dissolved and the competition file transferred to the
Cairo governorate, the ISDF, and the Ministry of Housing (whose minister at the time had been
involved in developing the Cairo 2050 plan)–all signs, in Madd Platform’s view, that the
government was reverting back to the status quo with regard to state-sponsored urban planning
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Ultimately, they hoped that the project would have what Zaazaa described to me as a “Townhouse
effect” on the area–a reference to Cairo’s Townhouse Gallery, which opened in Downtown Cairo in 1998.
Founded as an independent, non-profit space for contemporary art in Egypt and the region, it quickly
became a prominent arts institution at both the local and the international levels. Many have described
the gallery as having helped to revitalize the neighborhood in which it is located (Personal Interview, June
8th, 2016).
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and development (Khalil 2018). In November of that year, the competition review was
concluded, and the committee announced that Foster + Partners, a major British architecture
firm, had won.57 Their proposal called for the construction of new commercial and residential
structures along the Nile edge, new major streets, and a number of parks and other public spaces
in the interior (Korody 2015).

Image 12. Model of Foster + Partners’ redevelopment proposal for the Maspero Triangle. (Credit:
Foster + Partners, November 2015.)

Though it differed significantly from Madd Platform’s proposals, it did appear–at least
visually and discursively–to adhere to the promise of secure housing for current residents.
Renderings provided by the firm foregrounded what seemed to be locals engaged in daily
activities–shopping, strolling on the street, enjoying tea in the local coffee shop. Likewise, in
their press release announcing the competition results, the firm asserted that their plan aimed to
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Zaazaa told me that it became apparent to Madd Platform very early on in the competition that the
authorities wanted “starchitects” for the project (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016).
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“introduce new residential, commercial and retail spaces, while rehousing the majority low
income population in the same area and retaining its unique character and spatial attributes”
(Foster + Partners 2015). Nevertheless, Madd Platform (though no longer formally involved in
the project by this time) expressed concern over the winning proposal. Writing on Cairobserver,
an online platform that publishes articles related to the city, Borham and Abo Tera commented
that “showing ordinary people in the visualized drawings is a statement to acknowledge their
presence in the design, but we must be aware that this is where this statement stops. These
visuals sold the proposal at this stage, but we see no guarantee that these ordinary people will use
the resulting spaces in this particular way, nor do we have evidence if any research was
conducted to guarantee that the socio-urban scenes depicted…are plausible” (Borham and
Abotera 2015).

Image 13. Rendering from Foster + Partners’ redevelopment proposal for the Maspero Triangle.
(Credit: Foster + Partners, November 2015.)
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These reservations were well founded. When I sat down with Zaazaa for our second
interview, he cut me off mid-greeting to ask if I’d seen the latest news: government officials had
been making the rounds of Maspero with a “questionnaire” and approaching residents to offer
compensation for their apartments, ominously declaring that if they chose to stay in the area,
they would be paying 5600 LE per month in rent (an impossible sum for most residents, whose
income likely did not exceed several hundred pounds). At the time, no one quite understood
what was happening–in fact, it was not even clear, initially, who was circulating the
questionnaire. Zaazaa himself was unsure what to make of it, wondering if there was a conflict
brewing between the governorate and the MOH or if government authorities were simply
“playing a game” and trying to gauge residents’ reactions to a looming rent increase (Personal
Interview, June 22nd, 2016).
Less than a year later, in early 2017, the government’s intentions came into focus: ISDF
made it clear that demolitions were imminent, and they began tense negotiations with residents
of Maspero to compensate and/or relocate them (Mohie and Ahmed 2017). Three options were
presented to the community: they could receive financial compensation of up to $5000; they
could be relocated to a government sponsored housing project known as Asmarat on the eastern
side of the city; or they could obtain an apartment in Maspero after the development project (now
entirely overhauled and no longer bearing any resemblance to the plans proposed by either Madd
Platform or Foster + Partners) was completed (Wahba 2020, 10). By the time the demolitions
began in early 2018, of the roughly 4500 families in the neighborhood, 3000 had accepted
financial compensation and left their homes, another 850-900 had opted to stay in the area,
having signed contacts for as yet unbuilt “alternative housing units,” and the remainder were
either still awaiting compensation or had already been relocated to Asmarat (Khalil 2018; Mohie
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2018b).58 With regard to the built environment, after the razing of the neighborhood was
completed, only 13 buildings were still standing–of which seven were registered as
architecturally significant (a point that may or may not ensure their preservation) with the
National Organization for Urban Harmony (NOUH), the government body responsible for
registering and monitoring architecturally and historically significant buildings in Cairo (Mohie
2018b).

Wading into and out of the “Parallel Stream”
As I suggested at the outset of this chapter, the fate of the Maspero Triangle and Madd
Platform’s project attests to the vulnerability of the sociospatial initiatives that proliferated across
the city after the January 25th Revolution–particularly in the unstable political climate that
followed and in the midst of the government’s efforts to re-assert authority and consolidate
power. These interventions were often at the mercy of this instability, with very little grounding
to help them withstand the fluctuations of the political landscape. In retrospect, and as came up
in other contexts during my fieldwork, the group saw their reliance on (and alliance with) a
single individual–namely, Iskander–as a liability in this regard. Although she cast a long shadow
over the initiative, Iskander’s involvement was described by Madd Platform’s founders as
somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand, they all agreed that she played a critical role in
advancing the project, but on the other, she was a controversial and polarizing figure in the
government whose tenure at MURIS was always presumed to be brief. She had come to the
ministry via the Ministry of the Environment, from which she had been removed, and she held,
according to Zaazaa, unorthodox views (such as advocating for collaboration with young
58

The Asmarat project, which was started in 2016 and slated to have 20,000 units once completed, was
part of al-Sisi’s broader effort to end “informal housing” by 2018 (Wahba 2020, 14)
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activists and supporting work among Cairo’s marginalized communities). In his interpretation,
her colleagues were simply waiting for her to be removed before they returned to “business as
usual” (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016). Zaazaa told me that Madd Platform’s dependence on
her as a kind of “hero” was one of the primary weaknesses of their project: it brought them into
the fold and afforded them “insider” status vis-à-vis the authorities, but only momentarily
(Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016). Consequently, her abrupt departure left
Madd Platform in a highly precarious position vis-à-vis the new administration, subject to
whatever direction that latter opted to pursue with regard to the project.
The subsequent unraveling of it, and the ultimate demise of Maspero, also imply that the
authorities may see these post-uprising sociospatial interventions as alternately (or
simultaneously) a threat to institutional power or an opportunity for the exercise of it (and thus
warranting government regulation and/or suppression). In their piece for Cairobserver, Borham
and Abo Tera addressed this idea directly, writing that their project in Maspero was “unique as it
represents a rare case of encounter between the state and alternative practices. Any outcome
should be observed and studied, especially to evaluate this parallel stream. Is effective
participatory planning a threat to the mechanics of capitalism in Cairo? Is it a threat to neoliberal
logics of space? Could it produce a new kind of space in this urban context? Can tactical
urbanism present an alternative policy?” (Borham and Abotera 2015). Given the fate of their
project, it would seem that the later administration’s response to these questions was a
resounding “yes.”
And yet, in spite of the outcome of their work, Madd Platform maintained–at least during
the time of my fieldwork–that the project had a tangible, positive impact. In their report, they
cited five such outcomes: “creating public interest for the case of Maspero, raising

93

legal…awareness among inhabitants [and the perception] that they can be agents of change,
empowering the people’s association legally and [connecting] them to decision makers, and
creating a precedent for participatory approach[es to] the government” (Madd Platform 2015,
393). When I spoke with Zaazaa a year after the report’s publication, he reiterated many of these
points, suggesting that even if the project “flopped,” they still “raised awareness” and introduced
a new view of land tenure. Additionally, he felt that the matter of compensation was more
“firmly on the table” by that time–a claim that appeared to prove accurate when the ISDF began
negotiations with local residents in 2017 (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2016).
Moreover, in spite of Madd Platform’s commitment to the idea of working in “parallel”
to the government (to say nothing of the outcome of their involvement with the authorities), the
group still appeared to believe that collaboration was necessary. Writing about the “parallel”
nature of their work, they noted in their report that “this approach might sound like an anarchist
approach, which [it] is not exactly, since the government’s role is not neglected, as the
government must be aware of these new frameworks, [in order to] to sync them in the broader
visions and plans of the state, so that these small actions are guaranteed to be sustainable and not
clashing with the state’s vision” (Madd Platform 2015, 25). In essence, what the group
advocated was a reconstruction of the terms of engagement, so to speak, by inverting the
traditional (i.e., top down) model of planning.
In my interviews with Zaazaa and Borham, they affirmed this commitment to
collaboration: Zaazaa described negotiations with the government authorities as a “ping pong
game,” yet he contended that working with them was a “necessary evil” (Personal Interview,
June 22nd, 2016). Borham likewise stressed the need for collaboration between local groups and
government agencies–contending that this approach was the most productive; however, he
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argued that Madd Platform’s “mistake” was to stop being “parallel”–i.e., to forego their
“independent edge” in favor of working with the authorities. In his view, this was an error of
judgement on their part–and one that cost them their most vital asset: the local community
(Personal Interview, August 3rd, 2016).

95

CHAPTER THREE: “DIGGING IN THE WATER?” THE CAIRO HERITAGE
SCHOOL AND THE ADAPTIVE REUSE OF BAYT AL-QADI
Introduction
Early one afternoon in August of 2016–one of those blistering summer days in Cairo
when the heat seems to sap you of all energy the moment you step outside–I found myself
pinned to a wall in a narrow alleyway off of Shariʿa al-Muʿizz li-Din Allah, a long thoroughfare
considered to be the heart of the area known as Historic Cairo. I had spent the past several hours
on a slow-moving tour of the neighborhood with a group of young, predominantly Egyptian,
architects, urban planners, and heritage specialists. They were all participants in a week-long
workshop organized by a new, local heritage association, the Cairo Heritage School (CHS), and
the tour was designed to introduce the group to the area and its numerous historic buildings.
Undertaken on the first day of the event, the walk began at Bab al-Futouh, the
northernmost point of Historic Cairo and one of the district’s three remaining 11th century gates,
once part of a Fatimid (969-1170) fortification that encircled the city. Passing under the gate’s
hulking stone towers, we headed down Shariʿa al-Muʿizz, which is pedestrianized and thus gave
us a rare chance to walk freely and look around without fear of being mowed down by a car or a
motorbike. Under normal circumstances, the street would have been bustling with international
tourists; however, the decimation of the country’s tourism industry in the wake of the January
25th Revolution had left the whole of Historic Cairo almost entirely devoid of foreigners.
Consequently, the street was full of Egyptians, who were out and about running errands or
enjoying a walk into the heart of the district. As we made our way down the street, we stopped
several times: first for a tour of Bayt al-Suhaymi, a sprawling, 17th century private home located
in a side street known as al-Darb al-Asfar, then for a break at Qasr Bishtak, the 14th century
palace that would serve as the workshop headquarters, and then for a visit to the Qalawun
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Complex, a recently restored, 13th century multi-purpose structure and located in an area known
as bīn al-qaṣrīn (between the two palaces).59

Image 14. Bīn al-qaṣrīn on Shariʿa al-Muʿizz in Historic Cairo. (Credit: author, August 2016.)

Once we had finished at Qalawun, we turned down a nearby side street to visit the
Maqʿad Mamay al-Seify, the building that was to be the focus of the workshop and for which the
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The expression derives from the two Fatimid palaces, built opposite each other, that once occupied the
area.
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participants would be developing design proposals. Known colloquially as Bayt al-Qadi (the
house of the judge), the small structure is all that remains of what was once a 15th century
palace.60 The building is surrounded by a metal fence, which was locked when we arrived.61 As
we milled around outside, our “handler,” a local supervisor from the Ministry of Antiquities
(MoA), shouted and sent people scurrying back and forth in search of the keys. Once they were
procured, we were let inside and led up a narrow flight of stairs that let out onto a kind of openair loggia known as a maqʿad (literally, “seat”). Although framed by a series of delicate,

Image 15. Exterior of Bayt al-Qadi. (Credit: author, August 2016.)
60

The colloquial name refers to the fact that the building was used as a court by the Ottomans (15171798). (For more on the architecture and history of the building, see Osman 2017).
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As noted in the Introduction, the Ministry of Antiquities (also sometimes referred to as the Ministry of
State for Antiquities) was established in 2011 and was responsible for overseeing the management of
Historic Cairo. Previously known as the Supreme Council of Antiquities (SCA), the agency had operated
as a department within the Ministry of Culture (MoC); however, in an attempt to gain greater autonomy,
staff at the SCA lobbied to separate from the MoC after the January 25th Revolution; however, in late
2019, the MoA was merged with the Ministry of Tourism to create the Ministry of Tourism and
Antiquities (MoTA). Given the time period covered in this dissertation, I continue to refer to the MoA as
an independent ministry (Alaa El-Din 2019).
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horseshoe-shaped arches that overlooked a small midan (square), the loggia was bare–the only
decorations were the wide band of Quranic inscription running along the upper part of the walls
and the wooden ceiling beams, which had been elaborately painted with geometric designs. In
light of the fact that this was the only time we would be allowed inside the building, the
workshop participants tried to make the most of it. They made their way around the building
carefully, inspecting the space and taking copious photographs and notes. They also peppered
the workshop director and the ministry official with questions–about this history of the site, its
official status as a registered monument, and past preservation projects.
After about an hour spent exploring the maqʿad–as well as the midan and several other
structures that the group would need to include in their proposals, we started back to Qasr
Bishtak. Drained from all of the walking and touring, the group was moving listlessly down a
back alley when a street vendor pulled up behind us with his cart–a broad, unwieldy contraption
piled high with withering grapes. We tried to line ourselves against the alley walls to let him
pass, but it was difficult to maneuver the cart in such a confined space, and the man quickly grew
frustrated with us for impeding his progress. In an attempt to defuse the situation, an elderly
Egyptian doktor (professor) who had joined the tour tried to engage the vendor in some playful
banter. The latter, however, was not amused, and as we squeezed ourselves tighter against the
alley walls to let him by, he unleashed a string of insults at both the professor and the group for
the inconvenience we had caused.
Given our collective fatigue, we let the moment pass without much comment. Indeed, by
the time we arrived back at Qasr Bishtak and settled in for some “ice-breaking” activities, I had
already dismissed the incident as an inevitable byproduct of the brutalizing heat that defines
summer life in Cairo. I was therefore caught off guard when it resurfaced several days later
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during a workshop lecture on the topic of community participation in preservation work. After
the talk had concluded and the participants were breaking up to work on their proposals, I
overheard the MoA supervisor animatedly recounting to the guest speaker and several others
what had happened. The official concluded his narrative by loudly asserting that if we had not
been with him at the time, he would have made trouble for the vendor–in his own words, he
would have ʿamiluh kamīn (ambushed him) because of the way he had spoken to the doktor. His
comment, which seemed to surprise those who were listening, was not well received: several
participants replied in alarm that they would not have wanted the official to respond in such a
manner. One even worried aloud that the official might have arrested the vendor. Although
everyone laughed, it was not entirely clear if the remark was intended as a joke, and the official
quickly asserted that he was not speaking literally: “As if I have that power!” he declared.
Despite the official’s protestations, the exchange made me uneasy, and I was left
wondering if he could, in fact, have made trouble for the vendor. This was partly due to my
uncertainty about the official’s precise role in the workshop: beyond facilitating access to Bayt
al-Qadi for the group’s one site visit, the purpose of his involvement was unclear. He was listed
in the event program as a guest speaker, but he made only a few remarks at the opening
ceremony; instead, he showed up sporadically over the course of the week, sometimes attending
lectures and tours and other times descending on us at Qasr Bishtak to meet with the workshop
organizers or make (what struck me as) arbitrary announcements to the group.
On one such occasion, he arrived at the palace with two men I took to be plainclothes
police to address some “security concerns.” Having already sussed me out as an interloper, he
made a beeline for some participants I was observing as they worked on ideas for their design
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proposal. Interrupting the group, the supervisor asked if I lived in Cairo.62 When I responded
nervously in the affirmative, he proceeded to inform us that all foreigners involved in the
workshop would need to be formally “registered” with the police. He offered no further
explanation of what this would entail (and, in fact, I was never asked to register with anyone) but
his declaration left me so shaken I could barely muster a chuckle when one of the participants
teased me: “They're watching you!”
More importantly though, after the supervisor left, several participants began discussing
his earlier reaction to the grape seller, with one young man criticizing the official’s comments
about “ambushing” him. In response, one of the workshop facilitators, an Egyptian scholar with
a PhD from Italy, defended the official, reminding the participant that the elderly doktor had
been with the group and that the vendor had, in her view, truly spoken rudely to him.
Unconvinced, the participant countered that the vendor was ghalbān (pathetic) and that the
official felt entitled to speak threateningly about him because he saw the grape seller as min alshariʿa (a derogatory expression that translates as “from the street”). Moreover, the participant
was sure that the official would never have dared to speak to him–the participant–in the manner
suggested by the official’s comments because they came from such starkly different
socioeconomic backgrounds.
The conversation moved on, but the participant’s observations left me even more
perplexed. The official’s comment did indeed seem to imply a view of the grape seller as min alshariʿa–someone to be treated with disdain or simply disregarded. The remark thus seemed
distinctly out of tune with the aims of the workshop–and particularly, the organizers’ explicit
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During the neighborhood tour on the first day of the workshop, he took to shouting “fīn al-Amriykān?”
(“where is the American?”) whenever the group was assembled together, occasionally following up with
an inscrutable reference to the Chicago Bulls.
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desire to engage directly and work closely with the “local community.” As the “workshop
preparatory document” described it, the goal of the event was to “act as an exemplary project of
heritage reuse that makes ‘local community participation’…one of its pillars and…dissolve[s]
the barriers between citizens and cultural heritage” (Cairo Heritage School 2016, 8). However,
as the workshop unfolded, I came to see the official’s threat to “ambush” someone who was
meant to be a “pillar” of the event as part of a pattern of interaction that actually typified the
MoA’s involvement in it. Though the ministry participated in all phases of the event, from the
preliminary planning and site selection through the day-to-day activities to the final review of the
participants’ project proposals, the agency’s contact with the group and its decisions regarding
day-to-day activities often seemed haphazard and unpredictable. On occasion, its interactions
with the group even appeared to run counter to official government positions regarding heritage
management.
In this chapter, I explore the MoA’s involvement in the workshop in order to demonstrate
that the boundary between the ministry and CHS was porous. In fact, I suggest that a kind of
symbiotic relationship played out between the two entities during the event–one in which both
the authorities and the workshop organizers had the opportunity to advance (even if only
partially) their own aims. Put differently, CHS was neither fully independent of the MoA nor
fully coopted by it–while the ministry granted the group a certain amount of autonomy, it
simultaneously harnessed the workshop activities in order to pursue its own agenda. This
dynamic illustrates the deep entanglement between state and non-state actors described in the
Introduction: rather than a dichotomization of “state” and “society,” in which non-state groups
are considered either entirely autonomous and free to choose allegiances and agendas or else
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fully colonized by government authorities and agencies, the workshop showed the fluidity
between them.
That being said, this chapter also pays attention to the ways in which the ministry
exploited this porous boundary–and specifically, to the techniques used to monitor the event. I
note the MoA’s explicit efforts to ensure the workshop remained under its control, but I also look
at the use of ambiguity and unpredictability as another tactic of regulation. In this regard, I show
that the MoA’s erratic and sometimes opaque involvement in the workshop was calibrated to put
CHS in a precarious position, limiting the group’s ability to fully implement its aims–particularly
those pertaining to “community participation”–while also forcing them to make repeated
accommodations to ensure the event ran at all. I contend that creating such an uneven and
ambiguous space of encounter worked to the MoA’s advantage, enabling the authorities to
effectively regulate the format, content, and outcome of the workshop while also advancing their
own aims vis-à-vis Historic Cairo. As I describe below, these aims concerned the physical and
symbolic reclamation of Shariʿa al-Muʿizz and its environs (an area sometimes referred to as
“Fatimid Cairo”), which had been transformed after the January 25th Revolution and the
consequent retreat of the police. This agenda can be linked to the broader government effort,
discussed in Chapter One, to regain control of the city and its public spaces after the political
upheaval of 2011; however, it was also connected to growing concern among international
cultural institutions (particularly, UNESCO) about the fate of Historic Cairo and its architectural
legacies. The CHS workshop was thus an opportunity for the ministry to reassure international
heritage organizations of its commitment to safeguarding the district’s historic structures.
To make this argument, I start by sketching the history of preservation work in Historic
Cairo, tracing more than 100 years of intervention–undertaken by local and non-local actors–to
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restore and maintain the district’s “monuments.” I highlight the paradigms that have dominated
these efforts, showing how they helped to produce a heritagized landscape, often at the expense
of local residents. One of my aims in this section is to underscore the patterns of intervention
from which the CHS workshop sought to distinguish itself. Additionally though, I note the
sociospatial changes that Historic Cairo underwent as a byproduct of the January 25th Revolution
and the political turmoil that followed. In this regard, I establish the stakes of the workshop for
the MoA as well as the opportunity it seemed to offer the ministry. Having provided the
necessary context for the event and the MoA’s involvement in it, I then turn to the workshop
itself and overview both the activities that occupied the participants during the week as well as
the ideological aims of the organizers. I then contrast the group’s aims with those of the MoA,
showing how their conflicting agendas created a tenuous–and sometimes contentious–alliance
between the two sets of actors. In the final section of this chapter, I look at the tactics used by
the MoA to regulate the workshop, demonstrating the power of the ministry’s efforts to create a
climate of uncertainty surrounding the event.

Architectural Conservation and the Making of Historic Cairo
In almost every respect, the CHS workshop was atypical of preservation interventions in
Historic Cairo. Indeed, its structure, content, and organization all ran counter to existing patterns
of managing and caring for the area’s architectural heritage (turāth). While the district has a
long history of European-style preservation work, community involvement in heritage
management and locally sponsored preservation activities have, until recently, been fairly
limited. Instead, since the end of the 19th century, state and international agencies have
monopolized efforts to protect the area’s remarkable architectural legacy. With some notable
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exceptions and a discursive emphasis (rarely operationalized) on addressing the urban fabric as a
whole, these efforts have largely focused on preserving single “monuments” in isolation from the
surrounding urban fabric. CHS’s project in Historic Cairo, with its twin aims of directly
engaging residents and developing a plan for Bayt al-Qadi that would respond to their concerns,
thus constituted a significant departure from the status quo.
Historic Cairo’s architectural legacies span more than 1000 years, dating back to the Arab
conquest of Egypt in 641 AD and the founding of al-Fustat, which was the first in a series of
Arab-Islamic capitals built in the vicinity of what is today known as Historic Cairo. Each of the
three capital cities that followed– al-ʿAskar (750 AD), al-Qataʾiʿ (868 AD) al-Qahira (969 AD)–
left its own architectural footprint, resulting in an area with one of the highest concentrations of
early Arab-Islamic architecture in the world: at the time of the UNESCO World Heritage List
nomination report, the district was home to some 500-600 classified monuments dating from the
seventh to the mid-nineteenth centuries, including madāris (schools), bimaristans (hospitals),
khanqahs (Sufi residences), sabiyl-katātiyb (combined Quranic schools and public fountains),
wikālat (caravanserais), and even private homes (Antoniou et al. 1980, 110; Sutton and Fahmi
2002, 80).63
These buildings have long been subjected to preservation work–some, due to the Islamic
system of religious endowments known as the waqf, since their initial construction.64 However,
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To avoid confusion, I have not transliterated bimaristan and khanqah, both of which are Persian words,
using the IJMES system. Likewise, I have used the Anglicized plural for each.
64
The waqf system, which dates back to the seventh century, was designed to ensure the physical and
financial survival of a building or institution in perpetuity. In the simplest terms, a waqf is an endowment
established by an individual or group of individuals that prevents a given property or institution from
being bought, sold, or modified (Bianca 2000). A waqf sets out strict guidelines for the structure’s
physical maintenance and economic stability–usually achieved through the alienation of commercial
institutions (such as shops or caravanserais), residential buildings or agricultural lands, whose revenues
are then invested into the waqf property (Deguilhem 2008; Denoix 2000; El-Habashi 2001, 36-48). This
system was widely used in Cairo for both public and private buildings, and it functioned as the primary
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at the end of the nineteenth century, a preservation organization was founded in Cairo that
transformed the area and its built environment and introduced what would quickly become the
dominant model of preservation work. Known as the Comité de Conservation des Monuments
de l’Arte Arabe (colloquially referred to as the Comité), the organization focused on both
documenting and preserving the district’s architectural heritage. It modeled its estimated 265300 interventions on the philosophies of preservation that were coalescing in Europe at this
time–particularly, at first, the philosophy of Viollet-le-Duc, which called for the restoration of
monuments to a “condition of completeness that could never have existed at any given time” (ElHabashi 2001; AlSayyad et al. 2005; Sanders 2008, 12-16). This commitment to “pure forms”
allowed the Comité to fabricate an architecturally homogenized landscape, which, in turn,
enabled it to produce a place that could be read as Arab, Islamic, and medieval (Sanders 2008,
102-104).65 In this way, the organization established what would subsequently become a central
effort in the management of the district and its architectural legacies: the discursive and
sociospatial production of the area qua “Historic Cairo”–i.e., as an historicized and heritagized
landscape–through the preservation of individual monuments.
This endeavor gained renewed salience with Historic Cairo’s addition to the UNESCO
World Heritage List in 1979. The designation led to a surge of popular and professional interest
in the area and, in the decades that followed, a variety of historic preservation projects were
pursued by an ad hoc constellation of international agencies, private organizations, foreign

model of “preserving” structures and institutions well into the Ottoman era (1517-1914). It is frequently
cited as having contributed to the long-term survival of so many historic buildings (Bakhoum 2011).
65
This project of spatial engineering dovetailed with the calls from Western travelers that had served as
the impetus for the formation of the Comité–namely, to save Cairo’s “old city” as an emblem of the
“authentic East” (Reid 1992; Mahdy 2001).
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archaeological missions and research centers, as well as the Egyptian government.66 Based on
the conclusions of the UNESCO experts who had studied the district, the listing also introduced
the idea of “area conservation,” a model of heritage management focused on revitalizing entire
neighborhoods. In this regard, the experts had argued that “the real quality of historic Cairo lay
in the uniqueness of the ensemble of buildings, and that any conservation strategy should include
not only the preservation of individual monuments but also the upgrading of the context in which
they are located” (Williams 2001, 597).
However, in spite of this new framework for approaching the district, many of these
contemporary projects continued to conceive of the area using the narrative originally advanced
by the Comité, drawing on images of a place that had maintained “forms of human settlement
which go back to the Middle Ages” in order to pursue the earlier practice of restoring individual
structures (ICOMOS 1979, 2). This approach frequently entailed the removal and/or relocation
of businesses and residents in order to create a sanitized “monument” that was sociospatially
isolated from the surrounding context, but which contributed to a more aesthetically “civilized”
urban landscape that would appeal to tourists (Sedky 2009, 160-165).
More recently, some projects–particularly those pursued by non-state groups–have
diverged from this model, focusing instead on applying the concept of area conservation as well
as the model of adaptive reuse–another approach to heritage management that has been endorsed
by the international agencies such as UNESCO. Although practically distinct, area conservation
and adaptive reuse are ideologically connected in their concern for local communities: while the
former treats urban historic districts as integrated wholes (and therefore may include
socioeconomic redevelopment initiatives targeting local residents), the latter focuses on restoring
66

For an exhaustive review of the various state and non-state groups involved in the care and protection
of Historic Cairo, see Sedky 2009, 121-226.
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and then “repurposing” historic buildings so that they can be used as libraries, community
centers, and art or event spaces–i.e., in ways that will benefit local communities (Serageldin
1986; Bullen and Love 2010; Aigwi et al. 2018).67
The Egyptian government has publicly expressed its support for these models of heritage
management; however, with a few notable exceptions, projects sponsored or undertaken by the
Cairo governorate and/or the Ministry of Culture (MoC)–now the MoA–have continued to focus
on the “monuments” in isolation from the community. In fact, at the end of the 20th century, the
authorities were still pursuing initiatives designed to create a “musealized” landscape for
touristic consumption–an agenda that has been criticized for consistently ignoring the broader
urban context and marginalizing the local community and their needs (Williams 2006, 283). The
MoC’s Historic Cairo Restoration Project (HCRP), a major multi-ministry initiative launched in
1998 (and one of the few state-sponsored plans to be implemented), is an instructive example in
this regard (Williams 2002, 458-459). With a budget of some 850 million EGP, the HCRP
aimed to convert the whole of Historic Cairo into an open-air museum, and it ultimately led to
the preservation of at least 100 registered structures in the district out of a planned 149 (El-Aref
2007). Significantly, the project was associated with two EU-sponsored initiatives: “Museums
With No Frontiers,” a program designed to encourage people to travel to see art and architecture
in situ (such that the sites themselves became a kind of permanent exhibit), and “Islamic Art in
the Mediterranean,” a Euromed Heritage program that aimed to promote “sustainable tourism”
through the creation of “heritage trails” and guidebooks for a number of Mediterranean countries
(Euromed, “Islamic Art in the Mediterranean, n.d.; Williams 2006, 275).
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One of the best examples of these approaches is the AKTC’s work in al-Darb al-Ahmar. (See footnote
#37.) The organization, which received the support of both municipal and state authorities, both
adaptively reused a number of buildings in the district and also focused its efforts on addressing the
socioeconomic conditions of the neighborhood as a whole.
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The project was roundly criticized by foreign and domestic heritage specialists on
multiple fronts: the authorities were blasted for having offered individual projects to contracting
companies with little (or no) experience working in historic preservation; the companies
themselves were denounced for the poor quality of their work as well as for their use of materials
and methods that were aesthetically or architecturally inconsistent with the sites; and the
initiative was critiqued for its plans to relocate residents, businesses, and workshops as part of
“slum clearance” (Williams 2006, 284). Finally, although the project attempted to adaptively
reuse several of the buildings it had restored, heritage experts criticized the nature of the repurposing, arguing that the emphasis on creating cultural institutions (such as art centers,
museums, and event venues) meant the “reuse” would be of little benefit to the local population
(Williams 2002, 466).
In spite of the concerns raised about the HCRP, the project had a profound sociospatial
impact on the area–particularly on Shariʿa al-Muʿizz, which emerged as the centerpiece of the
initiative. More than 30 registered buildings were restored on the street, which was also
pedestrianized and closed to vehicular traffic. The heights of surrounding buildings were
adjusted to ensure they did not dwarf the newly restored structures, and an elaborate drainage
system was installed to address the problem of rising ground water (El-Aref 2007). Moreover,
various workshops were slated for removal and relocation: at a 2007 event to celebrate the
completion of restoration work on the street, the head of the Ministry of Culture (MoC) at the
time, Farouk Hosny, announced that “skilled workers and their handicrafts are essential to the
distinct character of [Shariʿa al-Muʿizz], since they provide the vivid atmosphere of the area and
the government is keen on settling craftsmen in their original locations, but in a way that
complements their architectural splendour.” He went on to explain that workers whose
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workshops “adversely affect[ed] the monuments” would be relocated unless they modified their
activities, in which case, they would be eligible to receive financial and practical assistance (ElAref 2007). The MoC declared the project a success, and Hosny asserted that Shariʿa al-Muʿizz
had “completely regained its allure” and would be resuming its “rightful place as Cairo's
principal tourist hub” (El-Aref 2007).
However, this newfound “status” was short-lived. The security vacuum caused by the
retreat of the police and the government’s preoccupation with pressing internal concerns after the
January 25th Revolution had a marked impact on Historic Cairo: a number of historic structures
were vandalized and, in some cases, looted.68 The iron gates used to close Shariʿa al-Muʿizz to
vehicular traffic were broken and motorized vehicles regained access to the street. Additionally,
vendors opened stalls and kiosks in front of various historic buildings and the courtyards of
several mosques were converted into parking lots or cafes. After the military resumed control of
the government in the summer of 2013, the authorities responded to these “encroachments” with
the “Cleaning al-Mu‘izz Street Campaign.” The initiative, sponsored by the MoA and the
Ministry for Environmental Affairs (as well as two local NGOs), aimed to re-pedestrianize the
street, repair damaged structures, and clear garbage, graffiti, billboards and vendors
Significantly, the project also entailed the establishment of a police unit to regulate traffic as well
as the construction of security booths at various places along the street (El-Aref 2013b, 2014).
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The looting and vandalism threw into relief long-simmering tensions between the MoA and the
Ministry of Endowments because a significant number of structures in Historic Cairo (including those
that were damaged) fall under the jurisdiction of both ministries. In fact, it is estimated that 80-90% of
the buildings listed as historic monuments in the area are waqf properties (El-Habashi 2001, 29). From a
legal standpoint, the MoA is charged with preserving registered buildings while the Ministry of
Endowments is responsible for appointing a guard and, in the case of mosques, a sheikh (Bakhoum 2011,
189). However, the relationship between the two authorities has been fraught, with each ministry
accusing the other of negligence–particularly when damage to or theft from a particular building is at
issue (El-Aref 2008). These accusations intensified in the wake of the January 25th Revolution and the
subsequent security vacuum (El-Aref 2013b, 2014).
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The CHS workshop should be understood in light of this history of preservation work in
Historic Cairo. As illustrated by the HCRP, such work has consistently prioritized the care and
protection of individual historic structures in the service of tourism in lieu of addressing the
urban fabric as an integrated whole–i.e., as comprised of both people and the built environment.
As I describe in the next section, the workshop was an attempt to break with this paradigm and to
challenge the continued “musealization” of the district. The project aimed to consider local
residents and business owners as integral to both preservation work and heritage management
while also thinking expansively about the contours of “community.” At the same time, the
MoA’s involvement in the workshop should also be viewed in light of this history–and
particularly, the recent effort to “clean up” and securitize Shariʿa al-Muʿizz. This effort, which
can be linked to the government’s broader, post-uprising attempt to re-assert sociospatial control
over the city, provided a strong impetus for the ministry to support the CHS workshop.

The Cairo Heritage School and the Bayt al-Qadi Workshop
At the opening ceremony for the workshop, held in the sleek auditorium of the Arab
Academy for Science, Technology, and Marine Transport (AASTMT), the project director,
Waleed Shehata, traced the origins of the Cairo Heritage School and the impetus for the event: as
students, he and his classmates discovered that although Egypt’s “historic heritage [was] lying in
chaos,” the government’s tendency to deny the public access to historic structures–sometimes
even after preservation, meant they were powerless to do anything about it. They could not, as
he described it, “touch their own heritage.” Yet, as Shehata, an architect and designer by
training, later explained to me, this impulse to create an “open-air museum” in which nothing
could be “touched” was only one side of the problem: on the other was a “destructive” tendency
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(often espoused by architects) to simply tear down buildings and replace them with something
new (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016). In short, the country’s architectural legacies seemed
to be caught between two competing visions, neither of which offered a viable path forward.
Frustrated by this dynamic and the limited educational and training opportunities for
students and professionals in their field, Shehata and his colleagues sought advanced training in
Europe. (Shehata, for example, spent nine months studying urban planning in the Netherlands.)
During this time overseas, he and his peers were exposed to urban contexts in which historic
districts and buildings were both well-maintained and open to the public to be “touched and
used.” Seeing these alternatives to “putting [cultural heritage] in glass boxes in museums”
suggested to them a possible “third way” for the management of Historic Cairo and its
architectural legacies.
This time abroad coincided with the January 25th Revolution, and although Shehata had
the opportunity to continue his studies in the Netherlands, he–like many of his peers–opted to
return to Egypt. Once back in Cairo, he threw himself into the various urban initiatives that
began cropping up across the capital in the immediate aftermath of the upheaval. Eventually,
however, he and two of his colleagues began to brainstorm a project of their own–one that would
enable them to explore their interest in adaptive reuse while also addressing the inadequacies of
design training in Egyptian architecture and historic preservation programs, which they had
experienced firsthand. These twin goals led them to form the Cairo Heritage School in 2015.
Though lacking any official organizational status, the group quickly began planning a week-long
“international summer school” that would bring Egyptian and non-Egyptian professionals
together and give them a chance to create adaptive reuse proposals for a building in Historic
Cairo.
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It is difficult to overstate the amount of work–particularly with regard to logistics and
bureaucratic wrangling–required to organize such an event. As illustrated by other initiatives
discussed in this dissertation, Egypt’s labyrinthine bureaucracy is remarkably difficult to
navigate and can significantly delay or swamp even the smallest task or activity. Compounding
the bureaucratic challenges is the fact that, in the context of Historic Cairo, the government is
notoriously reluctant to give the public access to registered heritage sites. Consequently, for the
“summer school,” the CHS group had to obtain permission from the MoA both to hold the event
in Historic Cairo and to have participants develop proposals for a registered building. They also
had to negotiate with the MoA regarding the actual site that was to be the focus of the
participants’ proposals: as I discuss in greater detail below, CHS wanted to work in a different
area of Historic Cairo, but the MoA pressed them to focus on Bayt al-Qadi and its environs–
specifically, an empty adjacent lot, a contemporary administrative building that was once the
Jewelry and Scales Authority, and the midan in front of the maqʿad. In addition, the group
needed permission to use Qasr Bishtak as its headquarters for the workshop.
After meeting with the Assistant to the Minister of the MoA, Mohammed Abdel Aziz,
and getting his support for the project, CHS was able to obtain written authorization from the
ministry to hold the workshop. However, the MoA could provide no funding, which meant that
the group needed to find financial backing for the event. The organizers proved remarkably
savvy in this regard, corralling more than a dozen institutional partners, including the Cairo
governorate, the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (which also supported CLUSTER’s
activities and at which one of Madd Platform’s co-founders now works), the aforementioned
AASTMT (where Shehata and his colleagues had studied and taught), and several foreign groups
such as the International Society of City and Regional Planners (a global association of urban
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planners).69 Lastly, the workshop needed to find conservation experts and heritage specialists to
give lectures, lead tours, and serve on the final jury panel. Here, the group drew on their own
extensive professional networks to pull together a diverse group of both Egyptians and nonEgyptians, securing the participation of some of the most prominent professionals currently
working in the field of heritage management in Egypt–both inside and outside the government.
With less than a year of planning and preparation, the organizers sent out a call for
participants, selecting 21 Egyptians and four non-Egyptians to join the workshop, which was
held during the first week of August in 2016.70 Over the course of the event, the participants, a
mix of architects, urban planners, and graphic designers, endured long, hot days at Qasr Bishtak
and on the streets of Historic Cairo. They attended lectures on a variety of topics designed to
introduce them to conservation paradigms, international heritage legislation, and examples of
adaptive reuse projects both domestically and internationally. They also went on a series of tours
and site visits intended to familiarize them with Historic Cairo and the dominant models of
heritage management in the area and introduce them to examples of “successful” and
“unsuccessful” preservation projects.
The majority of the participants’ time, however, was spent working in teams on their own
proposals for Bayt al-Qadi and its environs. Indeed, they spent countless hours brainstorming,
researching, and developing their concept designs in the large reception hall of Qasr Bishtak.
Yet they also ventured out to speak with local residents and business owners–the intended
beneficiaries of their work. This aspect of the workshop was done informally and at the
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Although only some of these partners provided financial support, their endorsement and/or nonmonetary assistance was essential to the event–and may even have facilitated the securing of financial aid
from other organizations.
70
The entire workshop–including the lectures, tours, preparatory document, and design proposals–was
conducted in English.
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initiative of the individual teams, but all of the groups took advantage of the opportunity, and
they conducted interviews and surveys while also engaging community members in informal
dialogue and conversation. The resulting proposals, which were judged by a panel of
professionals at the end of the event, reflected their efforts to account for what community
members had told them about their interests, needs, and concerns. They included a wide range
of ideas for the adaptive reuse of Bayt al-Qadi and the surrounding structures, such as an
exhibition space, a puppet show, a café, a literacy program, crafts workshops, co-working space,
a community center.71

On Having a Foreigner Complex: Privileging “Western” Models
Throughout the event, the workshop organizers foregrounded adaptive reuse (aʿādat altawẓīf) as a means of supporting and benefitting local residents while also linking this concept to
community involvement (broadly construed) as an essential component of heritage
management.72 Indeed, these two interrelated ideas served as ideological and methodological
anchors for the event. In the workshop preparatory document, CHS argued that adaptive reuse
helps to “ameliorate local conditions and support local community development” (Cairo Heritage
School 2016, 16). It not only “step[s] up the maintenance of the structure and delay[s] its decay,
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The proposal that ultimately won the competition, entitled “The Revival of the Bayt al-Qadi Area
through Adaptive Reuse,” focused on creating a visitor center that would introduce tourists to the history
of Bayt al-Qadi and a café in the adjacent empty lot. Although the ideas were fairly modest in
comparison with the other projects, some of the jurors argued this was actually one of its strengths–i.e.,
the goals were realistic and achievable.
72
The parameters of “community” was also a topic of frequent discussion and debate during the
workshop. For example, while observing a group as they worked on their proposal, I heard one
participant ask Shehata if there was a “radius” to consider with respect to the community. Shehata
responded quickly in the negative, but he went on to say that the community was much bigger than
residents of the street or the neighborhood–or even Cairo. For him, “community” meant not only all
Egyptians but something bigger–indeed, in his view, because of the concept of “world heritage,”
everyone was potentially a relevant community member.
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but it also helps the functioning building to get involved in the living context it lies within, unlike
buildings that are deserted and disused” (Cairo Heritage School 2016, 6). At the same time, the
format of the event indicated that the group saw it as a novel opportunity for different actors–
government officials, Egyptian and non-Egyptian professionals, and especially members of the
local community–to connect, interact, and even collaborate: “Design, programmatic,
construction, and technical innovations are required to be shown to the different
stakeholders…Bringing...architecture students, government officials, professionals, international
experiences, and representatives of the local community all together is essential to communicate
knowledge of heritage reuse” (Cairo Heritage School 2016, 7). In short, heritage management
needed to “prioritize…human beings,” as Shehata put it during a lecture he gave to
participants.73
Implied in this assertion was a critique of the Egyptian government’s methods for dealing
with Historic Cairo as well as a corollary privileging of Western (sometimes glossed as
“international”) philosophies of and approaches to heritage management. The former was
particularly evident during several of the workshop’s site visits, which included critical tours of
the Egyptian Textile Museum (Methaf al-Naseeg al-Masry) on Shariʿa al-Muʿizz and the newly
restored train station in Downtown Cairo–both of which were contrasted against Megawra’s
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This assertion regarding the need to prioritize people in heritage projects met with some resistance from
the participants, one of whom argued that it was not the responsibility of the architect or archaeologist or
heritage specialist to come in and dictate how a given heritage project might affect local development–to
do so would mean taking on the role of the government or NGOs. In short, it was not their responsibility.
Shehata, however, pushed back against the participant’s comments, maintaining that the domains of
intervention were not mutually exclusive–rather, heritage management and socioeconomic development
were interrelated, and should be treated as such. And yet, during our interview, Shehata seemed to take a
slightly different position, telling me that the group had not wanted to lose sight of the buildings
themselves. Thus, when I asked him why no one had mentioned the work of the AKTC in al-Darb alAhmar, he told me that he had wanted to keep the workshop focus on the buildings, and he saw the
AKTC’s work as too focused on socioeconomic development and sustainability (Personal Interview,
August 9th, 2016).
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work in the Khalifa neighborhood (which participants saw during a tour of the area given by the
director). However, the criticism of the authorities’ interventions was also clear in the content of
some of the lectures–especially Shehata’s own talk on the “Pillars of Adaptive Reuse.”
During this lecture, Shehata conceded that adaptive reuse was not a “perfect solution”
and, in fact, posed a number of potential problems (such as damage to the “authentic” urban
fabric, “functional disorder” in the form of underused spaces, environmental damage, and the
introduction of aesthetically incongruous or disruptive architectural or structural features).
Moreover, by his own admission, European projects were as vulnerable to these problems as any
other; however, to illustrate these challenges, he focused on buildings in Historic Cairo. In
particular, he looked at the fate of the nearby Wikalat al-Ghouri, a 16th century caravanserai that
is part of a larger complex of buildings.74 The structure had been restored as part of the HCRP
project and was now being used for weekly tannūra (literally, “skirt”) performances that featured
ritual Sufi dancing and which catered almost exclusively to tourists. While some features of the
restoration project–such as the fact that the chairs and lighting were all removable–were
successful in Shehata’s view, he ultimately considered the project to be a poor example of
adaptive reuse. On the one hand, it was not economically “sustainable:” although the influx of
visitors coming to attend the performances had benefitted neighboring businesses, the revenue
from the show was not enough to maintain the building itself, which meant that the MoA had to
continue underwriting the initiative. On the other, the project also revealed the challenges of
dealing with different “stakeholders” and negotiating their varied–and potentially conflicting–
interests. In this regard, Shehata noted that the wikāla is “managed” by the MoA but the
activities held at the site are run by the Ministry of Culture (from which the MoA recently broke
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A caravanserai is a multi-use commercial space that generally includes lodging on the upper floors and
a trading and storage center on the ground floor.
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away and with whom they are now embattled over finances). He added further that because the
tannūra show is a dance performance, it has become a source of religious conflict given that the
Ghouri Complex as a whole includes a mausoleum and there is a prohibition against singing and
dancing in the vicinity of a burial.
Shehata contrasted the “failure” of the wikāla project with a number of “successful”
initiatives in Europe, including the Tate in London, L’Opera in Paris, and the Eastern Docklands
in Amsterdam. This contrast was just one instance of the aforementioned privileging of Western
models of heritage management. This privileging, like the critique of the MoA, was also evident
throughout the workshop. For example, it was clear in Shehata’s narrative about the origins of
the workshop, which I noted above. It was also evident in the workshop preparatory document,
which was dotted with quotes from European heritage scholars and practitioners such as Violletle-Duc, and it was also reiterated in the content of the other workshop lectures, which, as Shehata
had done, consistently foregrounded examples of successful adaptive reuse and urban
rehabilitation in places such as France and Italy–often contrasting them with comparable
examples in Cairo.75 For his part, Shehata was aware of the implications of this Western
orientation: he conceded that there was an element of ʿaqdat al-khawāga (foreigner complex–
i.e., valuing foreign goods, ideas, and practices over their Egyptian counterparts) underpinning
the event; however, he told me that he felt there was still value in applying these models and
ideas to the Egyptian context.76 Moreover, he suggested this orientation served a practical
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For example, one of the lectures reviewed a project to create a parking lot in Trier, Germany, another to
put glass over Roman ruins in a pedestrian zone in Zadar, Croatia, and a third to save subterranean water
tanks in Plaza del Torico in Terual, Spain.
76
In her research on gender and class in Cairo, Anouk de Koning describes ʿaqdat al-khawāga as a
common “Egyptian trait,” which can be understood as an “unqualified preference for everything foreign
over local alternatives” (De Koning 2009, 89). She notes that the hiring of foreign staff is a common
manifestation of this phenomenon, and I would therefore script my own presence at the workshop–and the
fact that a quote from me was included in the preparatory document–as an illustration of this idea.
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purpose: ensuring the workshop had some “international” elements (e.g., the inclusion of nonEgyptian participants, the endorsement of international institutions) helped to raise the profile of
the event while also making it more appealing to the MoA (Personal Interview, August 9th,
2016).

A Tenuous Alliance: The Cairo Heritage School and the Ministry of Antiquities
Although the workshop unfolded largely without incident, it was clear that the organizers
had been negotiating a tenuous and somewhat unpredictable relationship with the MoA. This
unstable dynamic manifested itself in different ways during the event, which meant that the CHS
organizers were continually adjusting their aims and activities in response to new or revised
decisions from the ministry. At the same time, the instability often left the group unsure of how
different aspects of the project would play out–or, in retrospect, why they played out as they did.
Publicly and practically, the MoA seemed to support CHS’s agenda and activities: they
authorized the workshop, gave the group permission to use Qasr Bishtek, provided a guide for
some of the local tours and site visits, and arranged access to Bayt al-Qadi. The ministry also
assured CHS that they would review the proposals submitted by the participants and try to
incorporate some of the ideas into their existing plans for the area–a promise that the workshop’s
aforementioned “handler” reiterated during the tour of Bayt al-Qadi, when he told the group that
the MoA took their work seriously and was interested in receiving some innovative and
“abnormal” ideas from them.77
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This assertion was met with skepticism by at least some of the participants: one woman confided to me
that she was “not expecting much” from the ministry, and she suggested that if the MoA was really
committed to improving conditions in the area, they could just clean up the garbage she had seen
everywhere.
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Even from an ideological perspective, the MoA appeared to be aligned with CHS–at least
with regard to the workshop’s emphasis on adaptive reuse: according to Shehata, the ministry
had recently announced plans to adaptively reuse some 100 historic structures in Historic Cairo,
including Bayt al-Qadi. Although the ministry supervisor, who was himself the head of the
Development and Training Unit for the Reuse of Listed Buildings in Historic Cairo, made no
mention of these plans during the event, he did repeatedly assert that the MoA supported this
model of heritage management. At the opening ceremony, he told the audience–almost as a kind
of confession–that there had previously been a “problem” with the ministry’s approach to the
area’s architectural legacies, with the MoA restoring structures and then closing them to the local
community and denying the latter access to the buildings. He assured us though, that the
ministry had seen the error of its ways and was now firmly committed to adaptive reuse. In
short, the government was no longer attempting to “musealize” the district through preservation
work that isolated buildings from the surrounding urban fabric. By way of example, he noted a
recent government-sponsored project to convert a wikāla adjacent to Bab al-Nasr (another
Fatimid-era gate) into a hotel. Likewise, he mentioned that the MoA had undertaken major
infrastructural work (e.g., re-paving/tiling) on Shariʿa al-Gamaliyya, another major artery in
Historic Cairo, which he argued was not really the ministry’s responsibility, but which
demonstrated their commitment to doing more than “just working on historic buildings.”
Ultimately, the MoA appeared to have a two-fold interest in supporting the CHS
workshop: on the one hand, the event allowed the ministry–at almost no cost–to claim that it was
pursuing progressive and internationally-approved forms of heritage management that involved
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local communities and non-state heritage actors.78 Demonstrating this commitment was of
particular concern to the MoA at the time of the workshop because, as Shehata told me,
UNESCO had expressed concern about the recent fate of Historic Cairo and the Egyptian
government’s inability to implement a comprehensive plan for its management and care.
Consequently, the agency was making noises about removing the area from the list of World
Heritage Sites (Personal Interview, Waleed Shehata, August 9th, 2016). By publicly supporting
projects such as the CHS workshop–particularly self-financed ones with an international patina,
the MoA could easily and visibly show that it was working to get things under control in Historic
Cairo and would be able to protect the neighborhood’s architectural legacies.
On the other, given the fate of the district after the uprising, the workshop was also a way
for the ministry to re-assert physical and symbolic control over Historic Cairo. This perhaps
helps to explain the ministry’s interest in having CHS focus on Bayt al-Qadi: bringing the event
into an area of Historic Cairo over which it had (and wanted to exert) greater authority
contributed to the government’s efforts to “reclaim” and “clean up” Shariʿa al-Muʿizz and the
surrounding area. The workshop thus offered an arena for the MoA to do what the government
authorities had done in areas such as Downtown Cairo and Midan al-Tahrir–namely, use spatial
interventions to alert the Egyptian public to the government’s “return” to power.

Regulating the Workshop: Unpredictability as a Tool of Governance
Given the opportunity the workshop presented to the MoA to advance its own aims, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the ministry endorsed the event and gave the organizers some
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According to Shehata, the MoA was particularly amenable to self-financed projects such as the CHS
workshop because the MoC had retained control of the funding after the MoA broke away, leaving the
latter without any financial resources (Personal Interview, Waleed Shehata, August 9th, 2016).
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autonomy in implementing their plans. Yet in spite of this support, there was also evidence to
suggest that the MoA saw the workshop as a threat to its authority–and perhaps with good
reason. As described above, the workshop organizers and participants were often openly critical
of the ministry and its methods for safeguarding Historic Cairo’s architectural legacies. One
woman summed up the general attitude after a government employee’s lecture, whispering to
me: “Of course, the MoA is the problem, but we can’t say that in this context.” Likewise, the
group repeatedly presented government-sponsored preservation and adaptive reuse initiatives to
the workshop participants as examples of failed or unsuccessful projects. In addition to the
example of Wikalat al-Ghouri, during the group’s visit to Cairo’s train station, Shehata
denounced the government’s renovation of the 19th century building and especially the
introduction of a neo-Pharaonic aesthetic over the neo-Islamic original, bluntly declaring: “it’s a
bad example, not a good one.”79
Moreover, the workshop’s emphasis on adaptive reuse and their attempts to engage the
“local community” could also be seen as a rebuke to the MoA–and even a potential threat to their
efforts to securitize the district. As with the other initiatives discussed in this dissertation, the
social interactions the CHS organizers sought to foster between young, Egyptian professionals
and local residents challenged the entrenched social stratification that was so ideologically
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The criticism of the government authorities extended beyond the MoA’s botched preservation projects.
When I asked Shehata about the incident with the ministry supervisor and the grape seller noted at the
start of this chapter, he responded with a long–seemingly unrelated–story about the local police and their
inability to deal with crowds in the area (during Ramadan but also during Friday prayer). He said that the
police did not know how to deal with these situations and so their solution was simply to make everyone
disperse–to kick people out (as they did to a group of men praying outside near Bayt al-Qadi). He said
this was both a “mentality” among the general public and a problem of training and lack of experience
among the police.
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central to the January 25th Revolution and thus constituted a form of social contact the authorities
seemed eager to curtail.80
In view of the challenges to the ministry posed by the workshop, the event required
careful monitoring and supervision. The resulting attempts to regulate the project were pursued
by the MoA through both explicit tactics and ambiguous ones, and they engendered friction
between the workshop organizers and the ministry as well as a pervasive sense of uncertainty
regarding the trajectory of the event. This friction was evident even in the planning stages of the
workshop, when Shehata and his colleagues tangled with the authorities over the site to be used
for the project. Shehata told me that it had never been his desire to work on Bayt al-Qadi, which
is located in the most heavily touristed area of Historic Cairo. Instead, he had wanted to hold the
workshop in Souq al-Silah, a low-income neighborhood located on the outskirts of the district
with far fewer tourists and less government attention. He told me that he and his colleagues
wanted to base themselves in a “marginal” but “living community” so that they would have the
opportunity to develop strong working relationships with the residents (Personal Interview,
August 9th, 2016). However, when he approached the MoA, the ministry pushed the group to
use Bayt al-Qadi on the grounds that they were already developing a project for the building and
its environs and were looking for some “fresh ideas.”
There was also tension between CHS and the ministry regarding participants’ ability to
move around the neighborhood and interact with members of the community. Although the
organizers had made arrangements with the Egyptian Organization of Gamaleyah Youth, a
nearby NGO, to have several young residents join the workshop and participate in the
development of the design proposals, the collaboration never took place. Consequently, CHS
80

Although, as one of the guest lecturers noted, community involvement can ultimately help the
government to collect information and enforce regulations related to heritage management.
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encouraged participants to connect with residents on their own, noting that the groups were free
to walk around and take photos, make sketches, talk with locals, and conduct interviews. As
already noted, many participants took these suggestions to heart and sought to speak with
business owners and residents; however, it was clear that they were hindered in their efforts by

Image 16. Looking south down Shariʿa al-Muʿizz. (Credit: author, August 2016.)
restrictions on their mobility–some of which could be traced to the MoA. They complained that
it was difficult to speak openly with people on the street and that photography frequently led to
harassment by the local tourism police or ministry officials.
Relatedly, the participants were frustrated that they had only been allowed to visit Bayt
al-Qadi (and the surrounding buildings included in the project) once–for less than an hour–on the

124

first day of the workshop. It was unclear to me why their access was so limited, but it was
evidently a source of annoyance for Shehata and his colleagues as well. In fact, during our
interview, Shehata challenged my assertion that the event had gone off without a hitch by
relaying to me what had happened when one of the participants tried to make a second visit to
the Jewelry and Scales Authority. As he explained, the individual had obtained permission to
access one of the buildings adjacent to Bayt al-Qadi; however, when she tried to enter it, she was
turned away by a cart driver who happened to be milling around outside. She told Shehata what
had happened, and he, in turn, went to the ministry official for help. To his surprise though, the
official defended the cart driver, arguing that the man had simply been trying to “help” the guard
who normally worked there. Shehata was irritated by the official’s response, but he felt his
defense of the man–and, indeed, the incident as a whole–was indicative of the MoA’s general
attitude vis-à-vis the area: one needed to have permission “in hand” in order to do anything and,
without such permission, anyone felt entitled to intervene (ostensibly on the MoA’s behalf). As
Shehata noted with regard to the cart driver: “What does he have to do with the building? He
should be minding his own business!”
Though perhaps rhetorical, Shehata’s question nonetheless points to a lack of clarity
regarding different actors and their actions or agendas that surfaced repeatedly throughout the
event. In fact, the encounter between the workshop participant and the cart driver was just one
of two stories Shehata shared with me in this regard: in the second, he was walking to the
workshop headquarters one morning with an Italian professor who had been invited to serve as
one of the event lecturers and jury panelists. The professor was taking a photograph in a side
street when a man approached and asked why she was taking pictures. Shehata asked the man
who he was, to which the latter responded: “ana wāḥid min al-athār” (“I’m from the Ministry of
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Antiquities”). Though it was unclear if the individual was, in fact, from the MoA, Shehata was
furious, seeing the question as a form of harassment designed to make the professor
uncomfortable and thus discourage her from taking photos.
In narrating the two incidents, Shehata emphasized the brazenness with which the two
men had interfered with the seemingly innocuous actions of those involved in the workshop. He
characterized this attitude regarding who has a right to be in public space (and what they can do
in those spaces) as pervasive, and indeed, his comments were echoed by several of my
interlocutors. Megawra’s director addressed the question of photography directly in a podcast
interview, noting that “as architectural students, all of us were at some point arrested because we
took a photograph of something that we weren’t supposed to [photograph]. And it is nothing
new to us either that a photograph in general is not something that is seen casually in a city like
Cairo. There are a lot of no no’s…The camera is not…a harmless, benign object” (Al-Ibrashy
2015). Likewise, one of Madd Platform’s founders told me that because of the long history of
university-led research in Egypt, students were the “last group” who could be out on the streets
and in public space with (relative) impunity. And yet he conceded that even though they were
“safest” (in comparison with others), they were still vulnerable–not only to the challenges noted
by the CHS workshop participants above–but to arrest and overnight detention (Personal
Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 22, 2016).
However, what struck me most about the encounters was the uncertainty surrounding the
identities of the two men. No one seemed to know who they were or what authority they might
have–and yet they were both remarkably successful in regulating the participants’ behavior. This
ambiguity cropped up elsewhere in the workshop: for example, it was unclear–even to Shehata
and his colleagues–why the workshop’s plan to collaborate with the local NGO had collapsed.
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Likewise, although Bayt al-Qadi was part of the ministry’s aforementioned plan to adaptively
reuse some 100 historic structures, no details about the project (or the existing proposal for Bayt
al-Qadi) were made available to the participants.81 Moreover, there was confusion regarding the
official status of Bayt al-Qadi and the surrounding buildings and how that status shaped the
scope of the participants’ projects. During our site visit, the ministry official and Shehata
explained the distinction between a building that has been registered as mabnā tāriykhy (historic
building) and mabnā athary (usually translated as monument). A building that has been listed as
mabnā athary falls under the jurisdiction of the MoA and therefore cannot be altered without
their approval. In contrast, a building that has been listed as mabnā tāriykhy has simply been
deemed historically significant by the NOUH (which has limited regulatory authority) and can
therefore be modified or changed without the MoA’s approval.82 Bayt al-Qadi was listed as
mabnā athary, which meant that it fell under the purview of the MoA; however, some of the
participants were unsure of what this status actually meant for their proposals–i.e., what would
constitute a legally permissible intervention. In addition, the other buildings they were meant to
include in their plans were not listed with the MoA, and thus seemed to fall into a kind of
bureaucratic grey zone, which led to uncertainty among the participants regarding what kinds of
changes they could propose.
Alone, this ambiguity surrounding the status of the buildings could be dismissed as a
minor detail or simply a failure of communication between the workshop organizers and the
participants; however, part of the argument I want to make in this chapter is that these seemingly
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In fact, Shehata told me that the “100 Monuments” plan had not been made available to the general
public, which had left conservationists and other non-state heritage actors in limbo, wondering where and
when the government would take action.
82
There are multiple criteria for buildings to be listed as either mabnā tāriykhy or mabnā athary, but, at a
minimum, for a building to be registered with the MoA, it must be at least 100 years old.
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discrete incidents or flashes of indeterminacy–and also unpredictability–fit together to empower
the ministry. The lack of clarity surrounding the fate of the workshop proposals and the plan to
collaborate with the local NGO, the erratic response of the ministry supervisor to the encounters
with the cart drivers (defending one man and threatening to “ambush” the other)–collectively,
these ambiguous or arbitrary actions and decisions left those involved with the workshop
suspended in a semi-permanent state of uncertainty. In turn, they afforded the MoA a kind of
diffuse authority over the event. Indeterminacy and unpredictability were thus powerful tools
wielded by the ministry.
Moreover, they were coupled with other, more explicit regulatory tactics such as
monitoring participants’ movements and their interactions with community members and
dictating where the workshop took place, what building CHS would focus on, and when the
participants could access certain sites. Collectively, these various techniques served the MoA
well: they were remarkably effective in circumscribing the event and limiting the group’s
activities. Ultimately, they also created a sense–at least for Shehata–that the workshop had been
an exercise in futility.83 Indeed, when I followed up with him to ask about the long-term
outcome of the workshop, he told me that although he presented the proposals to the MoA’s
Assistant to the Minster, who was impressed with the concept designs, none were ever taken up
by the ministry. In fact, as of 2019, the MoA had made no forward progress on the rehabilitation
(or adaptive reuse) of Bayt al-Qadi, and the building remained mostly closed to the public, used
only infrequently for exhibitions and other events (Personal Communication, August 10th, 2020).
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Shehata told me that in the weeks following the workshop, he presented the proposals to the MoA’s
Assistant to the Minster. While the official was impressed with the concept designs, ultimately, none of
them were taken up by the ministry. In fact, as of 2019, the MoA had made no forward progress on the
rehabilitation (or adaptive reuse) of Bayt al-Qadi, and the building remained mostly closed to the public,
used only infrequently for exhibitions and other events (Personal Communication, August 10th, 2020).
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Though he could not have foreseen this ending, he still took a highly critical view of the event in
its immediate aftermath, arguing that one worked incredibly hard in Egypt for “almost no
output.” He drew a parallel with the January 25th Revolution in this regard, describing Midan alTahrir as “the space for all that didn’t happen” and telling me that Egypt “kills hope” for anyone
working in the field of development (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016). These sentiments
seemed to underpin his desire to leave the country and pursue his PhD abroad, in a place where
he would be able to feel that his work “had an impact.”84 As he lamented, “I don’t want to just
be digging in the water.”
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And in fact, at the time of writing, he was a PhD candidate at Bond University’s Abedian School of
Architecture in Australia.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CREATING “SPACES OF MEDIATION:” CLUSTER, URBAN
DIPLOMACY, AND THE REVITALIZATION OF DOWNTOWN CAIRO’S
PASSAGEWAYS
Introduction
In October 2015, the American University in Cairo (AUC) co-hosted a two-day
conference entitled “Creative Cities: Re-framing Downtown” at the university’s original campus
in central Cairo.85 Organized by a local research and design group known as the Cairo Lab for
Urban Studies, Training and Environmental Research (CLUSTER), the symposium was
concerned with post-2011 sociospatial changes in the neighborhood surrounding the AUC–
namely, the district abutting Midan al-Tahrir and known colloquially as Downtown Cairo (or
wuṣṭ al-balad). The organizers brought together an impressive group of participants to explore
this topic: a mix of Egyptian and non-Egyptian academics, urban planners, heritage specialists,
government officials, real estate investors, and aṣḥāb al-maṣliḥa (or “local stakeholders”), the
last a somewhat vaguely-defined group that proved a lightning rod for debate during the event.
Over the course of two days, these panelists made presentations on a range of issues related to
“public space, heritage and urban culture, the revitalization of downtown in the context of
gentrification and securitization, and urban governance” (CLUSTER 2015a).
Fueled by the sense that I had hit the ethnographic jackpot, my excitement over the
conference left me sleepless for days. Given the nature of my research, I felt an anxious
gratitude for having been in “the right place at the right time.” This sentiment reached
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At the time of the AUC’s founding in 1919, the university constructed a modest campus in the
southeastern corner of Midan al-Tahrir; however, in the succeeding decades, the institution grew and
expanded into the downtown neighborhood, eventually comprising three “campuses” and one villa. In
2008, after years of construction and an investment of some $400 million, the school moved to a massive
new campus in New Cairo, a satellite city located on the outskirts of the capital. Though the university
retains its original campus in Midan al-Tahrir, all major schools and departments have been relocated, and
most of the remaining complexes in central Cairo have been leased or sold. (For more on the history of
the university, see Murphy 1987 and Sharkey 2008.)
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something of a fever pitch at the end of the first day of panels when attendees were able to join
one of six neighborhood tours organized by the conference. These thematic Downtown “walks,”
which were conducted in English, included a literary tour, a biking tour, a cinematic tour, a
photography tour, a modernist architecture tour, and a “passageways” tour, which was led by one
of CLUSTER’s co-founders, Omar Nagati. Because CLUSTER had emerged as such a
formidable player in recent efforts to “revitalize” the district, it was Nagati’s walk that I opted to
join.
Thus it was that I found myself, late one afternoon at the end of October, leaving the
calm and quiet of the AUC courtyard and trailing eagerly after Nagati as he led us across Shariʿa
Mohammed Mahmoud and into Downtown’s network of noisy, bustling streets. Over the next
several hours, he deftly guided our group–a mix of Egyptian and non-Egyptian conference
attendees–through an exhaustive tour of the district: we ambled along the broad, main
thoroughfares lined with their remarkable examples of Art Nouevau, Art Deco, and Modernist
apartment buildings. We inched down narrow side streets, some crowded with small shops and
businesses and others swamped with parked cars that the neighborhood sāyyis (street-level
parking attendant or valet) moved nimbly between with a fistful of keys. Along the way, we
passed several of Cairo’s most famous bars and cafes–Estoril, Café Riche, Horreya–as well as
countless small coffee shops offering shīsha (water pipe) and tea, their multi-colored plastic
chairs and tables spilling out onto the sidewalk–or street, as needed.
Though Nagati maneuvered us across a huge swath of the neighborhood, his focus was
the area’s mimarāt (passageways)–a spatial typology CLUSTER had defined as including both
formally constructed passages, such as the commercial arcades that were modeled on those of
19th century European cities, and informally developed passages that have grown up organically
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as “in-between spaces” between buildings (akin to service alleys) and which host various
commercial and entertainment activities (CLUSTER 2015b). As we stopped to look at examples

Image 17. Mimar al-Nekhely. (Credit: author, October 2015.)

of each type, Nagati impressed upon us his own nuanced understanding of these spaces as
charged sociospatial terrain rich in symbolism. In one narrow passage lined with small shops, he
showed us a barber’s towels drying on a metal laundry rack in the walkway itself. He used the
positioning of the rack to suggest that the spaces transcend the binary spatial logic of public
versus private. In another passage festooned with strands of colored flags, he took us up to the
bright blue doorway of Fasahet Somaya, a wildly popular new restaurant whose proprietor had
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started out cooking for protestors during the January 25th Revolution. As we peered into the
cozy dining room with its handful of tables, Nagati proposed that Somaya’s decision not to serve
drinks–in order to generate business for an older coffee shop directly opposite–illustrated how
the passages can engender multiple forms of sociality. Later in the tour, he took us to a
passageway full of cafes near CLUSTER’s office to explain how the spaces also create tension
and conflict. To illustrate his point, he described a long-simmering conflict between a cabaret
and its neighboring mosque. The latest evidence of friction between the two institutions was a
publicly displayed banner asserting that “tourism is good for all of us,” a message to the mosque,
in Nagati’s view, to “live and let live.”

Image 18. “Al-siyāḥa khīr lina kulina.” (“Tourism is good for all of us.”) (Credit: author, October 2015.)

Over the course of the walk, Nagati interwove these images and anecdotes to present the
passageway as a metonym for Egypt’s political climate at the time, describing it as an
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“interstitial” site of “liminality” that reflected the country’s political transition after the
tumultuous events of 2011–a “transitional space between two urban political orders, one that has
collapsed and one that is still becoming,” as he described it in a talk at the AUC in 2015.
Through this spatial re-framing, he linked older passages that have recently come to be
recognized as “historically significant” with others that are more generally viewed as purely
functional or utilitarian, suggesting that these physically disparate spaces should be understood
as having shared sociocultural value.
Nagati used this conception of the passageways–as spaces that are aesthetically and
functionally diverse but of equal cultural significance–to articulate an expansive view of the
neighborhood’s “heritage” (turāth). In the context of Downtown Cairo, this term has generally
been reserved for the area’s 19th and early 20th century buildings, which, despite their association
with Egypt’s era of colonial-monarchical rule, have recently been re-signified as part of Egypt’s
“national heritage” (El Kadi and ElKerdany 2006; Abaza 2011).86 However, towards the end of
our walk, Nagati pushed back against this categorization, suggesting that “Downtown culture”
was fundamentally “multilayered” and lacked a “single origin.” In his analysis, this “culture”
(thaqāfa) was not limited to the district’s architectural legacies; rather, it encompassed the whole
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In line with the scholarship on heritage-making and nationalism, Egyptian cultural and architectural
legacies have been used to generate a coherent story for the nation, its founding, and its members
(Meskell 2000; Abu El Haj 2001; Benavides 2004; Colla 2008). The origins of so-called Egyptian
heritage can be traced back to the 19th century, when Europeans cultivated “Egyptian archaeology” as part
of the imperial project, making use of Pharaonic, Greco-Roman, Coptic, and Islamic architectural and
archaeological legacies to justify–and even naturalize–colonial intervention; however, in this midst of
their efforts to appropriate “Egyptian heritage,” Egyptians themselves developed a keen interest in the
country’s architectural and archaeological remains, seeing in them the roots of their own “national
identity” (Hassan 1998; Reid 2003). Over time, the Egyptian authorities consolidated the ideological link
between the Egyptian nation and the country’s archaeological and architectural legacies through efforts to
control both the physical remains of those legacies and the narratives produced about them. Using myriad
heritage-making projects, the state solidified an historical narrative for the nation that foregrounded the
country’s Pharaonic, Islamic, and–to a lesser extent–Coptic heritage as civilizational evidence that Egypt
is “one of the first countries” (Ministry of Culture 2015).
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of the built environment dating from the 19th to the 21st centuries as well as cultural forms such
as 1970s signage and social practices like contemporary street vending–all of which warranted
recognition and protection as part of the area’s heritage. In making this claim, Nagati challenged
the established approach to heritage management (particularly vis-à-vis the government’s recent
preservation efforts in the area), which has been to suppress this very heterogeneity by focusing
on “one point in time.” He argued instead that a revised understanding was needed of what he
now referred to as “Downtown’s heritage”–one that accounted for the area’s multiple
architectural and sociocultural layers.

Image 19. CLUSTER’s walking tour of Downtown Cairo’s passageways. (Credit: author, October 2015.)

The walk proved an invaluable introduction to CLUSTER and their view of Downtown
Cairo. Moreover, when I reflected on Nagati’s comments regarding the district’s heritage, I was
able to see the organization’s ideological agenda more clearly. In particular, I realized he had
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invoked this deeply familiar idiom in order to render new aspects of the urban fabric legible to
the members of the tour–and more specifically, to shape our perception of them as socially and
culturally valuable. In short, his re-conceptualization of the term suggested a calculated effort to
assign value to spaces, people, and activities in the area that have long been denigrated or
dismissed. This foregrounding of local residents and their spatial practices distills the values and
aspirations underpinning CLUSTER’s work. As I discuss in this chapter, the organization has
emphasized sustained engagement across their activities with what they describe as “local
stakeholders” (aṣḥāb al-maṣliḥa or al-aṭrāf al-mukhtalifa): residents, landlords, business owners,
real estate developers, local government authorities, NGOs, and other non-state groups. Making
this engagement central to their work, they have presented community involvement as critical to
any effort to “revitalize” Downtown Cairo. This ideology echoes the dominant narrative of the
January 25th Revolution described in Chapter One–as a moment when entrenched class
stratifications were momentarily transcended. It also stands in explicit contradistinction to recent
state and private-led revitalization efforts in the area, which have been accused of overlooking
the needs of local residents in order to advance an agenda of so-called neoliberal gentrification
(Abaza 2017, 180).
Yet CLUSTER’s interest in these “local stakeholders” extends beyond simply
guaranteeing socioeconomically or structurally diverse forms of “community participation” in
their work; rather, they seek a kind of engagement that will help them to build what they have
described as an “alternative model of urban governance.” In this chapter, I trace the contours of
this “alternative model,” showing how it has been conceived as a self-sustaining infrastructure to
manage and care for the urban environment. Critically, CLUSTER has not organized this
infrastructure around increased engagement with the government authorities. Instead, they have
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built it around open channels of communication among different “stakeholders” (in which there
is space for disagreement and dissent) as well as a shared sense of responsibility toward and
investment in the care and protection of the urban environment.
While CLUSTER’s commitment to this agenda is clearly articulated in their rhetoric,
their implementation of it is has proved more complicated. The organization has had to negotiate
a highly unstable working environment in Downtown Cairo over the past eight years: in addition
to the political turmoil and the government’s relentless crackdown on NGOs and other non-state
actors, public and private real estate companies have recently intensified their efforts to
redevelop the area and its built environment. At the same time, the Egyptian government has
pursued aggressive tactics to securitize the district and its public spaces, particularly those that
were central to the January 25th protests. I argue that in order to navigate this terrain, CLUSTER
has worked hard to position themselves as a “mediator” or a “bridge” between different
constituencies, and they have refused to establish clear or fixed alliances. Instead, they have
asserted that everyone–from the municipal authorities to the real estate developers–has a role to
play in the care and maintenance of Downtown Cairo and its built environment. Consequently,
the organization has moved continuously among different groups, sometimes getting close to
local residents or business owners and at other times working with groups or individuals who
might be in conflict with those same community members. Such flexibility has not always
proved easy–not least because, depending on the context, it has entailed privileging the interests
of certain actors over others, which has occasionally led to tension and resentment.
Nevertheless, this pliability has come to represent CLUSTER’s modus operandi, and it has
served the organization well, facilitating their work in a variety of contexts.
In the remainder of this chapter, I contextualize and then unpack these dynamics of
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CLUSTER’s work in order to show both the political valences of and ambiguities embedded in
their interventions. I begin by reviewing Downtown Cairo’s history, from its origins as the
country’s new, “modern” capital in the 19th century to its glory days as the apex of so-called
Egyptian cosmopolitanism to its recent valorization as part of the pantheon of Egyptian “national
heritage.” I also sketch the sociospatial changes to the area wrought by the January 25th
Revolution–both the government-led efforts to securitize the district and the renewed attempts to
“revitalize” it pursued by both state and non-state actors. This overview of historical and
contemporary developments in the area helps to frame the images and narratives about
Downtown Cairo that are currently circulating in popular discourse and against which
CLUSTER’s work is set. I then turn to the organization itself, laying out their origins and early
activities as well as the gradual evolution of their mission. Following this, I narrow in on the
passageways project, which, at the time of my fieldwork, was the organization’s most significant
intervention in Downtown Cairo to date. After summarizing the details of the project, I analyze
the ideological agenda underpinning it, arguing that the initiative illustrates how CLUSTER used
the city and its materiality to create an alternative sociopolitical arrangement. In the final section
of this chapter, I look closely at one dimension of the project–their work in Phillips Passageway–
to explore the challenges and contradictions embedded in this ideological project.

Historical Overview of Downtown Cairo: Origins, Growth, Decline, and “Rebirth”
Downtown Cairo has long served as a symbolic touchstone in both the popular and
national imaginaries, functioning through the years as a flexible but “overloaded” signifier
(Ryzova 2015). Given its rich social history and architectural legacies, the area has, over the
past few decades, been scripted in popular discourse as the locus of “Egyptian modernity,”
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“Egyptian cosmopolitanism,” and Egypt’s “belle époque” (Volait 2013). Though this narrative
began to take shape at the end of the 20th century, its roots trace back to the original construction
of the district at the end of the 19th century. Spearheaded by Khedive Ismaʿil (1863-1879), the
project was inspired (at least partly) by his visit to Paris in 1867, where he saw not only the Paris
Exposition Universelle but Baron Haussman’s transformation of the capital. Upon his return to
Cairo, Ismaʿil determined to build new, “modern” quarters beyond the borders of the “old city”
(the area now known as Historic Cairo).87 He appointed the European-educated engineer, ‘Ali
Mubarak, to oversee the planning of these new neighborhoods, and within four years, Mubarak
had laid out three areas in the new district: Ismaʿiliyya, Azbakiyya, and Nasriyya (Bodenstein
2015, 19). Ismaʿiliyya, which corresponds most closely to what is today understood as
Downtown Cairo, was the most extensively developed, with a network of roundabouts connected
by broad boulevards (Fahmy 2005, 177-178; Raymond 2001, 314).
It has been argued that the new construction divided Cairo into two halves: the old,
Egyptian–or native–city, and the new, modern, European city (Abu-Lughod 1971, 98; Raymond
2001, 317). Though the veracity of this characterization has been challenged, the new
neighborhood, with its large villas and gardens, did mark an architectural and aesthetic break
with their predecessor. Moreover, the contrasts between the two areas sharpened over the next
100 years: as the “old city” fell into decline, the new quarters grew and expanded during several
periods of economic prosperity that continued through the Revolution of 1952 (Elshahed
2015).88 In the course of this development, the villas that had defined Ismaʿiliyya were
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Mohamed Elshahed argues that this framing of Isma‘il’s urban development project–as an attempt to
replicate what he saw in Paris–is a “myth.” Instead, he contends that it was connected to “modernizing”
efforts unfolding in cities across the globe at this time (Elshahed 2015).
88
A number of scholars have argued that the two areas were much more integrated–both socially and
economically–than has been suggested (Bodenstein 2015, 20; Elshahed 2015; Farouk Ahmed 2005).
However, the new neighborhood–with its large villas and gardens–did mark an architectural and aesthetic
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demolished and replaced with public, private, and governmental structures built according to
prevailing architectural trends. The legacy of this construction is found today in the stunningly
diverse array of buildings in the district, which is a veritable cornucopia of structures designed in
Neo-Baroque, Neo-Classical, Art Nouveau, Art Deco, Gothic, Venetian, Neo-Islamic, Modernist
and Internationalist styles.89 Yet it is also found in the passageways themselves, for it was the
redevelopment of the area in the first half of the 20th century that gave rise to the informal
passages referenced above.
Socially and culturally, Downtown Cairo flourished during this period from the end of
the 19th century until the 1952 Revolution–the era often referred to as Egypt’s belle époque
(Volait 2013). At this time, it served as the capital’s commercial and entertainment center for the
middle and upper classes, boasting numerous European-style department stores and hotels,
cinemas and theatres, nightclubs, restaurants and cafes. From a residential perspective, it
attracted both Egyptian elites as well as many families of European and Levantine origin, a mix
that helped to create a religiously and ethnically diverse community. Given this social and
cultural vibrancy, particularly in the decades leading up to the Revolution of 1952, this moment
in the area’s history has come to be the metonym for so-called Egyptian cosmopolitanism.
However, in the wake of the 1952 Revolution, many of the area’s European and Levantine
residents fled–including most of the district’s Jewish population. In turn, middle-class
Egyptians, empowered by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalist policies, began to move into the

break with their predecessor. Moreover, an exodus of affluent residents from the “old city” coupled with
a wave of European residents moving to the “new city” meant that there were physical and socioeconomic
distinctions between the areas. For my purposes, however, the veracity of this distinction is less
significant than its durability as a popular model for imagining Cairo.
89
The sheer range of these architectural styles challenges several popular labels used to describe the area–
e.g., the khedival city, the colonial city, and even “Paris on the Nile” (Elshahed 2015).
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Image 20. Downtown Cairo’s architectural diversity. (Credit: author, November 2015.)

neighborhood to take over the newly vacated apartments. Though the neighborhood maintained
its vitality into the 1960s, this was the first of several shifts in the socioeconomic makeup of the
area. The second shift occurred in the 1970s, when those middle-class residents decamped for
newly developed districts such as Mohandeseen (Elshahed 2015). This marked the beginning of
a prolonged period of depopulation, one that continued through the end of the 20th century–
particularly as new, government-sponsored satellite cities and gated communities were
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developed on Cairo’s periphery and lured residents away from the city center (Kuppinger 2004;
Sims 2010).90
This depopulation–and the broader demographic shifts to which it was tied–had a
profound impact on Downtown Cairo’s urban fabric: the housing stock began to decay as
numerous apartments sat vacant, and landlords–constrained by Egypt’s antiquated rental laws–
were unwilling or unable to invest in building maintenance. The area’s infrastructure also
crumbled as the government shifted its focus and resources to the development of the
aforementioned satellite cities. Moreover, although the neighborhood endured as a popular
destination for shopping and entertainment (though now catering to a different strata of the
Egyptian population), this popularity led to increased traffic and congestion–both vehicular and
pedestrian–which further degraded the infrastructure and built environment.

“Rediscovering” Downtown Cairo at the Turn of the 21st Century
Beginning in the late 1980s, new forces and actors emerged in the district, and the area’s
sociospatial dynamics began to shift yet again. To start, upper- and upper middle-class Cairenes
began to express a collective longing for the cosmopolitan lifestyle with which the neighborhood
was often associated (Elshahed 2015). This “wave of public nostalgia,” which manifested in
cinema, literature, and other forms of popular discourse, focused on the area’s history in the first
half of the 20th century.91 Drawing on images and representations of the district and its
architecture, this nostalgic discourse framed Downtown Cairo as the one-time apex of “Egyptian
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These newly developed areas were carefully marketed to appeal to affluent Cairenes with promises of
privatized services and a permanent escape from the noise, pollution, traffic, and crowds that had come to
define the Egyptian capital.
91
See, for example, Cynthia Myntti’s (1999) book of photographs of the district. For examples of literary
representations of this nostalgia, see al-Aswany 2004; Lagnado 2007; Mehrez 2010. For analysis of
several of these works vis-à-vis the evolution of Downtown Cairo, see Naaman 2011.
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cosmopolitanism” and a symbol of the country’s long-lost “golden years” (Ryzova 2015).92
As this narrative took root among Egyptian elites, state agencies and heritage
professionals began to show renewed interest in the district as well. The convergence of these
two phenomena gave rise to a reconceptualization of Downtown Cairo as part of Egypt’s
“national heritage,” a shift Mercedes Volait (2013) has characterized as a case of “invented
tradition.”93 Critical to this shift was the 1992 Cairo earthquake, which damaged scores of
buildings–historic and otherwise–and killed more than 500 residents. In the wake of the disaster,
the Ministry of Education announced its intention to demolish schools that had been housed in
19th and 20th century palaces or villas (El Kadi and ElKerdany 2006, 356). The announcement,
which proved highly controversial, engendered a surge of popular concern for Cairo’s “modern”
architectural legacies–including those in Downtown Cairo, which Egyptian architects and
conservationists began to demand be preserved and protected. Over the next few years, their
efforts yielded several state-sponsored revitalization initiatives in the neighborhood as well as
legislative changes designed to inventory and protect the district’s built environment, including
several demolition bans (El Kadi and ElKerdany 2006, 357-366).94
This re-framing of Downtown Cairo’s built environment as a “national heritage”
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Lucie Ryzova argues that this nostalgia represented a marked departure from previous “postindependence models of a national historical imagery.” In this earlier model, Downtown Cairo was
treated as the physical legacy of foreign hegemony–its buildings were “silent reminders of foreign
domination over Egypt's economy and the plundering of its resources” (Ryzova 2015).
93
Government legislation from the 1980s also facilitated the official recognition of Downtown Cairo’s
buildings as architectural heritage. Law 117, which was passed in 1983, set a moratorium period of 100
years for any object or structure to be considered an “antiquity,” thereby establishing a new–and
expanding–temporal framework for the conception of “Egyptian heritage” as well as its protection (Volait
2013; Awatta 2015, 48).
94
In particular, a presidential decree from 2001 led to the formation of the National Organization for
Urban Harmony (NOUH), the government body tasked with producing a registry of historically and
architecturally significant buildings and with regulating all renovation and preservation projects
undertaken on listed structures (Volait 2013). Though its mandate includes cities throughout Egypt, the
organization has focused heavily on Downtown Cairo, generating an extensive list of protected buildings
for the district (Awatta 2015, 61-64).
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dovetailed with other sociospatial developments in the area in the early 2000s, including the
emergence of the district as the locus of the city’s independent arts scene as well as a surge of
investment by public and private real estate groups.95 These real estate companies capitalized on
the popular interest in the area, as well as its depressed real estate market and the country’s rental
laws, to begin acquiring and renovating “architecturally significant” buildings. At the
government level, Misr Real Estate Assets (MREA), which was established in 2007 as a
subsidiary of the publicly owned Misr Insurance Holding Company, began purchasing properties
and “refurbishing” them. They currently own 140 buildings in the district, of which almost half
are officially recognized as “architecturally significant.”96 At the private level, the most visible
actor has been Al Ismaelia for Real Estate Investment, which was founded in 2008 by SaudiEgyptian investors–and which warrants some attention here given the company’s close, if
fraught, relationship with CLUSTER.
Bucking the pattern of private investment in the suburban development of Cairo’s
satellite cities, Al Ismaelia has purchased some 22 buildings of historic and/or architectural
significance in the district–of which several have already been renovated.97 They have framed
their work as an attempt to “revitalize the center of the capital city by preserving the architectural
95

The anchor for this burgeoning independent arts scene was–and still is–Townhouse Gallery. (See
footnote #56.) Of particular significance is the Gallery’s organization of the Nitaq Festival, which ran
from 2000-2001. The event was comprised of lectures, exhibitions, and various performances, and it
brought Cairenes to the district from across the city. It also served as a precursor to the D-CAF festival,
which began after the January 25th Revolution. (For more on the development of Downtown’s art scene,
see Elshahed 2015, 131-135.)
96
Several of these buildings have recently received façade renovations that have proved unpopular with
the general public due to the poor quality and superficial nature of the work (Awatta 2015, 65-66).
97
While many of these buildings are listed as “protected” in the NOUH registry, this designation does not
prevent the firm from purchasing the properties. Instead, Al Ismaelia must simply obtain the NOUH’s
approval for any renovation work. However, the company contends that their greatest challenge is not the
need for such approval but the negotiation of tenancy in the acquisition of properties. In order to
purchase a building, the firm must buy out all tenants–a complex process given Egypt’s rental laws,
which allow family members to pass leases from one generation to the next regardless of unit occupancy
(El Dorghamy 2010).
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grandeur of Downtown while celebrating Cairo’s dynamic urban fabric” (Al Ismaelia, “About
Us,” n.d.). Their goal, as one of the company’s co-founders, Karim Shafei, noted at the “Reframing Downtown” conference, is to re-create the district as a space that is welcoming to a
broad cross-section of Egyptian society.98 At the same time, the company has been clear about
their interest in attracting certain segments of the population over others. According to Shafei:
“Cafés or bars or libraries–we think they belong downtown…Some other activities, like
metalworking–we don’t think they should be downtown. We offer them key money to relocate”
(Berger 2014).
In order to “capture the [district’s] spirit and dynamism and to attract, again, life and
business to the heart of Cairo,” the company has been actively supporting cultural initiatives in
the area, which has brought it into close contact with CLUSTER. They have offered attractive
rental agreements to galleries (including Townhouse Gallery, the Contemporary Image
Collective, and Studio Emad Eddin), and they have also developed their own projects–most
notably, the Downtown Contemporary Arts Festival (D-CAF), an annual arts event conceived in
2010 and launched in 2012 (Szremski 2012). Additionally, they put together the Cairo D-Tour,
an English-language walking tour created by CLUSTER that “recognizes the city’s monumental
boulevards, surviving palaces, and opulent apartment buildings, while exploring the everyday
experience around its books stands, food stalls and mobile vendors” (Al Ismaelia, “About Cairo
D-Tour,” n.d.).99
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For a comprehensive discussion of Al Ismaelia’s work in the neighborhood, see Awatta 2015, 78-88.
For a critique of their work, see Berger 2014. In particular, Berger compares Al Ismaelia to the Cairo
2050 project, writing that the two “interpret development in the same way: as neoliberal growth abetted
by a kind of ‘culture’ not currently present in the area, and the industry that follows in its wake. Both are
based on appropriated types of urban modernity that have little to do with what Cairo currently looks like,
or how it operates.”
99
For a critique of Al Ismaelia’s relationship with D-CAF, see Szremski 2012.
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Image 21. Hotel Viennoise, one of Al Ismaelia’s acquisitions. (Credit: author, May 2015.)

Looking at Al Ismaelia’s work alongside the other sociospatial changes unfolding in the
area at this time–a growing effort to protect the district’s architectural legacies, a popular
discourse about the neighborhood as the locus of a bygone “Egyptian modernity,” a flourishing
arts scene, and state-sponsored redevelopment efforts–it would appear that the area was
undergoing a process of “neoliberal urbanization” or, more specifically, “neoliberal
gentrification,” in the years leading up to the January 25th Revolution (Ryzova 2015).100
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Scholars working in a variety of contexts have documented how the heritage idiom is mobilized to aid
in gentrification efforts and other forms of urban development enabled through neoliberal economic
policies. Specifically, they have highlighted how state officials and private developers–often working
together–frame revitalization projects around the supposed need for “heritage preservation,” using this
rhetoric as a pretext to evict residents from a given neighborhood in order to facilitate its redevelopment.
As seen in Rome (Herzfeld 2009 and 2010) and Beirut (Sawalha 2010), those facing eviction from
historic districts tend to be long-term, low-income residents who are not property owners, making them
particularly vulnerable to the radical market shifts associated with gentrification. Additionally, as
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However, the complexity of the district’s urban fabric–especially with regard to property
ownership and rental laws–as well as the continued interest in suburban development by both the
government and private developers slowed this process. The turmoil wrought by the January
25th Revolution, to which I now turn, added another layer of complexity–disrupting, even if only
momentarily, much of the activity just described.101

In the Wake of January 25th: Securitizing Downtown Cairo
Ultimately, the political upheaval of 2011 re-affirmed Downtown Cairo’s practical and
symbolic centrality at the local and national levels, and, in turn, intensified many of the preuprising processes underway in the district. On the one hand, the uprising galvanized both state
and non-state actors already involved in the neighborhood and provided a fresh ideological
impetus for their work; on the other, the turmoil created practical opportunities for new groups
and organizations to intervene in the district. At the same time, the post-uprising tumult
engendered aggressive efforts by the authorities to securitize the district and eradicate the
sociospatial traces of its recent history.
As I discussed in Chapter One, in the wake of Mubarak’s overthrow, Cairenes capitalized
on the temporary security vacuum to “re-claim” public space in Downtown Cairo. The
proliferation of street vending already noted was highly prominent in the neighborhood, and

described not only in Beirut (Puzon 2017) but in Damascus (Totah 2014) as well, these residents are
frequently scripted both as the source of the neighborhood’s decline and as unsuitable “stewards” of its
heritage (Dines 2016). However, scholars have also shown how “heritage” is used to resist gentrification.
In some instances, such as the post-war reconstruction of Beirut, the call to preserve heritage is also used
by activists to challenge redevelopment that is deemed a threat to cultural or architectural legacies (Puzon
2017). In other contexts, such as the Spanish city of Palma (Franquesa 2013) or the Cretan town of
Rethemnos (Herzfeld 1991), residents themselves invoke the heritage assignation in reference to their
own property, recognizing the potential economic value inherent in the label.
101
Elshahed has argued that the district is unlikely to undergo “conventional gentrification” as it has been
described in cities of the “Global North” (Elshahed 2015, 121-123)
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vendors used many of the area’s major thoroughfares to hawk their wares (Abdelrahman 2013;
Nagati and Stryker 2013). Likewise, visual and performance artists staked a claim to public
space in the district with dance and music performances as well as exhibitions and installation
works (El Shimi 2013; Malsin 2015). However, this flourishing of activity in the neighborhood
was short-lived, as the government (however unstable) quickly sought to regain control over both
Downtown Cairo and Midan al-Tahrir. Efforts to impose “order” on the square began almost
immediately after Mubarak’s removal, with government authorities launching a campaign to
clear Midan al-Tahrir not only of protestors and vendors but of all popular vestiges of the
January 25th Revolution as well (Abdelrahman 2013).102
Following the military ousting of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, these “clean up” efforts were
expanded to include the whole of Downtown Cairo, with the government implementing a series
of aggressive policies in the neighborhood. In the summer of 2014, the authorities renewed their
attempts to forcibly remove the street vendors and relocate them to the parking lot of Torgoman
bus terminal on the periphery of central Cairo (Barsoum 2014). A year later, as part of an
alleged effort to relieve congestion, parking was banned along the district’s major streets and
microbuses (a staple of the Egyptian transit system) were forced to find alternative locations to
pick up and drop off passengers (Shukrallah 2015).103 Similarly, every local business was
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This “clean up” project included the eventual demolition of the modernist-era headquarters of the
National Democratic Party (NDP), a registered landmark building that was burned during the Revolution
and which the government decided to raze in mid-2011. Though the original proposal engendered a
vociferous anti-demolition campaign, the building was eventually demolished in 2015 (Elshahed 2011;
Boer 2015). Other buildings in Midan al-Tahrir have also been facing an uncertain future: the Egyptian
Museum is eventually to be displaced by the Grand Egyptian Museum, a massive new project at the Giza
Plateau that is still under construction (Farhat 2018). Similarly, in 2016, the government announced the
imminent closure and relocation of the Mugammaʿ, the center of Egyptian government bureaucracy
(Raafat 2016). The proposal dates back to 2005, but, if ever implemented, the offices housed in the
building will be relocated to one of the capital’s satellite cities–possibly to “new New Cairo,” the
government’s proposed new capital in the desert (Kingsley 2015).
103
The parking ban coincided with the completion, in 2015, of a massive parking garage under Midan alTahrir (Kotb 2014). The ban also, as Nagati noted on the conference walking tour, transformed the
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mandated to put a garbage bin outside their shop, leading to a sudden explosion of trash cans in
an area where there had been virtually none.
In the aggregate, these various initiatives served as more than just a practical effort to
“securitize” Downtown Cairo and re-instate order; they also functioned as a symbolic
articulation of “the state’s” return to power. As Abdelrahman (2013) has written with regard to
the clearing of Midan al-Tahrir, they were meant to “restore public order to the streets
and…regain the image of a powerful state and of the ‘respectability’ of Egyptian society.” Yet
they were also designed to sanitize Downtown Cairo and erase all physical traces of the recent
political upheaval. This erasure allowed for the imposition of a new narrative about the
neighborhood–one that Nagati described to me as decidedly “apolitical” (Personal Interview,
August 1st, 2016). The surge of interest in revitalizing Downtown Cairo and protecting its
“heritage” has been incorporated into–and intensified by–this project of de-politicization: by
remaking the district and promoting it as an emblem of Egypt’s belle époque, the authorities
have been able to strip it of its recent political associations. The government-led securitization of
Downtown Cairo was thus inextricably linked to the various place-making projects being
pursued in the neighborhood both before and after the uprising.
It is within this context of pre- and post-2011 urban transformation that CLUSTER has
attempted to situate itself. While the organization certainly capitalized on the window of
opportunity created by the security vacuum that followed the January 25th Revolution, they have
also struggled to weather the spatial and political crackdown that followed it. Likewise, while
they have sought to frame their work in ways that will generate interest among the general
public, they have had to consider the potential consequences of invoking popular and newly
district’s side streets, into virtual parking lots. Because parking was still legal there, it was not
uncommon to find parked cars three rows deep.
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circulating concepts such as “gentrification,” “heritage,” and “public space.”

CLUSTER and the Founding of an “Alternative Practice”
CLUSTER’s headquarters are located in the heart of Downtown Cairo, in one of the
neighborhood’s countless old residential buildings. As is often the case, the building entrance is
difficult to find–recessed and set away from the street, its location does not quite correspond to
the physical address. On the day of my interview with Nagati, I circled the block multiple times
in search of it, growing increasingly frustrated and unable to solicit accurate information from
any of the local shopkeepers milling about on the sidewalk. I finally stumbled across the
entrance by chance. Once inside, I took a moment in the lobby to let the cool darkness soothe
my frayed nerves before climbing the wide, graceful staircase that wound around the old elevator
shaft up to the third floor, where a discrete plaque on an imposing wooden door told me I had
reached my destination.
Like many of their neighbors, CLUSTER works out of a converted apartment–a
sprawling warren of rooms that have been pressed into service as a library, private office, and
common workspace replete with a loft and a massive white table. The walls were covered with
drawings, models, and posters from their various projects, yet the space still evoked a sense of
domesticity–creaky wooden floors, delicate moldings around the windows and doors, a kitchen
area somewhere in the back. The office into which Nagati led me was tranquil, with soft leather
chairs and tall windows facing two directions, offering me a glimpse of the neighboring
buildings.
The space figures centrally in CLUSTER’s origin story, for it was here that the seeds of
the organization were planted in the months prior to the January 25th Revolution. As Nagati
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relayed to me, he left his job working for a private architecture firm in 2010, a position he had
taken after returning to Cairo from several years of studying and teaching in the US and Canada.
A growing dissatisfaction with the work and a kind of professional restlessness led him in search
of what he described as an “alternative practice”–by his own admission a “dreamy” and
“sketchy” idea at the start (Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016). At about this time, he met
CLUSTER’s co-founder, Beth Stryker, an American architect and curator working on projects
related to art and public space in the Middle East. Though they lacked a clear agenda, they
shared an interest in collaborating, which galvanized Nagati to sign a five-year lease on the
office space.
In retrospect, their timing could not have been better: just a few months later and several
blocks away, the country’s political order was brought to its knees by the uprising. For Nagati
and Stryker the social, political, and economic conditions described in Chapter One–a collective
sense of optimism about the future and a will to “do something,” a “weak” government and an
easing of the ḥāl al-ṭawāraʾ (state of emergency), and an influx of foreign funding–converged
with the sociospatial transformation of Downtown Cairo to give them an initial focus for their
work. More specifically, in the very streets below CLUSTER’s office, an array of new spatial
practices was unfolding, which Nagati felt compelled to document–in part due to his sense, as he
noted in a lecture held at the AUC in 2016, that the farāgha (opening) enabling them was
temporary, a fluid situation that was bound to disappear as “law and order” were eventually–and
inevitably–re-imposed. This imperative began with a time-lapse video of the increased street
vending in their area but quickly evolved into a multi-faceted research initiative that sought to
archive the spread of “informal encroachments” across the urban landscape after the uprising.104
104

The video, in turn, served as a springboard for another long-term research project focused explicitly on
street vendors. This project, which ran until 2015 documented vending practices and related conflicts
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Focusing on “hard” interventions (e.g., roadside construction) and “soft” interventions (e.g.,
graffiti), CLUSTER aimed to document, typologize, and archive the “transient conditions
characterizing the contemporary moment” in Cairo (Nagati and Stryker 2013, 19).105
As this initial project gained momentum, several others began to take shape. One was the
the Cairo Urban Initiatives Platform (CUIP), which CLUSTER set up in 2012 in an attempt to
document the countless urban-focused activities, organizations, and events that were
proliferating across the capital at the time. Conceived as a “community based, user-generated
interactive map, directory, [and] shared calendar of events,” the platform allowed users to upload
information about events, organizations, and projects based in Cairo. The aim, according to
Nagati, was to share resources–it was the “idea of a co-working space put a little differently”
(Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016).106
Another initiative CLUSTER pursued at this time–albeit with less success–was the ʿArd
al-Liwaʾ Community Park Project. After the government authorities announced a plan in 2012
to redevelop the lone greenspace in ʿArd al-Liwaʾ, an informal community located in Giza, local
residents approached CLUSTER for help. In response, CLUSTER coordinated with the relevant
government ministries as well as local non-state actors to develop a plan to convert the space into
a community park. Though Nagati was guarded about the details of the project (and its
outcome), he emphasized that in this instance, CLUSTER’s role was “inverted.” As with Madd

among vendors and other “stakeholders.” According to their website, this initiative aimed at “developing
strategies and proposals for pilot areas that would address the needs and aspirations of the multiple users
and stakeholders in downtown streets and public space” (CLUSTER 2019). A book based on the project,
Street Vendors and the Contestation of Public Space, was released in 2019 with the support of a grant
from the Ford Foundation made to the Research Foundation of the State University of New York.
105
The project yielded the book, Archiving the City in Flux: Cairo’s Shifting Urban Landscape Since the
January 25th Revolution, which was published in 2013.
106
According to Nagati, CUIP began with 35 initiatives in 2012 but quickly grew to more than 300 by
2015 (Personal interview, August 1st, 2016).
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Platform’s early activities, instead of the architect/urban planner approaching the community, it
was the community reaching out to the professional.
Finally, additional early projects came in the form of two symposiums, which served as
precursors to the “Re-framing Downtown” conference I attended in 2015. The first was a panel
held at the Goethe Institute in Cairo in 2012 addressing the topic of “Artists as Urban Catalysts”
(Elshahed 2015). The second was an interdisciplinary conference held at the AUC in April of
2013, entitled “Learning from Cairo: Global Perspectives and Future Visions.” The event, which
brought together “academics, professionals, and policy makers” to “revisit Cairo’s urban revolt
and accompanied processes of urban change” entailed a series of “working sessions” with
different panelists paired with several walking tours (Stryker et al. 2013, 154).107
CLUSTER’s ability to pursue these early activities meant that by the time of the 2013
military coup, the organization had established itself as one of the main non-state actors
addressing post-2011 urbanism in the Egyptian capital. Though they were not (and, at the time
of writing, are still not) registered as an NGO, they had the “ingredients,” to use Nagati’s
expression, both to sustain themselves and to expand the scope of their work. Critically, they
had built sufficient financial resources through consultancies, institutional support, and
partnerships with domestic and foreign universities to be able to self-finance their activities.
Moreover, they had earned a certain renown by this time as well as a robust network of
colleagues and allies. They were, as Nagati put it, “getting invited to all of the talks and
conferences,” which gave them a degree of visibility that facilitated (and perhaps even protected)
their work. In short, they had built the infrastructure necessary to weather the new political
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Descriptions about and literature from the events suggest that both received funding from the Ford
Foundation; however, this information was not included on CLUSTER’s website nor did Nagati mention
it to me during our interview.
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turmoil and the government crackdown on non-state organizations that followed the coup.
CLUSTER had also had a chance during this period to develop a clear agenda,
methodology, and philosophy for their work. Now describing themselves as a “platform for
urban research, architecture, art, and design initiatives,” (CLUSTER 2015a), they formulated a
mission statement outlining five primary goals: to promote a “sustainable urban environment and
a more diverse and accessible public space;” to develop “new approaches to informal practices
that would generate alternative modes of urban development;” to create a “platform integrating
art and culture as urban catalysts;” to build social and institutional networks to help professionals
work with “stakeholders and local communities;” and to encourage collaboration across research
institutions both within Egypt and abroad (CLUSTER, “About,” n.d.).
Though this mission was ambitious, they came to operationalize it using a surprisingly
simple methodology: “think in a big framework but implement on a small scale” (Personal
Interview, Omar Nagati, August 1st, 2016). The organization has since replicated this paradigm
across multiple contexts–they engage big questions of urban development and sustainability but
operationalize this engagement through small, self-contained projects. This includes their work
on the passageways: although they undertook an extensive documentation project related to the
mimarat, they ultimately developed interventions for just two passages (and of those two, one
was significantly more extensive than the other).
With regard to ideology, Nagati told me that although CLUSTER’s first 18 months were
“experimental,” and dominated by a sense that they were “fighting a battle but they didn’t know
the outcome,” they came to see their initial work as framed around a central question: “How can
we redefine our role as citizens and as professionals so that we can contribute to this process of
change that we see unfolding before us?” In particular, Nagati emphasized the organization’s
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role as a bridge between different actors: “How can architects be mediators between the state and
[Egyptian] citizens as a new relationship between those groups is forming?” (Personal Interview,
August 1st, 2016). Over the ensuing years, CLUSTER applied this philosophy to a staggering
number of interventions in design, public programming, research, and training: in addition to the
conferences and other activities described above, they completed more than a dozen design
projects, published at least six books and numerous maps, organized multiple workshops with
students and professionals, and established the Cairo Urban Resource Library (CURL), a
publicly available collection of architecture and urbanism materials. However, at the time of my
fieldwork, the organization’s work on Downtown Cairo’s passageways was still their “flagship”
project, and the fullest expression, in Nagati’s view, of their interest in developing an
“alternative model of practice.”

The Passageways as an Alternative Framework for Development
CLUSTER’s work on the passageways began in 2012, when Nagati and Stryker
undertook a comprehensive research and mapping project of the more than 100 passages in the
district. Building on information gathered during a class Nagati taught in 2010, the project
included exhaustive multi-method documentation of almost every aspect of the spaces, including
daily activities, usage patterns, history and morphology, physical characteristics, circulation and
access (Nagati and Stryker 2015a). The research yielded an English-language guidebook and
pocket map–as well as an eagerness, on the part of Nagati and Stryker, to implement some of
their ideas and, especially, to test their conception of the passageways as a potential “alternative
framework for the development and revitalization of Downtown” (CLUSTER, “Cairo
Downtown Passages,” n.d.).
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This eagerness translated into action in early 2014, when CLUSTER organized an art
exhibition in Kodak Passageway, a broad, side alley that was pedestrianized in the 1990s. Held
as part of the annual D-CAF Festival, the exhibition was an opportunity, as they described it, to
think about the role art and culture might play as “catalysts” in urban development. However,
the show was only the precursor to a more substantive project that came directly on its heels–
namely, a four-day design workshop held in April 2014 and organized with the support of the
Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) and the Centre for Culture and Development, a “selfgoverning institution” working under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen.
The event brought together a group of eight Egyptian and Danish artists and architects to develop
concept proposals for two passageways: Kodak and its neighbor, Phillips Passage (DEDI, “Cairo
Downtown Passages,” n.d.).108
The two passages were structurally, aesthetically, and socioeconomically quite different.
Kodak was, in Nagati’s terms, mutawaḍab (arranged or primed): it was a bright, open space
located opposite one of Cairo’s last surviving synagogues, which meant there was a highly
visible and active security presence. In addition, the passage was surrounded by several large,
well known businesses as well as what Nagati described as nās kabīra (big, important people)–
including Al Ismaelia, which owned two of the buildings overlooking it. At the same time, it
was home to a number of long-vacant storefronts, among them, the now closed camera shop for
which it was named (El Shimi 2015). In contrast, Phillips was a dark, narrow, L-shaped setback
between buildings. It was “more typical” of the passageways in that it had not been designed as
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When I asked Nagati and Stryker about the inclusion of non-Egyptians in the project, they offered a
very pragmatic response, challenging my assumption that it was underpinned by an idealization of
international cooperation. Rather, they maintained that the funding shaped the contours of the project:
they were working with two Danish institutions and so they were obligated to include Danish
participants–i.e., it was a condition of their work (Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016).
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such; rather, it had developed organically over time as new construction went up. Nevertheless,
it was bustling with commercial activity, occupied by a number of cafes as well as kiosks selling
lightbulbs and extension cords (a reminder of the Phillips store that was once located in the area)
and small, stationary stores (remnants of the shops that dominated the area in the 1960s when it
was popular with engineering and architecture firms) (CLUSTER 2016b). Critically though,
Phillips was privately owned by Al Ismaelia, a factor that significantly shaped the nature of
CLUSTER’s work in the passage.
However, irrespective of the differences between the two spaces, the workshop
foregrounded engagement with “local stakeholders” in both, and it was premised on the idea that
the participants’ proposals would evolve out of community members’ stated needs and concerns.
In this regard, Nagati has noted: “We take a stakeholder approach to design…It doesn’t start
from an artist's vision in an abstract way; it starts from interviewing many people in the area–
trying to get an idea of what people need and bridg[ing] gaps between the different stakeholders”
(El Shimi 2014). To that end, CLUSTER capitalized on their familiarity with Kodak
Passageway and its environs to conduct a “stakeholder analysis” in preparation for the event,
asking “all those who have a stake in public space” (kul al-aṭrāf illy liha maṣliḥa fil faragh alʿam) what they wanted to see happen in the two passageways (El Shimi 2015). They then used
the responses to prepare both a design brief that they gave to the workshop participants and a
model of the passages that the participants could use to speak with community members about
their ideas and solicit feedback.
After the workshop was completed, two concept proposals were selected for
implementation: the “Green Oasis” (al-Waha al-Khoudraʾ) in Kodak Passageway and the “Light
Oasis” (Wahat al-Nour) in Phillips. After developing the ideas into full designs on their own,
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CLUSTER undertook the grueling task of obtaining the requisite permissions for each project.
As Nagati explained during a talk at the AUC in 2015, this process required not only time but
also a “tactical” framing of their project such that the benefits to the government authorities (e.g.,
urban “upgrading”) would be clear and the “risks” (e.g., “more democratic” public space)
minimized. Ultimately, it took the organization nearly three months of bureaucratic wrangling
during the summer of 2014 to finalize the approvals (from seven different government offices–
including the governorate) and begin working on the proposed renovations.
If obtaining the requisite approvals was a challenge, so too, was earning the trust of the
community. In Kodak Passageway, the physical renovation work was initially met with
skepticism by some of the local residents. According to Nagati, just by virtue of working in
public space, they were under near constant scrutiny from different local actors, who repeatedly
approached them with questions: “Who are you? What are you doing? Who is funding your
work?” Yet, the skepticism embedded in these questions eventually, according to Nagati, gave
way to a sense of trust in CLUSTER’s agenda–particularly after they began work digging
irrigation trenches to protect the building foundations from water damage. As he explained, “I
think this kind of intervention created a sense of credibility within the community. Once they
saw we were really taking care by doing things to a certain standard, in a way that is not often
done, they started to take us more seriously and began to help [by donating money] and even
conceding some of their specific demands for the benefit of the greater good of the project”
(Bartschek 2015).109
By January of 2015, both projects had been completed: in Kodak, which received the
lion’s share of CLUSTER’s attention and resources, they had re-tiled the walkway, installed
109

This assistance included financial contributions from local businesses such as Babel Shoe Store and
Sarwat Abdel Shahid Law Firm as well as Al Ismaelia (El Shimi 2015).
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new, Art Deco-style light fixtures and benches, and planted a plethora of greenery to evoke both
a sense of privacy and a park-like atmosphere. In Phillips, they had built a marquee at the
entrance to the passage and introduced lighting and a film screening space inside. Additionally,
and in response to the passageway’s lack of proper drainage and the problem of flooding
(whenever it rained), they had elevated the flooring so that water could run out to the streets (El
Shimi 2015).
When I interviewed Nagati, it had been a year and half since the renovations were
completed, which had given CLUSTER a chance to track the long-term results of their
interventions. With regard to Kodak, Nagati noted that local residents had worked hard to
maintain the space, replacing lightbulbs and painting their buildings. Additionally, he told me
that CLUSTER had helped to organize a maintenance plan for the passageway, which included
finding a gardener and arranging for garbage collection. In the aggregate, he saw these efforts as
a “testament to the sense of ownership the residents feel and an appreciation for what they have”
(Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016). Moreover, while some of these developments had
unfolded in ways that CLUSTER might not have wanted, the general state of the project after 18
months seemed to align with Nagati’s observation that “the most successful thing that can
happen in a design project or in an intervention like the passageways is that the project has a life
after the designer or planner or architect steps away.”110
Perhaps most significantly though, in the intervening months, CLUSTER had been
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Regarding their dissatisfaction with some of these developments, Nagati complained that the project’s
biggest failure was not maintaining a foothold in the community. (I understood this to mean that
continued contact with the community would have enabled them to monitor the passageway more
closely). He even went so far as to suggest that CLUSTER might have “stakeholders” sign contracts in
future projects; however, as he volunteered this idea, Stryker cut him off, countering that “of course, you
can’t control it. We’re not real estate developers so we don’t have the money to invest in the area in order
to force a certain outcome” (Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016).
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working to create a community board for Kodak Passage. The passageway was surrounded by
three properties, each of which had its own residents’ board; however, the passage between the
buildings was treated as a “leftover” space and had, historically, been neglected.111 To redress
this, CLUSTER was trying to “reverse the framework” by establishing a committee modeled on
existing residential tenant boards. In so doing, they hoped to set up a durable “management
structure and procedure and process and budget for the upkeep and maintenance” of the space
(Nagati and Stryker 2015b).

Design as Urban Diplomacy
Ultimately, the process of engaging with community members was precisely what
CLUSTER sought to achieve with their “pilot project” (mashroūʿ istirshādy) in the two passages
(El Shimi 2015). While they certainly hoped the renovations would “promote more diverse,
inclusive, and accessible public spaces downtown,” what they most wanted to do was explore
how design can be used as a “negotiation tool among different stakeholders” (CLUSTER, “Cairo
Downtown Passages,” n.d.). In other words, the initiative was conceived as “an experiment in
the hands of the community” to see if the passageway could become “a space of mediation”
between different actors–a place where “stakeholders” could negotiate conflict and engage in
what Nagati described as “urban diplomacy” (Bartschek 2015).
This “diplomacy” was meant to play out on a micro-scale–i.e., in the very negotiation of
the materiality of their work: they wanted, as Nagati explained at the “Re-framing Downtown”
conference, to “use these very simple design elements–like the bench or the tile or the tree or the
lamp–as sites where…competing interests intersect but also as a way to negotiate, to find a
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The situation was different in Phillips Passageway because it was privately owned by Al Ismaelia.
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common ground.” For example, both the walkway tiles and the benches proposed by CLUSTER
proved to be contentious details during the renovation: while some shopkeepers opposed the use
of grooved tiles, which they argued would be too hard to clean, a local law firm was resistant to
the idea of installing benches, on the grounds that they might attract “undesirables” to the area
(presumably young men and/or couples who might come and loiter in the passage). For Nagati
and Stryker though, these expressions of disagreement were precisely what they hoped to
generate through the project. They were opportunities to see if it would work to say: “Okay, I’m
going to change the tile if you give me approval to [make] the bench.”
This framing of their work as an attempt to foster “urban diplomacy” dovetailed with
CLUSTER’s perception of its own role in that effort–namely, as a mediator and facilitator of
dialogue among different stakeholders in a context marked by the “absence of formal
democracy” (Personal Interview, Omar Nagati, August 1st, 2016). On the walking tour with
which I began this chapter, Nagati contended that the socioeconomic and political problems
facing residents of Downtown Cairo (and Egyptians more broadly) were not simply a byproduct
of ineffective governance; they were also due to the absence of any forum for open dialogue.
There were no spaces or opportunities, in Nagati’s view, for different community members to
engage publicly with each other–let alone with municipal or state officials. CLUSTER sought to
redress this absence, in part by cultivating the conditions for dialogue through their interventions,
but also by serving as a bridge between different constituencies.
Yet if the goal was to mediate among various local actors to “define a little bit of a
middle ground” during the project, Nagati simultaneously acknowledged the impossibility of
ever achieving full consensus (Nagati and Stryker 2015b). He explained that if you brought all
of the relevant “stakeholders” together to discuss the fate of the passageways, you would never
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reach agreement on a single issue–there would always be opposing views and a certain amount
of dissent. Given this, Nagati had adopted a pragmatic attitude, arguing that obtaining 60%
agreement at any one time was better than not soliciting anyone’s opinion in the first place. In
his view, this kind of negotiation represented “democracy in action,” and it was the infrastructure
for such interactions that CLUSTER hoped to create through their work.
The corollary to CLUSTER’s interest in developing an “alternative model of
governance” through the creation of self-sustaining urban spaces is that such spaces would not be
dependent on the municipal or government authorities, which Nagati described as
“dysfunctional.” The emphasis was therefore on creating a governing infrastructure outside of
state regulation; however, CLUSTER was firm in their belief that those authorities had a vital
role to play in urban governance.112 In fact, Nagati consistently reiterated the organization’s
view that all “stakeholders”–Al Ismaelia, the government, local residents and business owners,
the municipality–had the opportunity to “bring something to the table” and that CLUSTER
therefore took a “critical position of active engagement with as many “stakeholders” as possible
(Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016). Nevertheless, Nagati was skeptical there would be a shift
in the status quo in the near future, and CLUSTER’s work was consequently premised on the
idea of an inefficient and largely absent government.

Playing the Middle Ground
In CLUSTER’s lectures, interviews, tours, and media appearances, their work in Kodak
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This attitude is illustrated by Nagati’s commentary on CLUSTER’s engagement with “informality.”
He told me that urban informality was “not the state of exception, it [was] not the 10%;” rather, it was the
“mainstream,” and he contended further that “if you want to have an impact and be relevant, you need to
work with the mainstream–and in Cairo, the mainstream is informality.” However, Nagati made it clear
that by “acknowledging” informality and approaching it head on in their work, CLUSTER still believed
the government had a responsibility to its citizens (Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016).
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Passage dominated their account of the bigger project, with the “Light Oasis” intervention in
Phillips receiving far less attention–and sometimes none at all. It is not difficult to see why: the
organization’s involvement in the latter passageway proved far more complicated, in large part
because Al Ismaelia, who owned Phillips, did not support their work in it. The company,
however, was explicit about this positioning vis-à-vis the space. In a short film that CLUSTER
made to document the workshop, Shafei, the aforementioned co-founder of the company,
explained this “mean, capitalist machine point of view” to some of the workshop participants: “I
wouldn’t get involved in this passageway for now. It’s not in my interest to do that today…If this
[area] starts doing well, the shops that I need to buy in the future will be extremely
expensive…We’ve [owned] those stores where you were standing today for eight or seven years;
[we] haven’t touched them because , the minute we do, everything else becomes expensive. So,
there’s a reason why we kept them that way” (CLUSTER 2016b). According to Nagati, Al
Ismaelia made it clear that, although they would not prevent CLUSTER from working in
Phillips, they would not help the organization either. The result was an uneven distribution of
financial resources across the two passageways and a more modest intervention in Phillips (El
Shimi 2015). In particular, CLUSTER was only able to introduce a temporary solution (the
elevation of the floor) to the passageway’s drainage problem. This, in turn, led to some
frustration among business owners, who were grateful for CLUSTER’s efforts but who
nonetheless wondered about the emphasis on Kodak and who wanted more work done on
Phillips (El Shimi 2015).113
The contrast between CLUSTER’s interventions in the two passageways is instructive,
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Nagati was characteristically sympathetic to and philosophical about their complaints, telling Mada
Masr: “We want to create a catalyst, an incentive for people to regain confidence in public good. We fell
short in what we could have done, but it’s not about the tangible, but [about] what happened intangibly”
(El Shimi 2015).
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and it encapsulates some of the tensions in the group’s work–not only with regard to their
relationship with Al Ismaelia but also vis-a-vis their role as agents of sociospatial change in
Downtown Cairo more generally. On the one hand, the organization’s attempt to position
themselves as a bridge between different “stakeholders” engendered a very fluid relationship
with Al Ismaelia. While CLUSTER has invited the real estate company to all of their
conferences, and the two have collaborated on various projects (such as Al Ismaelia’s walking
tour of the district), the organization has also struggled with them at times. Nagati summarized
this instability in another short video made by CLUSTER, in which he spoke with a group of
shopkeepers smoking sheesha (water pipe) and drinking tea in Phillips. He asked the men: “Do
you know what Ismaelia thinks of Phillips Passageway?” to which one of the men responded:
“Yes, of course we know. They want it hit by a rocket.” Shortly thereafter, another man added:
“They [Al Ismaelia] don’t want this passage clean. They want it to stay the same. What you
[CLUSTER] are trying to do is damaging their plans.” Nagati responded to the men by
expressing a somewhat oppositional stance towards the company: “We told [Al Ismaelia] that we
don’t need anything from them and that they should just let us work, and, in return, we would
also have an intervention in Kodak” (CLUSTER 2016a).
In my reading, Nagati’s reply implied a desire to both demonstrate CLUSTER’s alliance
with local residents while simultaneously maintaining a professional relationship with Al
Ismaelia. His statement thus seemed to encapsulate CLUSTER’s willingness to engage with all
“stakeholders,” and their corollary unwillingness to develop fixed or firm alliances with specific
groups or individuals. This attitude of occupying the middle ground was not limited to the
organization’s relationship with different actors; in fact, it permeated CLUSTER’s rhetoric, and
it was particularly evident in their view of so-called gentrification. For example, on the walking
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tour noted at the start of this chapter, Nagati argued in favor of what he described as “soft
gentrification,” a slow process of redevelopment that could be beneficial to the local
community–and in which a variety of actors had the potential to play a productive role. He
distinguished this position from the "Starbucks style" approach where a very specific
socioeconomic audience was being catered to. Similarly, during our interview, Nagati proposed
that some redevelopment was good–and even necessary. By way of example, he told me to peek
into the airshaft of the building housing their office. When I conceded that it was full of trash, he
told me that the basement of the building was likewise in rough shape–swimming in sewage. In
short, the building infrastructure was on the brink of collapse. He used this to argue that some
intervention was needed, and that CLUSTER has tried to position themselves between the two
poles of “gentrification versus collapse” (Personal Interview, August 1st, 2016).
Ultimately, this attempt to stake out a kind of shifting middle ground–between
stakeholders, between spaces, between urban processes–has served CLUSTER well. It has
helped them to garner financial and practical support for their activities and has likely enabled
them to continue working in the face of the government’s brutal repression of non-state actors
and organizations. Their work in Downtown Cairo thus offers an illustration of the productive
capacities of indeterminacy: by not positioning themselves in line with one group or another
other, by not articulating a confrontational ideological orientation, by not refusing to work with
the “dysfunctional” government authorities, they have given themselves significant room to
maneuver.

165

CHAPTER FIVE: “COLLABORATION…YIELDS A GOOD RESULT:” MEGAWRA,
PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION, AND BENEVOLENT HERITAGE IN AL-KHALIFA
Introduction
The main room of al-mustawṣaf (the clinic), as Megawra’s headquarters are locally
known, had no roof. Instead, a series of vaulted arches crisscrossed the upper regions of the
unfinished building to frame the open sky. The effect was mesmerizing–particularly in the late
afternoon, when the sun turned the top of the building a golden yellow and created a breathtaking
contrast with the blue of the sky behind. The arches themselves curved down gracefully toward
the space below, resting atop a set of smooth, carved columns that ran the length of the room.
Between the columns, a massive swatch of thick canvas had been strung up, presumably to
provide a bit of shade–or perhaps protection from the occasional rainstorm that sweeps through
Cairo in the winter months. A scrappy-looking cat with a mournful expression frequently milled
about, jumping on empty chairs whenever anyone was nearby in hopes of garnering some
attention. The walls, a patchwork of brick, stone, and stucco, were mostly bare, but along the
south side of the room, three large windows fitted with wooden mashrabiyya overlooked the
sunken courtyard of the 13th century mausoleum of Shaggarat al-Durr. On the adjacent wall
facing east, there was a miḥrāb (prayer niche), above which someone had painted al-shahāda,
the Muslim statement of faith, in red: “There is no god but God, and Mohammed is his prophet.”
The space was tranquil, even as noise from the street trickled in and local residents–
especially children–came and went. The mix of stone and sky, as well as the building’s deep,
curved entrance, seemed to insulate it from the bustle outside. Yet, the room was rarely empty.
As Megawra’s primary event space, it was pressed into service for different activities on an
almost daily basis: for the organization’s youth “heritage awareness” programs, tables were often
arranged in one corner so that local children could draw or play games; for their public lecture
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series featuring talks by young scholars and professionals, rows of wooden folding chairs were
set up facing the miḥrāb, over which a screen was sometimes pulled to allow speakers to show
slides; for their annual “tourist promotion” event, a street festival known as “Spend Your Day in

Image 22: Al-mustawṣaf, Megawra’s headquarters. (Credit: author, February 2016.)

Khalifa,” the tables were lined up around the perimeter so that vendors and local workshop
owners could sell food and crafts. During one iteration of the festival, a tannūra show was even
held in the space, with residents and visitors pressed together in the dark, clutching their
smartphones and crowding around the musicians and a lone dancer, who whirled between the
columns with his brightly colored skirts.
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The building itself had a checkered history: in the late 19th century, the Comité, the
official agency tasked with architectural documentation and conservation at the time, tore down a
mosque that stood next to Shaggarat al-Durr’s mausoleum, arguing that the structure–along with
several houses–constituted an encroachment on the “monument.” The government authorities
insisted that another mosque be built, and so, in the 1920s, after many years of delay, the
construction of what would become Megawra’s headquarters began. The mosque was never
finished, but after the 1952 Revolution, the government laid claim to the half-constructed space
and it was subsequently used by various political parties as a community center and medical
clinic. After several decades, the community center closed, but the doctor who ran the clinic
continued working out of the building for several more years; however, once he left, the space
was locked up and used only informally for storage (El Gibaly 2017).
It was in this shuttered state when Megawra arrived in the area, a low-income
neighborhood known as al-Khalifa, in 2012. The organization, which was established by a
prominent Egyptian conservationist in late 2011, is a two-part institution comprised of a
registered NGO, the Built Environment Collective, and a consultancy/contracting firm,
Megawra.114 Along with several sub-initiatives, the group has pursued a range of projects in alKhalifa to address heritage conservation as well as other issues such as infrastructure upgrading
and socioeconomic development. Though they immediately expressed interest in using almustawṣaf for some of their activities, it took them nearly two years to gain access to the
building, in a circuitous process that points to the murky bureaucratic landscape and communitylevel dynamics the organization has had to navigate in the course of its work. In a podcast
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The organization is thus often referred to as Megawra-BEC; however, for ease of reading, I refer to the
group using the shortened appellation.
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interview with The Funambulist magazine, Megawra’s founder and director, May al-Ibrashy,
explained how they came to “occupy” the structure:
I think, when I tell the story [of the space], I feel as if I am telling the story of Egypt in a
way because it starts…much earlier than the actual space. [It starts] in the 13th century,
with the dome that was built…by Egypt’s only female ruler during the Islamic period,
Shaggarat al-Durr. And then next to it a mosque is built. And the name of the mosque,
[al-Khalifa], is actually the name the whole street takes. And then the mosque is
removed [by the authorities in charge of conservation] because it’s too close to the
monument, and…it is decided to build a new mosque a bit further away. [But] it takes
them 40 years to build that mosque–from deciding to do it in the early 1900s to starting to
build it in the 1920s to stopping somehow in the 1940s and not finishing [it]. [In] 1952,
al-Itihad al-Ishtiraky–the Socialist Union–takes it. [They are] basically the arm of the
military socialist government at the time, after the 1952 Revolution, and [they] turn it into
a community center and a clinic. [In the] 1970s…the power moves to what was the only
party at the time, the National Democratic Party [NDP], so they take control of it, and it
continues to function as a community center and a clinic. Then for some reason, it
closes, and we come in…after the 2011 Revolution. It takes us a year to find out that the
key is with a local–you know, somebody from the local community. It takes us [another]
year…to gain the trust of the neighborhood to the point where they give us the key. And
[so] we start to use it literally with the permission of the people. This whole process,
starting from the Socialist Union taking it to the NDP taking it, can be described as illegal
because there is no official paperwork that transforms it into a clinic and a community
center. So, we are continuing–happily–in the same tradition and basically occupying it
with the permission of the people. And, of course, it helps that the conservation work
that we do is in partnership with the Ministry of Antiquities (MoA), and so there is a kind
of legitimacy in the way we have taken over the building, but at the same time, I can’t
really say that we have the legal papers. (Al-Ibrashy 2015)
In addition to highlighting the ambiguity surrounding al-mustawṣaf and who controls access to it,
al-Ibrashy’s narrative is striking for the origin story she tells about Megawra and the way in
which she positions the group vis-à-vis the local community and the government authorities.
She deftly intertwines the organization’s biography with that of the building itself, linking
Megawra to its history of quasi-legal squatting. Yet she further “legitimates” the group by
emphasizing the idea that their presence in the neighborhood has been sanctioned by both
residents (signified by the protracted process of acquiring the key) and government officials
(signified by their “partnership” with the MoA). This calibrated positioning between state and
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local actors–i.e., foregrounding their collaboration with the authorities and their embeddedness in
the local community–runs through Megawra’s public rhetoric as well as their various initiatives.
As with CLUSTER, whose work was described in the previous chapter, Megawra has tried to
stake out a middle ground between different actors. On the one hand, they have framed local
residents as key participants in and the primary beneficiaries of their interventions, and the
organization has worked hard to solicit the community’s involvement in their activities. On the
other, the group has been explicit about the necessity–and benefits–of working directly with
government institutions such as the MoA and the Cairo governorate, which have historically
been at odds with local communities, particularly those based in Historic Cairo.
In this chapter, I explore the tactics Megawra has used to negotiate this balancing act, and
I suggest that the two components are interrelated: in order for the organization to work so
closely with local residents in al-Khalifa, they have had to expend significant time, energy, and
resources cultivating relationships with these government authorities. In other words, their
ability to foreground “community participation” has hinged on the degree to which they have
made their agenda amenable to the various government agencies and institutions with which they
collaborate. As I demonstrate in what follows, they have proved remarkably adept at the latter:
of the four organizations discussed in this dissertation, the authorities have given Megawra the
most latitude in terms of the structure and content of their projects. I argue that this dynamic
reflects several interlocking factors: Megawra’s ability to gauge the bureaucratic landscape and
to finesse the scale and scope of their activities–and even their own institutional structure–
accordingly; al-Ibrashy’s professional background and the extensive connections she has in the
government; and the group’s skill at soliciting a steady stream of domestic and foreign funding
to finance their projects.

170

By harnessing these different components of their work, Megawra has managed not only
to set down roots in al-Khalifa but also to continue working in the face of Egypt’s return to
authoritarian rule. In fact, in the years since al-Sisi took power and the government launched its
aggressive crackdown on NGOs, the organization has flourished: they have developed and
implemented new projects, recruited additional funders, and expanded their activities into several
adjacent neighborhoods. They have also been able–almost inexplicably given the government’s
anxiety about dissent and popular unrest–to underscore their commitment to what they describe
as “citizen participation” in the care and management of the neighborhood and its built
environment.
Admittedly, none of this has come easily. The trajectory of their work has been
unpredictable, requiring a doggedly philosophical attitude. Al-Ibrashy recently wrote along
these lines that “[we] need to constantly negotiate and reconcile different–sometimes even
conflicting–mandates and principles between us and our governmental, professional, and
academic partners. Nothing is simple. Everything is complex” (Al-Ibrashy 2019). Nevertheless,
the organization has survived–and thrived–in recent years. Their capacity to do so given the
political context has earned them a popular following and a privileged status among their peers:
they were the group held up most frequently as a “success” by my interlocutors, in terms of their
ability to bring proposed plans to fruition, weather the ongoing political turmoil, and “have an
impact.” Other professional elites working on similar projects often cited them as a model for
their own activities or as a shining example of the transformative potential embedded in the
surge of post-uprising urban initiatives. As Madd Platform’s co-founder suggested, Megawra
was “opening cracks in the system” (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016).
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This chapter examines how Megawra’s attempts to “open cracks in the system” have
played out in practice, with particular emphasis on Athar Lina, their “participatory conservation”
initiative. By narrowing in on Athar Lina’s work, I shed light on what I believe has enabled the
organization to prosper–and simultaneously “stick to their mandate”–at a time when the
government has all but obliterated so-called civil society. In what follows, I forego a section that
provides historic context for the group’s activities and turn directly to the organization itself: I
start by sketching the origins of Megawra’s work in the wake of the January 25th Revolution,
noting how they, like all of the organizations discussed in this dissertation, bear the ideological
and practical imprint of the country’s political upheaval. I then narrow in on the move to alKhalifa, which dovetailed with the launch of the Athar Lina initiative. After overviewing the
initiative’s activities, I look at the primary concerns anchoring their work–namely, “community
participation” and the related question of who “owns” the area’s architectural heritage. This is
followed by a short ethnographic account of a “participatory workshop” that I attended in 2015,
which I use to illustrate how Athar Lina’s commitment to engaging local residents and fostering
a sense of “ownership” has unfolded on the ground. This narrative also serves as a segue to the
final section of the chapter, in which I analyze Megawra’s relationship with the government
authorities. Here, I examine how the group has positioned itself vis-à-vis the different agencies
with which it works and the various strategies and resources it has mobilized to try to ensure its
activities run smoothly.

From Mentorship to “Participatory Conservation:” An Overview of Megawra and Athar
Lina
Megawra, which translates as both “neighborhood” and “mentorship,” was launched by
al-Ibrashy and a group of young colleagues in the months following the January 25th Revolution;
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however, the idea for the initiative began to develop in 2010. By this time, al-Ibrashy, who holds
a doctorate from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, had
walked away from a 20-year career leading conservation projects in Historic Cairo. Many of
these projects had been sponsored by the Egyptian government or the American Research Center
in Egypt (ARCE), with whom she had a long-standing affiliation. Yet in spite of her
professional success and reputation, she had grown disenchanted with the work, feeling that the
buildings sometimes looked worse after the restoration was completed or with the passage of
time. As she told the novelist Youssef Rakha in a conversation for Bidoun magazine, “…my
engagement [with the historic city] had mostly been through conservation, and that approach, of
focusing purely on heritage buildings without truly engaging with the city, was not working. It
might be gratifying on a personal level but it’s not necessarily useful or impactful in the long run.
You conserve a building, it’s fine for five to ten years…then the city takes over and we’re back
to square one” (Al-Ibrashy and Rakha 2017). Given her uncertainty about the long-term impact
of her work, she left the field and began teaching architecture full time at the British University
in Egypt.
The academic environment offered a respite from the specific challenges of conservation
work; however, she quickly grew frustrated with what she perceived as the shortcomings of the
Egyptian system of education and, in particular, the way in which architecture was taught. She
was especially dismayed by how isolated architecture students were from one another. Siloed in
their individual programs, they were offered few opportunities to connect and interact with
students and faculty from different departments. Believing that this institutional framework was
hindering the formation of a sense of community among young professionals, she began to
brainstorm the creation of a space that would enable them to gather, dialogue, and collaborate.

173

This idea was just starting to congeal into a plan when the uprising began in January of
2011. Like many of her colleagues, al-Ibrashy capitalized on the momentum and sense of
optimism generated by the protests to take action. As she told Rakha: “after the revolution I had
a sense that things could move forward in place–that architecture and conservation might be able
to makes things better in the moment” (Al-Ibrashy and Rakha 2017). Within months, she had
co-organized Megawra’s first event, a roundtable conversation held with a group of Egyptian
architects and urbanists, entitled “What a Building Wants to Be.” She also applied to register the
Built Environment Collective as an NGO–a bold and, as she suggested to me, somewhat
impulsive move that again reflected the pervasive “idealism” that characterized the first few
months after the January 25th Revolution. To her surprise, the government approved the
application by the end of the year (months earlier than expected, in fact), after which, she and a
group of students and young professionals opened an office and self-described “co-working
space” in Heliopolis, an affluent neighborhood located in northern Cairo.115
The philosophy underpinning this initial incarnation of Megawra is still referenced on the
group’s website, where the organization is described as an “architectural hub for young students
and architects that is also welcoming to the public. It is a platform for holistic debate on the field
of architecture and urbanism with a focus on it as art, theory, praxis and cultural heritage and its
role in promoting sustainability and social responsibility in the built environment” (Megawra,
“About,” n.d.). This characterization of the co-working space as an “architectural hub” is apt, as
students and recent graduates quickly started flocking to Megawra to work, study, and attend
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This official status distinguishes Megawra from the vast majority of groups currently working on
urban-related issues in Cairo–most of which operate either as informal associations or as architecture
and/or consulting firms. It is particularly significant in light of the government’s aggressive targeting of
NGOs, which has now made it virtually impossible for local organizations to obtain government approval
while also stifling the activities of those who have.
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lectures organized by the group; however, as the months passed, and the organization started to
take shape, al-Ibrashy came to see that some of their initial ideas were not panning out as
planned. In addition to issues of financial sustainability, she noticed that they were cultivating
two distinct audiences: the lecture attendees and the co-working space users. While she was
pleased with the robustness of both, she nonetheless wanted to engage a broader public.
Moreover, the location of the space in Heliopolis ran counter to another of al-Ibrashy’s
concerns–namely, that students were isolated from the socioeconomically mixed communities
that often surrounded their home institutions. By establishing an office in an upper middle-class
district, Megawra was ironically pulling students further away from those contexts (Personal
Interview, May al-Ibrashy, August 9th, 2016).

“Getting out into the Street:” Relocating to al-Khalifa
Al-Ibrashy’s realization about the drawbacks of basing Megawra in Heliopolis dovetailed
with a burgeoning desire among her “team” to “get out into the street.” While they wanted to
maintain their current “audience,” which was largely comprised of young, middle class
professionals, they also wanted to work with–and in–a local community. Moreover, there was
growing interest in shifting the group’s focus away from engineering in favor of exploring
“cultural concerns” and the intersection between the arts, architecture, and the humanities. This
re-orientation marked the birth of the Athar Lina initiative and augured the organization’s
eventual move to al-Khalifa.
Athar Lina began in June of 2012 with a “participatory design workshop” (mashroūʿ
taṣmīm tashāraky) to investigate the relationship between al-Khalifa’s residents and the
architectural heritage with which they lived–or, as Megawra described it, the “interface” between
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the neighborhood’s heritage sites and the surrounding environment. Al-Ibrashy and her
colleagues chose al-Khalifa as their focus because they were interested in exploring the
intersection of cultural heritage and urban development in a residential area. The neighborhood,
which stretches from the 9th century mosque of Ibn Tulun in the north to the 19th century mosque
of al-Sayyida Nafisa in the south, was an ideal spot for such an undertaking: although it is
located within the boundaries of Historic Cairo, it is about 1.5 miles south of Shariʿa al-Muʿizz
and its environs and is thus considered “off the beaten path.”
In fact, al-Khalifa’s distance from this area (i.e., Fatimid Cairo) was important to
Megawra: as with the organizers of the Cairo Heritage School (CHS), they particularly wanted to
avoid al-Mu‘izz, which al-Ibrashy described to me as a “commercial street” that had already
been significantly “worked over” by heritage professionals (Personal Interview, August 9th,
2016). In contrast, al-Khalifa had largely been ignored by the government and the MoA.
Consequently, although the area was home to at least 12 registered monuments of major
architectural significance (such as Ibn Tulun, which is the oldest standing mosque in Cairo), the
buildings were “under-appreciated” and, like much of the neighborhood, in poor condition (AlAhwal and Abushadi 2018, 285). At the same time, al-Ibrashy believed that the neighborhood’s
residents–in part because the area had been left largely untouched by the authorities–were very
“aware” of and “connected” to the monuments in their midst.116 In her words, the community
was “tightknit and united in its love of its shrines, a love manifested in the community’s care of
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One experience I heard al-Ibrashy talk about in this regard actually concerned al-mustawṣaf. During a
walking tour she gave to the participants of the CHS workshop (discussed in Chapter Three), she
explained that in attempting to gain access to the unfinished mosque, Megawra crossed paths with a local
resident who controlled the area in front of the building. Although he ended up working for the
organization as a kind of guard, he was a polarizing figure in the community, which reflected back on
them: while some residents resented the group because of their connection to him, others warmed to them
for the same reason. For al-Ibrashy, their own entanglement with these social networks illustrated the
need to treat “heritage” as deeply connected to community.
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its religious buildings and exuberant gatherings to celebrate mawlids or religious holidays” (AlIbrashy 2019). The convergence of these factors persuaded al-Ibrashy that there was “potential”
for al-Khalifa and for the organization’s involvement in the area.

Image 23: Megawra’s mural map of al-Khalifa, opposite Ibn Tulun. (Credit: author, December 2014.)

Over the course of the six-month workshop, which was funded by the Danish Egyptian
Dialogue Institute (DEDI) and held in “partnership” with the MoA, the group organized a series
of community meetings, seminars, interviews, focus groups, and exhibitions with at least 60
“representative stakeholders” (Megawra, “Athar Lina,” n.d.). The aim of these events was to
deepen Megawra’s understanding of the aforementioned “interface” between residents and the
built environment and then make recommendations focused on improving that relationship.
These recommendations, which were underpinned by the idea, as al-Ibrashy put it, that
conservation could be a “form of immersive participation,” clustered around three primary
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concerns: identifying heritage nodes to conserve and rehabilitate so as to make them useful for
(and available to) the local community; working with children through “heritage awareness
activities” in order to help them develop an appreciation for the local architectural heritage;
addressing the street as a whole–both physically and socioeconomically–and pursuing projects
that would link local heritage to “economic and social benefits” for the community (Megawra,
“Athar Lina,” n.d.).
As a corollary to these recommendations, the workshop also revealed the need to repair
years of damaged confidence among local residents, who had been on the receiving end of halfcompleted projects and unfulfilled promises made by both state and non-state actors and who
were thus distrustful of Megawra and sometimes hesitant to engage with the organization (AlAhwal and Abushadi 2018, 305). As al-Ibrashy noted during the CHS walking tour, she realized
very quickly that the worst course of action Megawra could take would be to descend on the
community, propose a slew of changes to the neighborhood and its architectural heritage, and
then leave. In a profile of the group published in Mada Masr, she explained their rationale,
noting that “words have a life of their own. Once you start talking to residents about how their
lives could be better, you have a responsibility. You’ve awakened images and aspirations, and
you can’t just walk away” (Al-Ibrashy, quoted in El Gibaly 2017). She thus concluded that if
Megawra wanted the community involved in their activities, they would need to create a sense of
equality–or common ground–with local residents. This, in turn, would entail a commitment both
to the idea that residents were muwāṭinīn (citizens)–or bany ʾadmīn (humans)–and to setting
down roots in the area.
This realization led the organization to al-mustawṣaf, the building described at the start of
this chapter; however, it also led Megawra to develop a template for their work based on “slow”
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activities that emphasized “capacity building” (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th,
2016). Thus, in the eight years since the initial workshop, as Megawra has continued with many
of its original activities, the Athar Lina initiative has pursued an ever-expanding configuration of
long-term projects and interventions in al-Khalifa–and, more recently, surrounding areas such as
al-Hattaba (another “neglected” neighborhood in Historic Cairo).117

Image 24: Opening of the newly restored Dome of Shaggarat al-Durr. (Credit: author, January 2016.)
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With regard to Megawra’s own work, there is still a clear commitment to students and new
professionals, who constitute the majority of the organization’s staff and volunteer team. They have also
continued their original aim of serving as a “hub” for young architects and planners to collaborate and
network while also providing training and mentorship. To that end, they still host workshops, seminars,
art exhibitions, and film screenings. In addition, they organize a regular lecture series that brings young
and established professionals together to share research on a range of topics relating to urbanism and
cultural and architectural heritage.
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In terms of conservation work, Athar Lina has spearheaded a series of restoration
projects, including that of the 13th century mausoleum of Shaggarat al-Durr and the neighboring
12th century shrines of al-Sayyida Ruqayya, Jaʿfari, and ʿAtika. More recently, they have
worked on the dome of the 13th century mosque of al-Imam al-Shafaʿi, which is located to the
south of Megawra’s headquarters, as well as the Mamluk-era (1250-1517) mausoleum of alShurafa, which is located in al-Hattaba (El-Aref 2017; Lotfi 2019).118
In addition, under the rubric of “social and cultural development,” Athar Lina has
established various programs to raise “heritage awareness” among local residents–particularly,

Image 25. Spend Your Day in Khalifa: Storytelling with Chirine el-Ansary. (Credit: author, January
2016)
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These projects have all been undertaken with the support of the MoA and external funding from the
American Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation, the UK-based Barakat Trust, and/or the
American Research Centre in Egypt.
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local youth.119 For example, they developed the “Khalifa Summer Camp,” which now includes a
year-round after school component, offering arts and crafts, sports, and religious activities to
local children. As stated on their website, the program is designed to help “establish and
strengthen ties between the children and their neighbourhood’s heritage” and is premised on the
idea that “raising children to respect their heritage and monuments could result in a society that
is more aware and concerned with safeguarding its heritage” (Athar Lina, “Khalifa Summer
Camp,” n.d.).120

Image 26. Spend your Day in Khalifa: Children’s walking tour. (Credit: author, January 2016.)
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Though the expression “heritage awareness” recurs throughout Athar Lina’s work, in a talk al-Ibrashy
gave at Megawra in 2015, she told the audience that she actually eschewed the idea of tawʿiyya
(awareness or consciousness-raising) and tried instead to think about what resources and expertise were
already available in the community and how the initiatives might use and improve them.
120
However, as al-Ibrashy explained during her 2015 talk at Megawra, that aim was not to have the
participants “memorize the history of buildings,” but rather to “give them memories from inside” the sites
that would enable the children to “talk about them in a personal way.”
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Other projects have included “Khalifa Exchange a workshop-based “capacity building” initiative
that brings local and non-local craftsmen and designers together for “knowledge exchange,” and
the aforementioned festival, “Spend Your Day in Khalifa,” which, at the time of writing, had
been held annually for the past seven years. The festival, which is described as a “tourist
promotion” event, traditionally runs for several days and includes a shifting constellation of
activities such as a crafts fair, storytelling performances, art and photography workshops for
young professionals, games and activities for local children, and neighborhood walking tours.

“The Monument as a Resource, Not a Burden:” Ownership, Participation, and Community
Benefit
Underpinning these myriad activities has been an enduring preoccupation with the
question of “ownership”–i.e., who “owns” the “monuments” in al-Khalifa? In fact, the very
name of the initiative–Athar Lina–reflects this preoccupation: in a talk she gave at Megawra in
2015, al-Ibrashy explained that she and her colleagues debated whether to call the project “the
monument is ours” (also sometimes translated as “heritage is ours”) or “whose monument?”
While they eventually settled on the former (al-athar lina), she noted that the question remained:
who is the “us” being referenced? Or, as they asked on their website: “who has a right–a claim–
to the monument? Is it the state that legally owns it and is responsible for it? Or is it the people
of the neighbourhood who live with it? Or is it other stakeholders such as those who study it,
work on it, pressure the state to preserve it, or visit it as tourists?” (Megawra, “Athar Lina” n.d.)
Al-Ibrashy traced these questions back to one of the meetings held during the initial
workshop in 2012. Organized early on in the event, the gathering included government officials,
local residents, and academics and professionals working in architecture and heritage
management–an attempt, by Megawra, to bring all of the “representative stakeholders” together.
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Al-Ibrashy described the meeting during the CHS walking tour: she noted that the participants
were so engaged with each other that they were eventually kicked out of Bayt al-Kritliya (a 19th
century private home that is now a museum) and forced to relocate to Ibn Tulun. They then
spent several hours role-playing in the mosque’s spacious courtyard and prayer hall, using the
activity to try to better understand their different perspectives on and approaches to heritage
management and the area’s architectural legacies. In the midst of the meeting, they were
approached by a group of local children who were curious to know where they had come from
and what they were doing. Upon learning the nature of the gathering, the children volunteered
their own experience with al-Khalifa’s heritage, telling the group that they used to play in (and
take care of) an area behind the mosque, but that local officials had recently stopped them from
using the space.
The meeting seemed to cast a long shadow for Megawra’s director–as well as several
other interlocutors, who surprised me by mentioning it in our interviews. In al-Ibrashy’s view, it
had been fruitful for the dialogue it generated among actors who had historically been fairly
isolated from–or in conflict with–one another. In this regard, the gathering seemed to be
emblematic of the liminal, post-uprising moment when such activities suggested the emergence
of new ways of “being in common” that could cut across professional and socioeconomic lines.
Yet it was the encounter with the children that appeared to resonate most strongly with alIbrashy and which she emphasized in her narrative of the event. Their anecdote about losing
access to a play space seemed to crystallize what she saw as the troubled relationship between
the government authorities, local residents, and the area’s architectural heritage–what she
described on the CHS walking tour as a “pattern of continuous disconnect, plotted and planned
by the government, to separate people from the heritage.”
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This “distancing” of local residents from the architectural heritage in their midst was
everywhere apparent to al-Ibrashy. Indeed, as she detailed during the CHS tour, numerous
features of Ibn Tulun itself attested to the problem: for example, the mosque was only open to
the community during prayer time and the entrance was patrolled by a police officer who was
allegedly there to provide security but who, according to al-Ibrashy, heckled the local residents.
Similarly, the structure was surrounded by two fences that were intended to establish a “buffer
zone” between the street and the building but which she framed as a form of state-sponsored
“encroachment” on the community. Taken together, she saw the fences, the regulated building
access, and the police patrol as part of a constellation of spatial tactics that reflected the
government’s view of itself as the “owners” of the area’s historic buildings.

Image 27. Interior courtyard of the Mosque of Ibn Tulun. (Credit: author, May 2016.)
In the wake of the workshop, Megawra made it clear that Athar Lina’s work would push
back against this dynamic, using its activities to develop a sense of milkiyat al-athār (ownership
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of the monuments) among al-Khalifa’s residents. However, this idea that community members
had some “claim”–even if only partial–to the neighborhood’s architectural heritage was not
treated as an end in and of itself. That is to say, Megawra’s mandate for Athar Lina was not
simply to cultivate this sentiment and then let local residents explore what milkiyat al-athār
might mean to them. Instead, “ownership” was tethered to “community participation” in
managing and caring for the buildings, which, in turn, was linked to the proposition that heritage
is a “resource” and something from which the community should “benefit.” Al-Ibrashy
summarized this framework in a recent blog post: “At Athar Lina, we believe that people, as
custodians of their own heritage, should be active participants in its preservation and
management. To do so they have to feel they own it. And to feel that they own it, they have to
benefit from it” (Al-Ibrashy 2019).
Although this passage lays out a kind of sequence for Athar Lina’s work, in practice, the
relationship between the different components–ownership, participation, and community
benefit–has been more fluid. Nevertheless, fostering community participation in the
conservation of al-Khalifa’s architectural legacies has been the axis around which Athar Lina’s
activities revolve. As stated on their website, the initiative aims to “establish modalities of
citizen participation in heritage conservation based on an understanding of the monument as a
resource not a burden” (Athar Lina, “About,” n.d.). To that end, the term “citizen participation”
(translated by Megawra as ishrāk al-mugtamaʿ or al-mushārika al-shaʿbiyya) has been deployed
across many of Athar Lina’s activities; however, Megawra’s understanding of what such
participation looks like in practice might best be described as pragmatic.121 In the
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For example, they recently completed a project entitled “Citizen Participation in Historic Cairo” (almusharika al-sha‘abeya fil qahira al-tarikhiya, which translates literally as “Popular Participation in
Historic Cairo”). The initiative, which ran from 2018-2020, focused on “three different urban typologies
in Historic Cairo. It argues that misguided readings of these typologies are mostly because the voice of
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aforementioned talk al-Ibrashy gave at Megawra, she scoffed at “participatory design reports,”
which she said “read like novels” in terms of their “romanticized” depiction of the relationship
between those organizing projects and the local community. She challenged such
representations, contending that while she and her team met with local residents and talked with
them about their needs and concerns, it was not a “romantic” encounter in which they simply
asked the community what they wanted for the neighborhood and then attempted to fulfill their
demands–rather, the goal was to “raise their [Megawra’s] awareness” and then find some
“common ground.” She even went so far as to ask if “participatory design” was possible given
the “hierarchies of participation” (i.e., the fact that, in the final analysis, Megawra held control
over the projects–a reality that no number of meetings with the “local population” would
change).
Despite these reservations, “citizen participation” has remained central to Athar Lina’s
interventions. Indeed, even as Megawra has expanded the initiative’s focus beyond the narrow
purview of heritage management to undertake “urban upgrade activities” (projects tackling other
local concerns such as waste management and access to public space), the organization has
continued to foreground community involvement in Athar Lina’s work. To better understand
how Megawra’s conception of such involvement has played out on the ground, in what follows, I
offer a brief account of a “participatory workshop” co-organized by Athar Lina and Cairo Urban
Sketchers (CUS), a group of architects who have hosted sketching tours across the city and who
have been frequent collaborators with the organization.

the resident is silenced. It brings the resident’s perspective to the foreground, re-examines these
typologies after valourising the resident’s view and proposes alternative approaches, policies and
methodologies for intervention” (Athar Lina, “Projects,” n.d.).
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The workshop was part of a broader intervention to convert an empty lot in Shariʿa Darb
al-Huesr into a sports area and football pitch (i.e., soccer field) for local children.122 Al-Ibrashy
explained to me that the project actually emerged out of the organization’s interest in addressing
waste management in al-Khalifa, which they tried, and failed, to tackle directly. However, after
learning that they had legal access to the empty lot because it was abandoned, and, given that the
community used the land as an unofficial garbage dump, Megawra saw an opportunity to
approach waste management indirectly (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016). The resulting
project, which was sponsored by the Cairo governorate and received funding from the Chipsy
and Pepsi companies formed part of Athar Lina’s “Open Spaces Program” (birnāmeg lil farāghāt
al-ʿama).123 This new program, which began in 2015, aimed to “increase the efficiency of the
urban systems of al-Khalifa [by] upgrading the built environment [for] the benefit of both
residents and cultural heritage” (Athar Lina, “Open Spaces Program,” n.d.). The CUS workshop,
to which I now turn, was just one component of the project; however, it included a gathering
between young professionals and local residents, which is the focus of my narrative.

“Citizen Participation” in Practice: Cairo Urban Sketchers and the Khalifa: A Dream
Workshop
A taxi delivered me to the entrance of Ibn Tulun on a sunny and mild spring afternoon in
May of 2016. The mosque, an imposing structure set back from the road and enclosed by
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For details on the project, see Al-Ahwal and Abushadi 2018.
Al-Ibrashy told me that the collaboration had a snowball effect: after Chipsy donated furniture for the
pitch, they proposed working with Megawra on another sports area, which yielded a new project for the
group. As of 2019, they had worked on three such interventions. Moreover, Megawra had found a way
to link these projects to their long-standing interest in addressing the area’s groundwater problem–
specifically, by developing a system such that the water collected in the process of dewatering local
heritage sites could be cleaned and recirculated to irrigate newly developed green spaces (Al-Ibrashy
2019).
123
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fortress-like walls, was not my final destination, but knowing the narrowness of the streets
behind it, I paid the driver at the building’s gate and made the remainder of my journey on foot.
Picking my way along the familiar route, I walked past stunted, gnarled trees and three- or fourstory apartment buildings on one side, and Bayt al-Kritliya (also known as the Gayer-Anderson
Museum), on the other. At the first intersection, I turned left and walked briskly down a narrow
side street, passing a string of small shops and street vendors selling vegetables and bread and
pausing only briefly when I reached the fruit seller on the corner. After quickly surveying what
he had to offer and noting what I wanted to purchase on my return trip, I crossed Shariʿa alAshraf, keeping to one side of the street in a largely futile attempt to avoid getting in the way of
passing cars and mopeds.
On this particular day, I had come to al-Khalifa to observe the second of a three-day
workshop entitled “Khalifa: A Dream.” The premise of the workshop was to bring young urban
planners, artists, and architects into the neighborhood and have them meet with local community
members to discuss the residents’ dreams for the future of al-Khalifa. The participants
would then use the images and narratives shared during the meeting to create a series of
drawings that would form the basis of a mural, which would be included in the rehabilitation of a
600-square meter lot into a sports area and football pitch (i.e., soccer field) for the neighborhood
children.
I found the organizers and both groups of participants in a street across from the lot.
They were already assembled by the time I arrived–the young professionals, both male and
female, and the local residents, of varying age, but exclusively male and including several
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Image 28. CUS workshop participants visiting the empty lot in Darb al-Huesr. (Credit: author, May
2016.)

individuals whom I recognized from attending Megawra’s other events. They were all seated
around a cluster of tables in the shade of a small building with paper and drawings spread out
before them. There was a palpable sense of enthusiasm on both sides–the local men seemed
eager to talk about their lives in al-Khalifa and everyone else was eager to listen. The
conversation proceeded easily, urged along by a set of questions I had helped CUS to prepare,
addressing residents’ personal histories in the neighborhood as well as their thoughts and
feelings about the area and their aspirations for its future.
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Image 29. CUS workshop participants meeting with local residents. (Credit: author, May 2016.)

Although the dialogue wandered, the residents repeatedly expressed a sense that safety
and security and certain forms of sociability had disappeared from the neighborhood–in large
part because of an exodus of younger residents and a perception of widespread drug dealing. For
some, the “life” of al-Khalifa had been lost: “There is no vitality and life has been killed”
(“mafīsh ḥayāwiyya wa al-dunyā itaʾtil”) announced an older participant who dominated much
of the conversation. Several other residents bemoaned specific changes to the area such as the
closure of the kuttāb (a small school providing an Islamic education), which they saw as
depriving the local children of a valuable resource. This almost visceral sense of nostalgia for a

190

lost community was coupled with an earnestly articulated hope to see “life” returned to the area–
to have families and businesses and public amenities brought back to the community. As one of
the men announced: “We want the neighborhood to work as it did in the past” (“ʿayzīn alminṭaʾa tashāghil zay zaman”).
After the gathering broke up, these evocative expressions of place-attachment were
analyzed and interpreted by the CUS organizers and the workshop participants at a separate
meeting held in al-mustawṣaf. As they sat together, they tried to make sense of the residents’
comments, carefully reviewing what they had been told, and noting the centrality of the past and
the longing for (now) fragmented social networks and forms of community life that had eroded
over the years. They even tried to legitimize what had struck me as a peculiar moment in the
conversation: when the residents were shown pictures of three different houses and asked which
they would prefer to live in, most chose the “hyper-modern” option, which mirrored housing in
the city’s gated communities, and not the one that most closely resembled the buildings in alKhalifa. Their choice caught me off guard, in part because most had expressed a fervent desire
to remain in the neighborhood (and their selection implied relocating to one of Cairo’s satellite
cities). Yet, in the workshop participants’ assessment, there was a logic to it: the residents had
reached their decision by a process of elimination.
This attempt by the CUS organizers and workshop participants to take the residents’
comments seriously, and to validate what might have been considered “incorrect” ideas about the
future of the neighborhood, stayed with me. Though it was just a brief exchange, it struck me as
emblematic of precisely the kind of “participation” Megawra sought to facilitate. Indeed, the
opportunity for dialogue between the residents of al-Khalifa and the young professionals that the
workshop created, and which allowed for the expression of certain views on the built
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environment that did not necessarily align with those of the workshop organizers, was one that I
saw replicated across Megawra’s projects: community members were routinely invited to attend
activities where they were given a chance to share their thoughts and perspectives on the
neighborhood–as well as their memories and experiences of it. Megawra’s aim here appears to
have been to use this “participation” as a vehicle to foster a sense of investment in and
commitment to the targets of these projects.
Significantly, Megawra did not appear to link this sense of commitment to the material
outcomes of residents’ involvement. In other words, while the organization consistently solicited
“community participation” and reflected on what they learned from residents, they did not
always incorporate the latter’s ideas into their actual projects. For example, the mural that CUS
eventually created for the sports area strayed from the conversations and ideas generated during
the workshop I observed. Depicting two historic buildings in the neighborhood, it actually had
little to do with the residents’ commentary about safety and security and their sense of the
neighborhood’s lost vitality.
The CUS workshop is also noteworthy for another, quite different, feature–namely, the
absence of government oversight during the event itself. Although the Cairo governorate
partnered with Megawra on the rehabilitation of the empty lot, no local officials from the
governorate (let alone any state ministries) supervised the event. In this regard, the workshop
stood in sharp contrast to the one organized by CHS (and described in Chapter Three)–all the
more so as CUS and Megawra managed to do what had proved impossible for the CHS
organizers: namely, bring local residents together to meet with the participants. This lack of
government involvement in the day-to-day activities of the workshop was likely due–at least in
part–to the differences in location as well as in focus: the CHS workshop was concerned with a
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registered monument that fell under the direct jurisdiction of the MoA whereas the CUS
workshop was dealing with an empty lot that was the responsibility of the Cairo governorate.
However, I believe it also indexed the relative latitude with which Megawra has been able to
pursue its work in al-Khalifa. As I argue in the next section, this latitude has been one of the
outcomes of the collaborative relationships the organization has established with different state
and municipal agencies.

“Collaboration…Yields a Good Result:” Negotiating with the Egyptian Authorities
At the time of my fieldwork, Megawra was working most closely with the MoA and the
Cairo governorate.124 Indeed, one or the other of the two institutions–and occasionally both–
appear to have sponsored the majority of their work during this period. Al-Ibrashy was frank
about these connections and about Megawra’s efforts to cultivate them: she argued that working
with the authorities was an inevitable necessity–“part of the deal,” as she put it. Yet she did not
necessarily consider these relationships to be unproductive; on the contrary, she told the CHS
workshop participants on their tour of al-Khalifa that “collaboration with [the MoA] yields a
good result” (“al-taʿāwun maʿhum biygīb natīga kwayisa”). She spoke similarly about the
ministry during our interview as well, describing them to me as a “perfect partner” for their
activities given the support they had offered the organization and their willingness to endorse
Athar Lina’s activities. To illustrate her point, she told me that when they were planning the
2016 iteration of “Spend Your Day in Khalifa,” they were very anxious about obtaining the
requisite approval because they had scheduled the event for the fifth anniversary of the January
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In fact, the Built Environment Collective, Megawra’s NGO arm, has a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Cairo governorate, which is intended to facilitate the processing of permit applications for
Megawra’s work in al-Khalifa. Additionally, the governorate has provided Athar Lina with a spot on
their committee dealing with heritage conservation (Al-Ahwal and Abushadi 2018, 306).
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25th Revolution. Though they anticipated the request would be denied (given the date and the
fact that the festival included activities in the street and other public places), in the end, they had
no trouble obtaining the necessary permission–a sign, in al-Ibrashy’s view, of the benefits of
“collaboration” (Personal Interview, May Al-Ibrashy, August 9th, 2016).125
These relationships with the government authorities evolved slowly, however, in a kind
of trial-and-error process. By the time I interviewed al-Ibrashy in 2016, Megawra had already
collaborated with a number of different ministries and government agencies–sometimes with
frustrating results. She angrily relayed to me their experience working with the Ministry of
Housing (MoH) during the aforementioned conservation of the shrine of al-Sayyida Ruqayya.
As she explained, the ministry had failed to fulfill its promise to use some of the funds allotted
for the project to install a dewatering system (critical to addressing the problem of rising
groundwater in the area) and to do some urban landscaping. She then complained that her efforts
to get either the MoA or the Cairo governorate to pressure the MoH had come to naught: while
the governorate was apparently “at odds” with the ministry and unwilling to tangle with them,
the MoA, she suspected, was reluctant to press the MoH because of their own financially
precarious situation. The result, she told me, was that Athar Lina’s work on the shrine had
essentially been undone (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016).
Al-Ibrashy’s criticism was not limited to specific incidents with individual government
agencies–on the contrary, she was often broadly (and openly) critical of the authorities and
official policies that have shaped heritage management and the built environment in al-Khalifa.
During the Q&A of a lecture given at Megawra by an Alexandrian architect, al-Ibrashy asserted
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Though the anecdote was presented as an innocuous demonstration of the advantages of working with
the MoA, the specifics of the context actually suggested to me the kind of ambiguous relationships that
have characterized so much of the Egyptian political landscape.
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that the problems facing residents of Alexandria (and, by extension, Cairo and al-Khalifa) were
the same as those facing urban residents all over the world; elsewhere, however, people were
“dealing with it.” There were solutions, in her view, and they rested with the government and
the effective implementation of laws to regulate urban development. In other words, the
authorities had a role to play in the care and protection of the urban fabric–one that they were
blatantly not fulfilling. This critical stance was apparent in her comments about the
government’s policy of creating “buffer zones” around registered “monuments” and the corollary
impact of the policy on local residents’ connection to (or disconnection from) those buildings.126
It was also evident in her assertion that the government had failed to provide adequate services,
such as waste removal, or address urgent infrastructural issues, such as rising groundwater (a
chronic problem in Historic Cairo and a significant threat to the area’s buildings).
Al-Ibrashy’s criticism even extended to what might be characterized as the government’s
stance vis-à-vis the question of responsibility. In lectures and tours, I heard her repeatedly come
back to the idea that although the government authorities often had good intentions and tried to
implement potentially beneficial plans, their work consistently pushed responsibility for the care
and management of the city onto its muwāṭinīn (citizens). For example, in her 2015 lecture, she
noted that the municipal authorities had suggested that Megawra organize a group of students to
clean the street–rather than acknowledging and taking responsibility for the local waste
management problem themselves. In our interview, she explained this attitude by linking it to
the January 25th Revolution, telling me that the government had appropriated the discourse of
“empowerment” that underpinned the uprising but then flipped the narrative on its head and
claimed it was Egyptians’ responsibility to take care of everything. As she summed it up: “the
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For a critique of this practice of establishing “buffer zones” around registered monuments in Historic
Cairo, see El-Habashi and Abdel Barr 2006.
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government tells people not to shit in the toilet because the sewage is their responsibility”
(Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016).
In practice, balancing this criticism with al-Ibrashy’s belief in the necessity of working
with the authorities has meant walking a fine line between collaborating with different agencies
and officials and not endorsing the fact that the government consistently failed to fulfill its
responsibilities. In other words, Megawra has “tried not to be enablers who allow the
government not to do their work” (Al-Ibrashy, quoted in El Gibaly 2017). At the same time, she
told me that Megawra was “not a pressure group or a watchdog group” and did not assume the
role of “trying to expose or rat out the state.” Thus, while they would certainly “apply pressure
on the government to do its job” (by writing letters to the authorities or mobilizing local residents
to appeal certain issues, or even going directly to the MoA), they studiously avoided undertaking
the government’s work on their behalf (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016). As she asserted
on the CHS walking tour, she believed that they should “never, as an NGO, undertake what the
government is trying to do.”
In short, Megawra has tried to finesse a kind of juggling act. First, the organization has
had to find ways to make their work amenable to the authorities so as to ensure governmental
support. Simultaneously, they have had to limit the scope of that work so as not to take on what
they consider to be the government’s responsibility (but which the government might want the
organization to do on its behalf). Finally, Megawra has tried to maintain their commitment to
working with the local community, which the government has often seen as a threat or a
problem. Further complicating the dynamic is the fact that they have had to navigate the
consequences of their long-term involvement in the community. In this regard, al-Ibrashy told
me that she increasingly found herself solicited by local residents to mediate disputes or solve
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bureaucratic problems. As she noted in the profile of Megawra in Mada Masr: “We discovered
that we now have a role as the voice of the community, which is not something we aspired to at
all” (Al-Ibrashy, quoted in El Gibaly 2017). In our interview though, she bemoaned this
dynamic, telling me that she resented serving as a wāsṭa (a connection or contact with the ability
to pull strings on another’s behalf) for local residents. At the same time, she recognized that the
longer Megawra stayed in the area, the more they would be called on to play this role (Personal
Interview, August 9th, 2016).
Again, the organization has proved adept at negotiating these competing elements in their
work–largely, as I proposed at the outset of this chapter, because they have successfully
determined what tactics are needed to ensure (mostly) smooth interactions with government
agencies and officials.127 According to al-Ibrashy, maintaining a focus on “heritage” has been
one critical tactic: she told me that when they first started Athar Lina, she did not understand
why the initiative took root over the other activities Megawra was pursuing at the time–several
of which had received significant financial support from major funding institutions.128 She
ultimately concluded that the group’s ability to implement projects and “have an impact” hinged
on their having maintained a consistent focus on heritage, which she characterized as one of the
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The role of “enlightened” individual officials in facilitating different activities came up repeatedly
during my fieldwork–for example, Laila Iskander’s involvement with Madd Platform’s project, which
was discussed in Chapter Two. Megawra seems to have recognized the need to seek out such officials as
well. In a recent essay, two staff members wrote that “government partnerships depend on the individuals
within these entities [the MoA and the Cairo governorate] who are proactive, enthusiastic, and support the
collaboration. To continue and strengthen these networks, [Athar Lina] involves these individuals from
governmental entities at the start of projects, inviting them to collaborative workshops, and community
meetings that establish a two-way learning environment” (Al-Ahwal and Abushadi 2018, 306).
128
One such project was an initiative they had begun organizing with Ain Shams University. Funded by
the Ford Foundation, the “applied research” project was designed to help students engage with the
neighborhood around the university, which is known as Abbasiyya. However, by the time Megawra was
ready to begin work, the new regulations on foreign funding were announced, which meant that the Ford
Foundation had to apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for approval. The project foundered
as a result and was eventually abandoned.
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few domains that the government finds “harmless” or “benevolent” (Personal Interview, August
9th, 2016). As she summed it up: their work “gets through” because the MoA “still thinks
heritage is cute” (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016).
In turn, this may explain why Megawra has used Athar Lina as the institutional anchor
for so much of their work–even (or especially) for those projects, such as the aforementioned
Open Spaces Program, that have focused on urban concerns other than “heritage.” The
rehabilitation of the Darb al-Huesr lot was listed as an Athar Lina project, but the only
connection to the area’s “heritage” appears to have been the murals that were included, which the
website describes as depicting the “heritage, myths, and monuments of al-Khalifa” (Athar Lina,
“Open Spaces Program, n.d.). At the same time, the project was, in al-Ibrashy’s view, a means
of tackling the problem of local waste management, which has proved difficult to address with
the authorities. Arguably then, the affiliation with Athar Lina and the emphasis on “heritage”
served as a gloss that allowed Megawra to engage with a more sensitive urban concern.
This last point relates to what I described at the outset of this chapter as Megawra’s
ability to tweak their institutional structure. As I noted earlier, the organization is a multi-part
institution, with different official designations and institutional partnerships. For example, as the
contracting branch of the institution, Megawra is responsible for the conservation activities
because the NGO branch, the Built Environment Collective, cannot undertake such work.
Likewise, Athar Lina is considered a foreign mission (akin to the archaeological missions of the
19th century), which means that it is governed by the laws that regulate those missions–including
those pertaining to funding and security (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016).129 Though
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This could explain why they have been able to continue receiving grants from abroad amidst the
government’s post-uprising targeting of NGOs and CSOs that receive foreign funding (Personal
Interview, August 9th, 2016).
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complex, this structure has given the organization remarkable flexibility, allowing them to forge
partnerships selectively (i.e., they have the ability to pick their collaborators, to an extent),
arrange domestic and international funding, and tackle projects that would have likely proved
impossible had they maintained one institutional format. As al-Ibrashy joked in Mada Masr’s
profile of Megawra: “we have an abundance of names, which is related to how we work in a
context like Egypt. We have to work organically and find the form that suits each situation” (AlIbrashy, quoted in El Gibaly 2017).
In addition to this institutional flexibility and streamlined focus on “heritage,” other
factors that have contributed to Megawra’s successful relationships with the government
authorities include the organization’s ability to obtain external funding for their work and AlIbrashy’s professional background. With regard to funding, al-Ibrashy noted during the CHS
walking tour that although they started with absolutely no resources (to the extent that she was
calling friends to ask for financial contributions), over time, various grants started to trickle in,
and they eventually found themselves with an array of domestic and international sponsors
(including the Ford Foundation, which has been a staunch supporter of Megawra’s work). These
funds have enabled them to underwrite their own activities, which has, in turn, endeared them to
the government–particularly the MoA, which was deprived of its financial resources after
splitting from the Ministry of Culture (MoC) and has thus been more amenable to self-financed
projects (Personal Interview, May al-Ibrashy, August 9th, 2016). (See footnote #77.) With
regard to al-Ibrashy’s background, her experience working as a conservationist in Historic Cairo
has been central to their work in al-Khalifa. This “history,” as one of my interlocutors described
it, has facilitated their negotiations with the government in part because al-Ibrashy is a
recognizable figure but also because some of her former students and employees have gone on to
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work for the agencies with which they now collaborate. For example, al-Ibrashy told me that
they were currently working with an individual from the office of the Cairo governorate who had
previously been her student (Personal Interview, August 9th, 2016). In the Egyptian context,
where having a wāsṭa is a fundamental part of bureaucratic–and even daily– life, such
relationships could have a profound impact on the trajectory of their work.
Megawra’s ability to mobilize these resources while also continually re-calibrating their
focus and the content of their interventions has helped to solidify their relationship with the
various government authorities with whom they work. By drawing on personal networks and
professional experiences, maintaining a degree of institutional fluidity, soliciting external
funding, and showing a willingness to tailor their work and limit the scope of their activities,
they have built a stable relationship, which has, in turn, afforded them a remarkable degree of
freedom to pursue activities in al-Khalifa. Indeed, this latitude has enabled them to sustain–and
even amplify–their focus on “citizen participation” at a moment when the government is
aggressively stamping out any and all traces of “civil society.” The trajectory of their work has
thus run counter to the overwhelming majority of post-uprising sociospatial initiatives in Cairo.
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CONCLUSION
When I first saw the photographs of Maspero that I noted at the outset of Chapter Two, I
had a sudden recollection of the Middle East Studies Association meeting I had attended just a
few months prior, in November of 2018. At the conference, I had presented an early iteration of
my chapter on the Cairo Heritage School and a fuzzy articulation of the argument being made in
this dissertation–namely, that the group’s work constituted an attempt by non-state actors to
foster sociopolitical transformation at the local level. During the Q&A at the end of my panel,
one of the audience members, a researcher at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, directed
a pointed, but plaintive, question at me: “How can you make this argument?” Her puzzlement
concerned what I think she saw as my naïvely optimistic reading of the CHS workshop and my
proposition that the event might augur a substantive shift in the political landscape. How could I
make such a claim when the country had slid backwards into autocracy, when the aspirations of
those involved in the January 25th Revolution had been crushed by a government whose violent
repression of dissent made some long for the halcyon days of Hosni Mubarak’s presidency?
Caught off guard, I sputtered an incoherent reply and let the other panelists steer the conversation
in a new direction.
After the conference, I put the question out of my mind; however, it resurfaced when I
saw the photographs of the aftermath of the government’s demolition of Maspero. The images
laid bare the audience member’s concern–now spatialized in a wholly new way–and generated
further troubling questions about the entire premise of my dissertation: if the government could
obliterate the entire neighborhood in just a few short weeks after Madd Platform’s sustained
effort to save the area and secure the tenancy of its residents, on what grounds could I argue that
the urban-focused initiatives sprouting up across Cairo after the January 25th Revolution
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constituted new spaces and forms of political action? How could I claim these interventions as
“sites of politics” in which local actors–momentarily empowered–were staging an alternative
sociopolitical reality in the present? Moreover, how could I suggest these projects had
transformative potential in the midst of an aggressive resurgence of authoritarianism? These
questions, which have nagged at me over the past eighteen months, were recently echoed by
Dina Wahba (2020), who wrote that to “argue for any kind of change, let alone transformation,
one must be blind to the strong backlash against any attempt to capitalise on the temporary gains
of the revolution. The only story left to be told seems to be one of failure. The utter failure of a
reformist movement to impose even partially its agenda for change” (3).
Although Wahba’s commentary struck a deep chord, part of what I have tried to do in
this dissertation is move away from a conception of the January 25th Revolution as “succeeding”
or “failing” dependent upon its ability to bring about radical, macro-level political change–i.e., to
realize the protestors’ demand for “isqāt al-niẓām” (“the fall of the regime”). This is not, in any
way, to dispute the legitimacy of the attempt; rather, it is to try to think broadly about other
outcomes to the upheaval–and, critically, to treat revolution as a “process rather than an event”
(Abdelrahman 2015, 138). The latter suggestion comes from Abdelrahman’s analysis of the
2011 uprising, in which she writes:
a revolution is a long process of accumulated struggles with moments of victory, defeat
and retreat. A revolution is not one grand moment marking a dramatic break and a
complete rupture with an older order and its instant replacement with a victorious one.
Egypt’s long revolutionary process started well before the 25 January uprising and still
continues. The fact that the uprising did not destroy the old regime and immediately
create a new order is not a testimony to the ‘failure’ or the end of the revolutionary
process. Neither does the fact that this process is still ongoing mean that the revolution
will ‘succeed’ or reach a satisfactory conclusion for those who initiated it. (Abdelrahman
2015, 138)
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I take Abdelrahman’s critique seriously; however, in order to explore its ramifications in the
context of my own research on post-uprising urbanism in Cairo, I have had to make several
theoretical “moves.” First, I have taken up an expanded idea of what counts as “politics” and
where it happens–specifically, the proposition that fostering moments of “communing” or “being
in common” constitute political action. Second, I have leaned into the suggestion that all forms
and spaces of political activity are invariably compromised, inconsistent, and partial–and that
this indeterminacy does not emerge in the course of that activity (as a kind of unwanted or
inevitable byproduct) but rather, is often the very origin point from which it is launched. This
theoretical maneuvering has allowed me to frame an ethnographic account of non-state actors
working in domains that sometimes seem far removed from the realm of “formal politics” as
nonetheless a story of sociopolitical change.
As part of this story, I have argued that Madd Platform, the Cairo Heritage School (CHS),
CLUSTER, and Megawra used the city as a tool through which to begin building an
“infrastructure of politics” amidst a protracted period of political upheaval and instability. This
infrastructure was comprised of several interlocking elements: first, it entailed bringing together
a socioeconomically diverse cross-section of Cairenes and cultivating a sense of connection–or
“being in common”–that transcended class lines. This was partly evident in the way that almost
all of these groups, whose founders and members came from largely middle- and upper-middleclass backgrounds, sought to embed themselves in the local communities with which they
worked. They did this by opening offices in their respective neighborhoods and spending time in
the areas in an attempt to “build trust” with residents and, as Madd Platform put it, overcome
their “outsider” status. It was also apparent in the structure and content of the activities they
pursued–from the walking tours organized by CLUSTER to the annual street festival hosted by
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Megawra to the numerous “professional workshops,” of which the CHS event is only one
example. In all of these contexts, the organizers sought to bring Cairenes of different class
backgrounds into neighborhoods with which they, as outsiders, had previously had little
experience, and, in so doing, to stage opportunities for contact, interaction, and even
collaboration with local residents. These moments of cross-class connection were meant to
challenge–if only briefly–Egypt’s deeply entrenched social stratigraphy.
Cultivating this sense of “being in common” was itself grounded in the belief that urban
residents had a shared stake in the care and protection of the city, and the development of the
latter idea constituted the second component of this “infrastructure of politics.” Again, this
element was illustrated in the work of all of the initiatives described in this dissertation–most
fundamentally, in their emphasis on soliciting the participation of the “local community,” which
formed the ideological backbone of all of their activities. In fact, the very notion of a
“workshop” (warsha), which was used to describe countless projects and activities, indexed this
goal, predicated as it was on the idea that residents had a set of common interests vis-à-vis the
city that they would “work on” together. Significantly though, this belief in having common
interests did not necessarily require agreement as to what those interests might be–let alone how
they should be addressed. CLUSTER’s work on Downtown Cairo’s passages is illustrative in
this regard: in the course of the project, they gave community members and various other
“stakeholders” the opportunity to contest and negotiate elements of the re-design of the
passageways–both with CLUSTER and with each other. Yet CLUSTER was not afraid of the
ensuing conflicts; on the contrary, the organization framed such friction as the very goal of the
project. In their view, contestation was evidence of “urban diplomacy” in action. Indeed, it was
the very seed from which a new political formation might emerge–a reading of their work that is
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in line with the scholarly theorizations of the “political” described in the Introduction, in which
“communing” is not defined by consensus, but rather by dissent and disagreement.
The third element of this infrastructure concerned the cultivation of shared knowledge
about the city–its history, heritage, government bureaucracy–which could be used by various
actors to address urban issues across different contexts. A 2015 workshop co-hosted by
Megawra and Takween (an urban development company noted in Chapter One), distilled this
aim: entitled “Know Your City” (“ʿAref Medinatek”), the event was designed for participants to
“learn the history” of al-Khalifa, but from the perspective of its residents. To that end, staff and
volunteers from the two organizations sat with community members in small groups and had the
latter describe favorite places in and memories of the area, which were then used to
collaboratively generate maps of the neighborhood. Significantly, the trajectory of knowledge
exchange during the workshop was inverted, with the residents providing the information to be
used by the “experts.” Variations on this inversion likewise recurred across the projects
discussed in the preceding chapters–from Nagati’s description of CLUSTER’s methodology as a
“stakeholder approach to design” to al-Ibrashy’s claim that Athar Lina eschewed the notion of
“raising [heritage] awareness” and instead sought out existing expertise in the community (see
footnote #118). Madd Platform also modeled their work on this approach, with one of the
founders telling me that the group had wanted to avoid turning up in Maspero and simply
declaring: “this is what we’re going to do” to redevelop the district. Instead, they wanted to let
the community guide their work–hence, his emphasis on the fact that their projects began only
after residents had initiated contact with the group (Personal Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June
22nd, 2016).
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If this attempt to develop an “infrastructure of politics” through urban-focused
sociospatial initiatives represents the first part of the story I have told in this dissertation, the
second part has pushed back against this narrative. In this latter, I have tried to tease out the
myriad inconsistencies and ambiguities that permeated these projects and variously thwarted and
enabled this undertaking. I located these indeterminacies in the broader political context in
which my interlocutors were working, but I also emphasized their own ambiguous or evolving
ideologies and agendas as well as their sometimes paradoxical interactions with other actors
involved in their initiatives.
The fate of Madd Platform’s work in Maspero is arguably the best example–if also the
most unfortunate–of how these organizations struggled to both stay afloat in the midst of
ongoing political turmoil and maintain some autonomy as the government has sought to re-assert
its own authority. The volatility of the group’s negotiations with the Ministry of Urban Renewal
and Informal Settlements (MURIS) and Madd Platform’s inability to control the outcome of their
work in the face of inter- and intra-ministerial upheaval speak loudly to this struggle. The
demise of their work also underscores the general vulnerability of these organizations. This
vulnerability has meant that many initiatives simply petered out or were never implemented or
ended up in a very different place from the one in which they had begun. Yet these initiatives
were also vulnerable in the day-to-day negotiations with the government authorities, where
dynamics similar to those at work in Madd Platform’s project played out (though often with less
dire consequences). The CHS workshop’s fraught negotiations with the Ministry of Antiquities
(MoA) regarding the details of their event in Historic Cairo, which yielded an unsuccessful
attempt to determine the location of the workshop and to collaborate with a local NGO, is an
instructive example in this regard. Even Megawra, which seemed, at times, immune to the
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shifting positions within the government, faced such challenges. As al-Ibrashy noted: “much of
the work we want to do is postponed or cancelled, and a lot of the work we end up doing, we do
because we can, not because we planned to” (Al-Ibrashy 2019).
With regard to the inconsistencies embedded in the initiatives and their underlying
ideologies, it is perhaps worth noting that it was sometimes difficult to determine, from an
institutional perspective, what these organizations were. The calibrated use of expressions such
as “hub,” “platform,” “school,” and “initiative” to describe the groups often concealed as much
as it revealed. For example, Megawra proved itself a bewilderingly complex entity, comprised
of an NGO, a contracting/consulting firm, and a handful of initiatives and sub-initiatives, all
working together in a shifting constellation of alliances. I have tried to show that, beyond this
institutional murkiness, the groups’ ideological positions were often quite fluid. In particular,
they showed a willingness to compromise with other actors and to adjust their activities in order
to see them move forward. This often created a disconnect between their professed ideological
commitment to “community participation” and the content of their work, which itself betrayed
the power differential embedded in the projects. Indeed, while all of these initiatives
foregrounded this commitment and espoused a “bottom up” approach to their interventions, the
groups still sometimes defaulted to their own view of the “right kind of city” and how it should
be inhabited, used, and protected. This dynamic is perhaps most clearly and simply exemplified
in the debate surrounding the inclusion of benches in CLUSTER’s work on Kodak Passageway.
At the “Re-framing Downtown” conference, Nagati explained that the organization’s response to
the law firm’s concerns about the benches (which the company did not want included in the
redesign of the space) was simply to modify the plan–in short, they re-labeled the seating as
“raised lights” so as to suggest that they were not including any places to sit at all. Disguised,
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the benches thus slipped into the project, allowing CLUSTER to assert their own conception of
public space and what should happen in it. The outcome of the CUS workshop in al-Khalifa is a
second, quite similar, example: though the group was so attentive to the residents’ commentaries
about the neighborhood, none of the latter’s feedback was actually included in the murals the
workshop organizers developed for the Darb al-Huesr Sports Area.
Finally, in terms of the ambiguities of the interactions among different actors, I have
endeavored to track the varied and shifting relationships these organizations developed with both
the government authorities and other non-state groups working in their neighborhoods. In the
context of the CHS workshop, I highlighted what I characterized as the porous boundaries
between the group and the MoA, showing how the two existed in a kind of symbiotic
relationship that sometimes made it difficult to determine whose aims were being realized. This
framing might also be applied to Megawra, whose deep ties to the MoA led one of Madd
Platform’s co-founders to joke that al-Ibrashy had the ministry “working for her” (Personal
Interview, Ahmed Zaazaa, June 8th, 2016). Moreover, the same “blurred boundaries” also
cropped up in CLUSTER’s work with Al Ismaelia, the real estate company buying up properties
in Downtown Cairo. While CLUSTER sometimes collaborated closely with the company (for
example, in the development of the latter’s D-Tour of the district), at other times, the group
seemed to see the company as obstacle to their work. This sentiment was illustrated by Nagati’s
exchange with the men in Phillips Passageway, which is owned by Al Ismaelia. As one of the
men told Nagati: “What you [CLUSTER] are trying to do is damaging their [Al Ismaelia’s]
plans.”
These ambiguities and inconsistencies were endemic to the groups and activities I
observed–and to the post-uprising landscape of sociospatial interventions more generally. Given
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this, the initiatives I tracked in this dissertation were compromised “sites of politics,” whose aim
of fostering new ways of “being in common” was continually challenged or subverted–
sometimes by their I own activities. However, the pervasiveness of this indeterminacy did not
prevent my interlocutors from moving forward with their work; on the contrary, it often served
as the raw material out of which their projects were formed. Herein lies my third claim in this
dissertation–namely, that ambiguity is intrinsic to political life, and as such, is harnessed both as
a technology of rule and a tool to be used in staging political action. While the Egyptian
government deployed it to advance their aim of consolidating power and re-asserting control
over the post-uprising city and its inhabitants, my interlocutors bent it to their own ends,
recognizing that flexibility, a willingness to make concessions, and a comfort in inhabiting grey
zones or interstitial spaces was the only way in which projects could be brought to light at all.
The arc of the preceding ethnographic chapters attempted to illustrate this idea: the more my
interlocutors leaned into indeterminacy, inconsistency, and compromise, the further they were
able to push their activities and the better equipped they were to weather the vagaries and
rigidities of the Egyptian authorities.
Yet this pattern begs the question: if their work was compromised, partial, paradoxical,
where does this leave the attempt to build an “infrastructure of politics?” I would suggest the
answer lies with the repetition and accretion of activity over time–the continual staging and restaging of opportunities for urban residents to come together and “commune.” With the
exception of Madd Platform, all of the initiatives discussed in this dissertation have continued
with their work. Even the Cairo Heritage School, whose workshop director despaired that their
efforts had simply been an exercise in “digging in the water,” has persisted. In spite of his
frustration, the group organized a second workshop in the summer of 2019, shifting to focus on
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al-Madrassa al-Saliheyya, a thirteenth century school located on Shariʿa al-Muʿizz , but
continuing to emphasize both adaptive reuse and the local community as central features of the
event. I think this tenacity is not to be overlooked. However small in scale or brief in duration,
the repetition of these moments of “being in common” mark an unsettling of the sociopolitical
status quo–one that has the potential, over time and space, to transform how residents relate to
the city, to the built environment, and to each other.
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